Punishment insensitivity in humans is due to failures in instrumental contingency learning

Punishment maximises the probability of our individual survival by reducing behaviours that cause us harm, and also sustains trust and fairness in groups essential for social cohesion. However, some individuals are more sensitive to punishment than others and these differences in punishment sensitivity have been linked to a variety of decision-making deficits and psychopathologies. The mechanisms for why individuals differ in punishment sensitivity are poorly understood, although recent studies of conditioned punishment in rodents highlight a key role for punishment contingency detection (Jean-Richard-Dit-Bressel et al., 2019). Here, we applied a novel ‘Planets and Pirates’ conditioned punishment task in humans, allowing us to identify the mechanisms for why individuals differ in their sensitivity to punishment. We show that punishment sensitivity is bimodally distributed in a large sample of normal participants. Sensitive and insensitive individuals equally liked reward and showed similar rates of reward-seeking. They also equally disliked punishment and did not differ in their valuation of cues that signalled punishment. However, sensitive and insensitive individuals differed profoundly in their capacity to detect and learn volitional control over aversive outcomes. Punishment insensitive individuals did not learn the instrumental contingencies, so they could not withhold behaviour that caused punishment and could not generate appropriately selective behaviours to prevent impending punishment. These differences in punishment sensitivity could not be explained by individual differences in behavioural inhibition, impulsivity, or anxiety. This bimodal punishment sensitivity and these deficits in instrumental contingency learning are identical to those dictating punishment sensitivity in non-human animals, suggesting that they are general properties of aversive learning and decision-making.

Punishment insensitivity in humans is due to failures in instrumental contingency learning

Punishment maximises the probability of our individual survival by reducing behaviours that cause us harm, and also sustains trust and fairness in groups essential for social cohesion. However, some individuals are more sensitive to punishment than others and these differences in punishment sensitivity have been linked to a variety of decision-making deficits and psychopathologies. The mechanisms for why individuals differ in punishment sensitivity are poorly understood, although recent studies of conditioned punishment in rodents highlight a key role for punishment contingency detection (Jean-Richard-dit-Bressel et al., 2019). Here we applied a novel “Planets & Pirates” conditioned punishment task in humans, allowing us to identify the mechanisms for why individuals differ in their sensitivity to punishment. We show that punishment sensitivity is bimodally distributed in a large sample of normal participants. Sensitive and insensitive individuals equally liked reward and showed similar rates of reward-seeking. They also equally disliked punishment and did not differ in their valuation of cues that signalled punishment. However, sensitive and insensitive individuals differed profoundly in their capacity to detect and learn volitional control over aversive outcomes. Punishment insensitive individuals did not learn the instrumental contingencies, so they could not withhold behaviour that caused punishment and could not generate appropriately selective behaviours to prevent impending punishment. These differences in punishment sensitivity could not be explained by individual differences in behavioural inhibition, impulsivity, or anxiety. This bimodal punishment sensitivity and these deficits in instrumental contingency learning are identical to those dictating punishment sensitivity in non-human animals, suggesting that they are general properties of aversive learning and decision making.

Basic capacity for social contingency detection continues to develop across adolescence

The main focus on individual social cognition in adolescence has prevented the study of the fundamental capacity to detect and respond to social cues, as this requires capturing interaction dynamics within dyads. To improve our understanding of basic social capacity development across adolescence, we used the Perceptual Crossing Experiment (PCE), to assess real-time social interaction in pairs of 208 adolescents. In comparing early, mid, and late adolescence, we found an overall higher performance of late adolescents on behavioural and cognitive measures of basic social capacity, while the reported awareness of implicitly established social interaction was overall lower in this group. In addition, late adolescents demonstrated faster improvement of behaviour throughout the experiment, compared with the other groups. Our results indicate that basic social capacity continues to develop throughout adolescence, which is expressed by faster social coordination on a behavioural level. This finding underscores dynamic social interaction within dyads as a new opportunity for identifying altered social development during adolescence.

Punishment insensitivity emerges from impaired contingency detection, not aversion insensitivity or reward dominance

Our behaviour is shaped by its consequences – we seek rewards and avoid harm. It has been reported that individuals vary markedly in their avoidance of detrimental consequences, that is in their sensitivity to punishment. The underpinnings of this variability are poorly understood; they may be driven by differences in aversion sensitivity, motivation for reward, and/or instrumental control. We examined these hypotheses by applying several analysis strategies to the behaviour of rats (n = 48; 18 female) trained in a conditioned punishment task that permitted concurrent assessment of punishment, reward-seeking, and Pavlovian fear. We show that punishment insensitivity is a unique phenotype, unrelated to differences in reward-seeking and Pavlovian fear, and due to a failure of instrumental control. Subjects insensitive to punishment are afraid of aversive events, they are simply unable to change their behaviour to avoid them.

Punishment insensitivity emerges from impaired contingency detection, not aversion insensitivity or reward dominance

Our behaviour is shaped by its consequences – we seek rewards and avoid harm. It has been reported that individuals vary markedly in their avoidance of detrimental consequences, i.e. in their sensitivity to punishment. The underpinnings of this variability are poorly understood; they may be driven by differences in aversion sensitivity, motivation for reward, and/or instrumental control. We examined these hypotheses by applying several analysis strategies to the behaviour of rats (n = 48; 18 female) trained in a task permitting concurrent assessment of punishment, reward-seeking, and Pavlovian fear. We show that punishment insensitivity is a unique phenotype, unrelated to differences in reward-seeking and Pavlovian fear, and due to a failure of instrumental control. Subjects insensitive to punishment are afraid of aversive events, they are simply unable to change their behaviour to avoid them.