Market Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and to the Characteristics of those Weaknesses under Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002

Author(s):  
Jacqueline S. Hammersley ◽  
Linda A. Myers ◽  
Catherine Shakespeare
2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy L. Harp ◽  
Beau Grant Barnes

ABSTRACT This study examines internal control weaknesses (ICWs) reported under Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 302 in the context of mergers and acquisitions. We predict that problems in an acquirer's internal control environment have adverse operational implications for acquisition performance. We argue that acquirers with low-quality internal information needed to select profitable acquisitions will make poorer acquisition decisions. We also argue that ICWs impede effective monitoring and are likely to hinder integration tasks that are important to acquisition profitability. We find that ICWs disclosed prior to an acquisition announcement predict significantly lower post-acquisition operating performance and abnormal stock returns. Poorer post-acquisition performance is concentrated in ICWs that are expected to impede acquisition activities (i.e., forecasting/valuation, monitoring, and integration). Our findings contribute to the literature linking ineffective internal control over financial reporting to negative operational outcomes. We also contribute to the SOX cost-benefit debate by documenting a previously unidentified benefit of ICW disclosures.


2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan M. Albring ◽  
Randal J. Elder ◽  
Xiaolu Xu

We investigate whether prior year unexpected audit fees help predict new material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Predicting material weaknesses may be useful to investors and other financial statement users because these disclosures have adverse economic impacts on disclosing firms. Unexpected fees are significantly associated with material weaknesses reported under Section 404, even after controlling for Section 302 disclosures and other factors associated with internal control weaknesses. Unexpected fees are associated with company-level weaknesses but are not significantly associated with account-specific weaknesses, consistent with differences in the nature and severity of the two types of material weaknesses. Our results are consistent with unexpected audit fees containing information on unobserved audit costs and client control risks, which help predict future internal control weaknesses.


2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Huajing Chen ◽  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Heibatollah Sami ◽  
Haiyan Zhou

SUMMARY Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires managers to assess, and their auditors to express an opinion on, the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). Policymakers expect the ICFR audits to enhance the credibility of firms' financial statements. Prior research argues that audit characteristics that enhance the credibility of financial reporting are associated with stronger earnings-return associations. We examine whether earnings accompanied by the first-time Section 404 ICFR reports were associated with higher informativeness compared with earnings in the prior year when only financial statement audit reports were available. We conduct our analysis for a test sample of accelerated filers with clean ICFR reports and clean previous Section 302 disclosures. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare the change in earnings informativeness for the test sample with that for a control sample of non-accelerated filers. We find that earnings informativeness for companies with clean internal control reports was greater in the Section 404 adoption year than in the previous year, while there was no change in earnings informativeness for the non-accelerated filers. Also, there is no difference in the increase in earnings informativeness across firms with small and large compliance costs (measured by change in audit fees), suggesting that both groups benefited from the Section 404 ICFR audits.


2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard

This paper extends prior research on audit risk adjustment by examining the association of audit pricing with problems in internal control over financial reporting, disclosed under Sections 404 and 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX]. While studies of auditors' responses to internal control risk provide mixed evidence, it is important to re-examine this issue using data on specific client problems not available prior to SOX. As a baseline, we first establish a strong association of audit fees with internal control problems disclosed in the first year of implementation of Section 404, consistent with prior research (e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006). We then address two issues on which prior results are contradictory. In a broadly based sample of accelerated filers, we find that audit pricing for companies with internal control problems varies by problem severity, when severity is measured either as material weaknesses versus significant deficiencies, or by nature of the problem. Also, while audit fees increase during the 404 period, our tests show less relative risk adjustment under Section 404 than under Section 302 in the prior year. Further examining intertemporal effects, we find that companies disclosing internal control problems under Section 302 continue to pay higher fees the following year, even if no problems are disclosed under Section 404. Overall, our findings provide detailed insight into audit risk adjustment during the initial period of SOX implementation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 363-390
Author(s):  
Kathleen Rupley

From a sample of firms reporting internal control deficiencies (ICD), I compare corporate governance structures to industry, exchange, and size – matched firms. I examine market reactions to reports of ICDs in 8-K filings. Additionally, I examine shifts in corporate governance characteristics since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Results indicate that weaker boards, larger audit committees, less independent nominating committees, and high growth companies are associated with ICDs. Market reaction is negative to ICD disclosures when they are associated with controls over revenue. Firms have made changes post-SOX including reduced non-audit services, more frequent audit committee meetings, formation of nominating and governance committees, creation of internal audit functions, and implementation of corporate governance policies.


2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lemuria D. Carter ◽  
Brandis Phillips ◽  
Porche Millington

Since the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002, companies have begun to place more emphasis on information technology (IT) internal controls. IT internal controls are policies that provide assurance that technical systems operate as intended, provide reliable data, and comply with regulations. Research suggests that firms with strong internal controls perform better than those with internal control weaknesses. In this study, the authors evaluate the impact of IT internal controls on firm performance. The sample includes 72 publicly traded firms, 36 that reported IT internal control weaknesses and 36 that did not. The results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression indicate that substantive IT internal control weaknesses negatively impact firm performance. Results and implications for research and practice are discussed.


2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kam C. Chan ◽  
Barbara Farrell ◽  
Picheng Lee

SUMMARY: The main objectives of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure. Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the external auditor has to report an assessment of the firm’s internal controls and attest to management’s assessment of the firm’s internal controls. Material weaknesses in internal controls must be disclosed in the auditor and management reports. The objective of this study is to examine if firms reporting material internal control weaknesses under Section 404 have more earnings management compared to other firms. The results provide mild evidence that there are more positive and absolute discretionary accruals for firms reporting material internal control weaknesses than for other firms. Since the findings of ineffective internal controls by auditors under Section 404 may cause firms to improve their internal controls, Section 404 has the potential benefits of reducing the opportunity of intentional and unintentional accounting errors and of improving the quality of reported earnings.


2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 839-867 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udi Hoitash ◽  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Jean C. Bedard

ABSTRACT: This study examines the association between corporate governance and disclosures of material weaknesses (MW) in internal control over financial reporting. We study this association using MW reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Sections 302 and 404, deriving data on audit committee financial expertise from automated parsing of member qualifications from their biographies. We find that a lower likelihood of disclosing Section 404 MW is associated with relatively more audit committee members having accounting and supervisory experience, as well as board strength. Further, the nature of MW varies with the type of experience. However, these associations are not detectable using Section 302 reports. We also find that MW disclosure is associated with designating a financial expert without accounting experience, or designating multiple financial experts. We conclude that board and audit committee characteristics are associated with internal control quality. However, this association is only observable under the more stringent requirements of Section 404.


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