scholarly journals Why Hope Cannot Be an Intellectual Virtue: Rationality of Hope Considered from an Analytic Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-37
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz
Keyword(s):  
Rational Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Standard Account ◽  
Recent Account

There are two aims of the paper. The first is to critically analyse the claim that hope can be regarded as an intellectual virtue, as proposed by Nancy E. Snow (2013) in her recent account of hope set within the project of regulative epistemology. The second aim is to explore the problem of rationality of hope. Section one of the paper explains two different interpretations of the key notion of hope and discusses certain features to be found in hope-that and hope-in. Section two addresses the question of whether hope could be interpreted as an intellectual virtue. To develop an argument against that view, a brief account of the notion of epistemic virtue is provided. Section three analyses the problem of rationality of hope and the parallels between rational belief and rational hope; the section focuses on what exactly makes a particular hope-that a rational and justified hope. Belief that p is possible/probable is part of the meaning of hope that p; therefore, it is assumed that rationality of hope cannot be considered in isolation from rationality of belief. It is argued that the “standard account” of the reasonableness of hope, which is found in the analytic literature, does not meet the standards of epistemic responsibility and needs rectifying.

QUASI-EVIDENTIALISM: INTERESTS, JUSTIFICATION AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUE

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karyn L. Freedman
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Doxastic Voluntarism ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
Normative Status ◽  
Relative Theory

AbstractIn this paper I argue against what I call ‘strict evidentialism’, the view that evidence is the sole factor for determining the normative status of beliefs. I argue that strict evidentialism fails to capture the uniquely subjective standpoint of believers and as a result it fails to provide us with the tools necessary to apply its own epistemic norms. In its place I develop an interest-relative theory of justification which I call quasi-evidentialism, according to which S has a justified belief that P at time t if and only if S's evidence at time t supports P in proportion to S's interest in P. I take interests as fixed and argue that adjusting our confidence in a proposition in the right way, given our interests, is fine-tuned through the exercise of intellectual virtue, in particular the virtue of epistemic conscientiousness. This theory refocuses epistemic responsibility in the subject and by locating agency in the cultivation of epistemic virtue it also provides a handy solution to the problem of doxastic voluntarism, insofar as the development of our epistemic virtue guides our responsiveness to reason.

Epistemic Virtue of Wisdom and Evidentialism

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 196-208
Author(s):  
Kirill V. Karpov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Objective Knowledge ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Historical Case

My primary concern in this article is the connection between virtue epistemology and evidentialism. This possible connection is analyzed upon, firstly, the example of the intellectual virtue of wisdom, and, secondly, the historical case – Thomas Aquinas’ approach to virtue of wisdom as an intellectual disposition (habitus). I argue that it is possible to offer such an interpretation of ‘intellectual virtue’ that aligns with the peripatetic tradition broadly understood (to which the epistemology of virtues ascends), and on the basis of which an evidentialist theory of justification is offered. In the first part of the paper, I briefly present the main interpretations of virtue epistemology and evidentialism in the light of externalism/internalism debate. In the second part I discuss Aquinas’ understanding of intellectual virtue as a disposition (habitus). The main concern here are virtues of theoretical habitus – wisdom and (scientific) knowledge. I show that habitus in this case is understood in two ways: as an ability, inherent to human beings, and as objective knowledge. Thus, there are two understandings of wisdom – as a virtue and knowledge (scientia). Finally, in the concluding parts of the paper, I outline possible ways of solving presented in the first part challenges to evidentialism and internalism.

THE VIRTUE OF CURIOSITY

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lewis Ross
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

ABSTRACTA thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicating the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, a number of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In this paper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuous curiosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate my account in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sort of motivations are required for epistemic virtue? And do epistemic virtues need to be reliable? I will sketch an account on which curiosity is only virtuous when rooted in a non-instrumental appreciation of epistemic goods, before arguing that curiosity can exhibit intellectual virtue irrespective of whether one is reliable in satisfying it.

scholarly journals Are knowledgeable voters better voters?

