Disclosure of internal control weaknesses and the capital market valuation of earnings surprise after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Wang
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Market Valuation ◽  
Earnings Surprise ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
The Capital Market

scholarly journals Insider Trading dan Pelanggaran Atas Prinsip Keterbukaan dalam Pasar Modal

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 705-710
Author(s):  
Mohamad Heykal
Keyword(s):  
Insider Trading ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
The Public ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Material Information ◽  
The Capital Market

Insider trading is a violation in the capital market. When it is ignored it can provide problems for the capital market industry in one country. Instead, the attempt to prove insider trading is difficult; and up to now handling the problems has many made use of the various provisions contained in Law No 8 of 1995. Research through the literature study relating to insider trading shows that insider trading is a violation of the principle of transparency existing in the capital market and is also difficult to prove. This study shows that there are several supporting factors to include insider trading. They are the insiders, material information and having not been announced to the public, as well as internal control weaknesses.

The Impact of Information Technology Internal Controls on Firm Performance

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lemuria D. Carter ◽  
Brandis Phillips ◽  
Porche Millington
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Performance Results ◽  
The Impact

Since the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002, companies have begun to place more emphasis on information technology (IT) internal controls. IT internal controls are policies that provide assurance that technical systems operate as intended, provide reliable data, and comply with regulations. Research suggests that firms with strong internal controls perform better than those with internal control weaknesses. In this study, the authors evaluate the impact of IT internal controls on firm performance. The sample includes 72 publicly traded firms, 36 that reported IT internal control weaknesses and 36 that did not. The results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression indicate that substantive IT internal control weaknesses negatively impact firm performance. Results and implications for research and practice are discussed.

scholarly journals Internal Control Weaknesses and Acquisition Performance

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy L. Harp ◽  
Beau Grant Barnes
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Acquisition Performance ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Abnormal Stock Returns ◽  
Internal Information ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Section 302

ABSTRACT This study examines internal control weaknesses (ICWs) reported under Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 302 in the context of mergers and acquisitions. We predict that problems in an acquirer's internal control environment have adverse operational implications for acquisition performance. We argue that acquirers with low-quality internal information needed to select profitable acquisitions will make poorer acquisition decisions. We also argue that ICWs impede effective monitoring and are likely to hinder integration tasks that are important to acquisition profitability. We find that ICWs disclosed prior to an acquisition announcement predict significantly lower post-acquisition operating performance and abnormal stock returns. Poorer post-acquisition performance is concentrated in ICWs that are expected to impede acquisition activities (i.e., forecasting/valuation, monitoring, and integration). Our findings contribute to the literature linking ineffective internal control over financial reporting to negative operational outcomes. We also contribute to the SOX cost-benefit debate by documenting a previously unidentified benefit of ICW disclosures.

Earnings Management of Firms Reporting Material Internal Control Weaknesses under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kam C. Chan ◽  
Barbara Farrell ◽  
Picheng Lee
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Reported Earnings

SUMMARY: The main objectives of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure. Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the external auditor has to report an assessment of the firm’s internal controls and attest to management’s assessment of the firm’s internal controls. Material weaknesses in internal controls must be disclosed in the auditor and management reports. The objective of this study is to examine if firms reporting material internal control weaknesses under Section 404 have more earnings management compared to other firms. The results provide mild evidence that there are more positive and absolute discretionary accruals for firms reporting material internal control weaknesses than for other firms. Since the findings of ineffective internal controls by auditors under Section 404 may cause firms to improve their internal controls, Section 404 has the potential benefits of reducing the opportunity of intentional and unintentional accounting errors and of improving the quality of reported earnings.

Investor reactions to restatements conditional on disclosure of internal control weaknesses

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiwen Li ◽  
You-il Park ◽  
Jinyoung Wynn
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Abnormal Stock Returns ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate investor reactions to financial restatements conditional on disclosures of internal control weaknesses under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Design/methodology/approach The research uses cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) as a proxy for investor reactions. Restatements and internal control reports are available on audit analytics. Multivariate regression analyses were used for testing. Findings Using a sample of restating firms whose original misstatements are linked to underlying internal control weaknesses, the research finds that cumulative abnormal returns for firms disclosing internal control weaknesses in a timely manner is negative in a three-day window around the restatement announcements. The finding indicates that restatements with early disclosure of internal control weaknesses provide more persuasive evidence of the ineffectiveness of a firm’s internal control over financial reporting, rather than early disclosure lowering the information asymmetry between a firm and investors. Research limitations/implications This study employs CARs to examine the market reaction to restatements conditional on disclosure of internal control weaknesses. Practical implications Further study on reactions by creditors who have access to private information on firms could extend the implications of the finding. Originality/value The study contributes to the existing research by documenting that early disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control affects investors’ reactions to financial restatements.

scholarly journals Internal Control Weakness and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 1157-1188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Byron Y. Song ◽  
Liandong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Loan Spread ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Loan Contracting ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Loan Contract

ABSTRACT Using a sample of borrowing firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this study compares various features of loan contracts between firms with ICW and those without ICW. Our results show the following. First, the loan spread is higher for ICW firms than for non-ICW firms by about 28 basis points, after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Second, firms with more severe, company-level ICW pay significantly higher loan rates than those with less severe, account-level ICW. Third, lenders impose tighter nonprice terms on firms with ICW than on those without ICW. Fourth, fewer lenders are attracted to loan contracts involving firms with ICW. Finally, our within-firm analyses show that banks increase loan rates charged to ICW firms after their disclosure of internal control problems and that banks reduce loan rates after firms remediate previously reported ICW.

SOX 404 Reported Internal Control Weaknesses: A Test of COSO Framework Components and Information Technology

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie K. Klamm ◽  
Marcia Weidenmier Watson
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
First Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Assessment And Monitoring ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses

ABSTRACT: This paper examines internal controls, from both an information technology (IT) and non-IT perspective, in relation to the five components of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization's Internal Control-Integrated Framework (COSO 1992), as well as the achievement of one of COSO's three objectives-reporting reliability. Our sample consists of 490 firms with material weaknesses reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 during the first year of compliance. We classify the weaknesses by COSO component and as IT-related or non-IT-related. Our results support the interrelationships of the COSO Framework. The results also show that the number of misstated accounts is positively related to the number of weak COSO components (i.e., scope) and certain weak COSO components (i.e., existence). Firms with IT-related weak components report more material weaknesses and misstatements than firms without IT-related weak components, providing evidence on the pervasive negative impact of weak IT controls, especially in control environment, risk assessment, and monitoring.

Economic Determinants and Consequences of the Proactive Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and Remediation Progress in IPOs

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudipta Basu ◽  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Jong Eun Lee ◽  
Yinqi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Going Public ◽  
Economic Determinants ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This study investigates (1) why some IPO firms proactively disclose internal control weaknesses (ICWs) and remediation progress in their prospectuses before going public, despite being exempt from the requirements of Sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act at the time of IPO, and (2) the association of such disclosures with IPO underpricing (i.e., the first-day return). We find that IPO firms that proactively disclose ICWs and remediation progress have higher litigation risk, are audited by industry specialist auditors, and are more likely to have audit committees prior to the IPO, compared with firms that do not disclose such information, after controlling for the ex ante probability of having ICWs. IPO underpricing is lower for firms that disclose ICWs and remediation progress, consistent with the conjecture that the disclosure of ICWs and remediation progress signals extensive premarket due diligence, thus reducing the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. JEL Classifications: G24; K22; M13; M41; M42; M49.

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