scholarly journals Capital Market Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses in China

2014 ◽  
Vol null (58) ◽  
pp. 183-199
Author(s):  
딩마오 ◽  
Chong-Kil Nah
2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlene A. Plumlee ◽  
Teri Lombardi Yohn

ABSTRACT A restatement suggests the existence of managerial errors and internal control weaknesses within the company. Disclosures of restatements highlight ineffective management and control systems such that management might act strategically in disclosing restatement and choose less transparent options. There are, however, external forces that likely encourage management to provide more transparent restatement disclosures, despite the fact that managerial ineffectiveness will be publicized. We examine the association between company and restatement characteristics and management's restatement filing choices to provide insight into external economic forces driving the choice. We document that more transparent filing is positively associated with the materiality of the restatement, an SEC investigation, the reporting of material internal control weaknesses, and leverage, and negatively associated with a CEO change. We also find that restatements filed via 8-Ks and via 10-K/As, after the SEC rule clarification in August 2004, are associated with significantly more negative market reactions than other restatements.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 705-710
Author(s):  
Mohamad Heykal

Insider trading is a violation in the capital market. When it is ignored it can provide problems for the capital market industry in one country. Instead, the attempt to prove insider trading is difficult; and up to now handling the problems has many made use of the various provisions contained in Law No 8 of 1995. Research through the literature study relating to insider trading shows that insider trading is a violation of the principle of transparency existing in the capital market and is also difficult to prove. This study shows that there are several supporting factors to include insider trading. They are the insiders, material information and having not been announced to the public, as well as internal control weaknesses.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Gao ◽  
Kenneth J. Merkley ◽  
Joseph Pacelli ◽  
Joseph H. Schroeder

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yangyang Chen ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Vijaya Bhaskar Marisetty ◽  
Cameron Truong ◽  
Madhu Veeraraghavan

SUMMARY In this paper, we investigate whether board independence has an impact on the likelihood that a company reports weaknesses in internal controls. Using a sample of 11,226 firm-year observations spanning the period 2004–2012, we establish several findings. First, we document a negative relation between board independence and the disclosure of internal control weaknesses. We also document that the negative relation is stronger for firms with unitary leadership (combined positions of CEO and chairman) than for firms with dual leadership. Next, we show that board independence is associated with both fewer account-specific and company-level weaknesses. Finally, we show that board independence is associated with timely remediation of internal control weaknesses and that the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 5 in 2007 weakens the effect of board independence on the disclosure of ICW. JEL Classifications: G10; G18.


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