2022 ◽  
pp. 1470594X2110650
Author(s):  
Michael Hannon
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Thinking ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Informed Citizenry ◽  
The One ◽  
Political Decisions

It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals tend to be the most partisan and the strength of partisan identity tends to corrupt political thinking. This creates a conundrum. On the one hand, an informed citizenry is allegedly necessary for a democracy to flourish. On the other hand, the most knowledgeable and passionate voters are also the most likely to think in corrupted, biased ways. What to do? This paper examines this tension and draws out several lessons. First, it is not obvious that more knowledgeable voters will make better political decisions. Second, attempts to remedy voter ignorance are problematic because partisans tend to become more polarized when they acquire more information. Third, solutions to citizen incompetence must focus on the intellectual virtue of objectivity. Fourth, some forms of epistocracy are troubling, in part, because they would increase the political power of the most dogmatic and biased individuals. Fifth, a highly restrictive form of epistocracy may escape the problem of political dogmatism, but epistocrats may face a steeper tradeoff between inclusivity and epistemic virtue than they would like.

scholarly journals Epistemic situationism and cognitive ability

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
The Social ◽  
Deliberate Effort ◽  
Over Time

Leading virtue epistemologists defend the view that knowledge must proceed from intellectual virtue and they understand virtues either as refned character traits cultivated by the agent over time through deliberate effort, or as reliable cognitive abilities. Philosophical situationists argue that results from empirical psychology should make us doubt that we have either sort of epistemic virtue, thereby discrediting virtue epistemology’s empirical adequacy. I evaluate this situationist challenge and outline a successor to virtue epistemology: abilism . Abilism delivers all the main benefts of virtue epistemology and is as empirically adequate as any theory in philosophy or the social sciences could hope to be.

Rational Belief: Structure, Grounds and Intellectual Virtue

Analysis ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 547-549
Author(s):  
George Botterill
Keyword(s):  
Rational Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Belief Structure

scholarly journals The Virtue of Curiosity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lewis Ross
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

A thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicat-ing the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, anumber of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In thispaper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuouscuriosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate myaccount in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sortof motivations are required for epistemic virtue? And do epistemic virtues need tobe reliable? I will sketch an account on which curiosity is only virtuous when rootedin a non-instrumental appreciation of epistemic goods, before arguing that curiositycan exhibit intellectual virtue irrespective of whether one is reliable in satisfying it.

Bullshit, Inquiry, and Irresponsibility

2020 ◽  
pp. 57-84
Author(s):  
Chris Heffer
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Moral Commitment ◽  
Theoretical Issues ◽  
Distinct Aspect ◽  
Point Of Departure

This chapter teases out some key theoretical issues relating to the extension of the concept of untruthfulness from sincerity to epistemic irresponsibility, or a lack of care with which speakers act in forming, retaining, and conveying their beliefs. It argues that subjective responsibility is already embedded within the nature of assertion, but that epistemic responsibility is also both an intellectual virtue and a moral commitment. The growing work on bullshitting and bullshit enrichens our understanding of epistemically irresponsible discourse, but the focus on relating bullshitting to lying and insincerity prevents us from seeing bullshit as deriving from a distinct aspect of untruthfulness. Instead, taking dogma rather than bullshit as a point of departure opens up this aspect of untruthfulness to broader epistemic concerns. The chapter closes by comparing the recent notion of “negligent false assertion” to the account of epistemic irresponsibility in the TRUST framework.

Epistemic Virtue and Epistemic Responsibility

dialectica ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Katzoff
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility

Simples, Representational Activity, and the Communication among Substances: Leibniz and Wolff on pre-established Harmony

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-128
Author(s):  
Gastón Robert
Keyword(s):  
Standard Account ◽  
Representational Power

This article aims to make further progress in revising the standard account of Wolff’s philosophy as a popularisation and systematisation of Leibniz’s doctrines. It focuses on the topic of the communication among substances and the metaphysics of simples and activity underlying it. It is argued that Wolff does not accept the pre-established harmony (PEH) in its orthodox Leibnizian version. The article explains Wolff’s departure from Leibniz’s PEH as stemming from his rejection of Leibniz’s construal of the activity of every simple as representational power and of the metaphysics of unity and activity in which that construal is rooted.

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