scholarly journals CEO Compensation Structure and Firm Performance

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoltan P. Matolcsy ◽  
Anna Wright
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Compensation Structure

scholarly journals CEO compensation structure and firm performance

2010 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 745-763 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoltan Matolcsy ◽  
Anna Wright
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Compensation Structure

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

CEO compensation, firm performance and operational characteristics

2008 ◽  
Vol 34 (8) ◽  
pp. 562-584 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud M. Nourayi ◽  
Frank P. Daroca
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Operational Characteristics

scholarly journals CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: The Role of ESG Transparency

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 278
Author(s):  
Chetna Rath ◽  
Florentina Kurniasari ◽  
Malabika Deo
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

Chief executive officers (CEOs) of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) firms are known to take lesser pay and engage themselves in corporate social responsibility activities to achieve the dual objective of the enhancement of firm’s performance as well as benefit for stakeholders in the long run. This study examines the role of ESG transparency in strengthening the impact of firm performance on total CEO pay in ESG firms. A panel of 67 firms for the period of 2014–2019 has been analyzed using the two-step system GMM model, with NSE Nifty 100 ESG Index as the data sample and ESG scores from Bloomberg database as a proxy for transparency. Findings reveal that environmental and governance disclosure scores have the potential to intensify the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, while social disclosure scores do not. In addition, various firm-specific, board-specific, and CEO-specific attributes have also been considered controls affecting remuneration. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of exhibiting ESG transparency and its nexus with CEO pay as well as firm performance.

scholarly journals Corporate Payout Policy and CEO Compensation Structure

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Lee-Hsien Pan ◽  
Thomas Barkley ◽  
Shaio-Yan Huang
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Share Repurchases ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Total Compensation ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Leverage Ratio ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Investment Projects

This paper examines how corporate payout policy is affected by CEO compensation structure using data from more than 1,600 firms during 1992-2006. Specifically, it studies the effects of CEO compensation structure, firm characteristics, and dividend payout policies on dividend type and relative dividend size.It finds CEO salary is positively associated with cash dividends, share repurchases, and relative dividend size whereas CEO salary (compared to bonus) as a percentage of total compensation has negative effects on cash dividends and share repurchases. It also discovers CEO stock awards as a percentage of total compensation are positively associated with share repurchases and CEO option awards are negatively related to cash dividends.In addition, this paper shows larger firms and firms with more free cash flow distribute more cash dividends and share repurchases. On the other hand, firms with higher leverage ratio and more investment opportunities prefer to save earnings for future re-investment projects. Finally, it show dividend payout policy (either cash dividends or share repurchases) increases relative dividend size. The results of this study suggest that CEO compensation components affect CEOs’ dividend payout decisions: when CEOs’ stock award increases, they prefer to use share repurchases; when CEOs’ option award increases, they prefer not to use cash dividends.

Accounting and Stock Price Performance in Dynamic CEO Compensation Arrangements

2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Boschen ◽  
Augustine Duru ◽  
Lawrence A. Gordon ◽  
Kimberly J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Financial Gain ◽  
Price Performance ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Initial Effect ◽  
Ceo Pay

In this study we examine the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO compensation. We find that unexpectedly good accounting performance is initially associated with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect soon reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. Overall, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good accounting performance is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock price performance is associated with increases in CEO pay for several years. Thus, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good stock price performance is positive and significant.

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