Dual-Process Models in Sociology: Reflections and Potential

AbstractThe model of addiction proposed by Redish et al. shows a lack of fit with recent data and models in psychological studies of addiction. In these dual process models, relatively automatic appetitive processes are distinguished from explicit goal-directed expectancies and motives, whereas these are all grouped together in the planning system in the Redish et al. model. Implications are discussed.

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Dual Process Models of Health Behavior

Encyclopedia of Behavioral Medicine ◽

10.1007/978-3-030-39903-0_300551 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 703-703

Keyword(s):

Health Behavior ◽

Process Models ◽

Dual Process ◽

Dual Process Models

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Is Biased Processing of Strong Attitudes Peripheral? An Extension of the Dual Process Models of Attitude Change

Psychological Reports ◽

10.2466/pr0.1999.85.2.589 ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 85 (2) ◽

pp. 589-605 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Eun-Yeong Na

Keyword(s):

Attitude Change ◽

Resistance To Change ◽

Process Models ◽

Dual Process ◽

Attitude Strength ◽

Extended Model ◽

Main Hypothesis ◽

Dual Process Models ◽

Boomerang Effect ◽

Biased Processing

It was suggested that the dual process models of attitude change should be extended to include the biased processing of strong attitudes. The main hypothesis of the extended model is that too much involvement intrinsic in strong attitudes may hinder objective processing, resulting in resistance to change even under strong message. Both attitude change and cognitive response measures in a 3 (attitude strength) x 2 (message quality) factorial design experiment supported the extended model. Only the holders of moderate attitudes showed greater attitude change when given a strong, rather than a weak, message. When given a strong message, holders of strong attitudes showed a boomerang effect by generating relatively greater counter-arguments (implying a central but biased processing with high motivation) in contrast with holders of weak attitudes who generated indifferent appeals and greater change in attitude regardless of the quality of the argument (implying a peripheral processing with low motivation).

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Single- and Dual-Process Models of Biased Contingency Detection

Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie) ◽

10.1027/1618-3169/a000309 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 63 (1) ◽

pp. 3-19 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Miguel A. Vadillo ◽

Fernando Blanco ◽

Ion Yarritu ◽

Helena Matute

Keyword(s):

Process Models ◽

Dual Process ◽

Contingency Learning ◽

Contingency Detection ◽

Dual Process Models ◽

Dependent Variables ◽

Single Process

Abstract. Decades of research in causal and contingency learning show that people’s estimations of the degree of contingency between two events are easily biased by the relative probabilities of those two events. If two events co-occur frequently, then people tend to overestimate the strength of the contingency between them. Traditionally, these biases have been explained in terms of relatively simple single-process models of learning and reasoning. However, more recently some authors have found that these biases do not appear in all dependent variables and have proposed dual-process models to explain these dissociations between variables. In the present paper we review the evidence for dissociations supporting dual-process models and we point out important shortcomings of this literature. Some dissociations seem to be difficult to replicate or poorly generalizable and others can be attributed to methodological artifacts. Overall, we conclude that support for dual-process models of biased contingency detection is scarce and inconclusive.

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