THE VIRTUE OF CURIOSITY

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lewis Ross
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

ABSTRACTA thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicating the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, a number of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In this paper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuous curiosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate my account in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sort of motivations are required for epistemic virtue? And do epistemic virtues need to be reliable? I will sketch an account on which curiosity is only virtuous when rooted in a non-instrumental appreciation of epistemic goods, before arguing that curiosity can exhibit intellectual virtue irrespective of whether one is reliable in satisfying it.

scholarly journals The Virtue of Curiosity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lewis Ross
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

A thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicat-ing the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, anumber of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In thispaper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuouscuriosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate myaccount in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sortof motivations are required for epistemic virtue? And do epistemic virtues need tobe reliable? I will sketch an account on which curiosity is only virtuous when rootedin a non-instrumental appreciation of epistemic goods, before arguing that curiositycan exhibit intellectual virtue irrespective of whether one is reliable in satisfying it.

scholarly journals Intellectual Humility, Spirituality, and Counselling

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 279-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma C. Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Specific Area ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

Although therapists often work with clients with whom they share a great many beliefs, there remain many cases where the therapist and client have very little in common. Spirituality is, especially in the latter kind of case, one specific area in which clashes and similarities may be important. However, recent evidence suggests spirituality is to a surprising extent ignored in therapy when exploring it would be therapeutically relevant and, even more, that counsellors often struggle when training to more effectively engage with client spirituality. These results are problematic, especially when taken together. In this article, I attempt to address this vexing issue in a way that brings together work on counselling and spirituality with recent discussions of intellectual virtue in contemporary epistemology. In particular, I show why it is important for the therapist to cultivate and maintain the virtue of intellectual humility with respect to spirituality in a counselling context. To this end, I explore, with reference to a particularly promising model of intellectual humility, how the therapist can be attentive to—and own—their limitations in a productive way when dealing with a wide range of spiritual backgrounds.

Epistemic Virtue of Wisdom and Evidentialism

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 196-208
Author(s):  
Kirill V. Karpov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Objective Knowledge ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Historical Case

My primary concern in this article is the connection between virtue epistemology and evidentialism. This possible connection is analyzed upon, firstly, the example of the intellectual virtue of wisdom, and, secondly, the historical case – Thomas Aquinas’ approach to virtue of wisdom as an intellectual disposition (habitus). I argue that it is possible to offer such an interpretation of ‘intellectual virtue’ that aligns with the peripatetic tradition broadly understood (to which the epistemology of virtues ascends), and on the basis of which an evidentialist theory of justification is offered. In the first part of the paper, I briefly present the main interpretations of virtue epistemology and evidentialism in the light of externalism/internalism debate. In the second part I discuss Aquinas’ understanding of intellectual virtue as a disposition (habitus). The main concern here are virtues of theoretical habitus – wisdom and (scientific) knowledge. I show that habitus in this case is understood in two ways: as an ability, inherent to human beings, and as objective knowledge. Thus, there are two understandings of wisdom – as a virtue and knowledge (scientia). Finally, in the concluding parts of the paper, I outline possible ways of solving presented in the first part challenges to evidentialism and internalism.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Intellectual Autonomy ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Subject Areas ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

This introduction gives an overview of Zagzebski’s work in epistemology during the last twenty-five years, introducing the papers included in the collection. The subject areas of most of contemporary epistemology are included in these chapters: (1) knowledge and understanding, (2) intellectual virtue, (3) epistemic value, (4) virtue in religious epistemology, (5) intellectual autonomy and authority, and (6) skepticism and the Gettier problem. Some chapters are among the earliest works published on a given topic—e.g., understanding, intellectual virtue, the value problem for knowledge, intellectual authority. Others take a novel approach to an old problem—Gettier, virtue in religious epistemology, a new transcendental argument against skepticism.

Intellectual Responsibility and Epistemological Theism

2021 ◽  
pp. 43-55
Author(s):  
Anastasia V. Ugleva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
Human Ability ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Intellectual Responsibility ◽  
Supreme Being

One of the most interesting and widely discussed trends in modern epistemology is the so-called intellectual ethics, normative in its essence, centered around the concept of epistemic virtue, based on the idea of metaphysical anthropology, supplemented by elements of theology. The last consists in the idea of a certain “gift” to a person from the side of the Supreme Being, which is God – and this gift lies in the epistemic virtues inherent in the individual. This subject-centered concept emphasizes the intellectual and epistemic qualities of the cognizing subject that guarantee the truth of their beliefs. However, if is God the true guarantor of their “epistemic reliability” and the possibility of thus identifying justified belief with knowledge? The reliability of the cognitive human ability is seen in the realization of virtus as “perfection in being for the good”, in this case epistemic, the only guarantee of which can only be divine will. Is it so? This article attempts to answer this question in the course of reconstruction and analysis of the epistemological-theistic approach to defining one of the key epistemic virtues of the cognizing subject – intellectual responsibility.

QUASI-EVIDENTIALISM: INTERESTS, JUSTIFICATION AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUE

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karyn L. Freedman
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Doxastic Voluntarism ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
Normative Status ◽  
Relative Theory

AbstractIn this paper I argue against what I call ‘strict evidentialism’, the view that evidence is the sole factor for determining the normative status of beliefs. I argue that strict evidentialism fails to capture the uniquely subjective standpoint of believers and as a result it fails to provide us with the tools necessary to apply its own epistemic norms. In its place I develop an interest-relative theory of justification which I call quasi-evidentialism, according to which S has a justified belief that P at time t if and only if S's evidence at time t supports P in proportion to S's interest in P. I take interests as fixed and argue that adjusting our confidence in a proposition in the right way, given our interests, is fine-tuned through the exercise of intellectual virtue, in particular the virtue of epistemic conscientiousness. This theory refocuses epistemic responsibility in the subject and by locating agency in the cultivation of epistemic virtue it also provides a handy solution to the problem of doxastic voluntarism, insofar as the development of our epistemic virtue guides our responsiveness to reason.

scholarly journals Are knowledgeable voters better voters?

2022 ◽  
pp. 1470594X2110650
Author(s):  
Michael Hannon
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Thinking ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Informed Citizenry ◽  
The One ◽  
Political Decisions

It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals tend to be the most partisan and the strength of partisan identity tends to corrupt political thinking. This creates a conundrum. On the one hand, an informed citizenry is allegedly necessary for a democracy to flourish. On the other hand, the most knowledgeable and passionate voters are also the most likely to think in corrupted, biased ways. What to do? This paper examines this tension and draws out several lessons. First, it is not obvious that more knowledgeable voters will make better political decisions. Second, attempts to remedy voter ignorance are problematic because partisans tend to become more polarized when they acquire more information. Third, solutions to citizen incompetence must focus on the intellectual virtue of objectivity. Fourth, some forms of epistocracy are troubling, in part, because they would increase the political power of the most dogmatic and biased individuals. Fifth, a highly restrictive form of epistocracy may escape the problem of political dogmatism, but epistocrats may face a steeper tradeoff between inclusivity and epistemic virtue than they would like.

scholarly journals Epistemic situationism and cognitive ability

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
The Social ◽  
Deliberate Effort ◽  
Over Time

Leading virtue epistemologists defend the view that knowledge must proceed from intellectual virtue and they understand virtues either as refned character traits cultivated by the agent over time through deliberate effort, or as reliable cognitive abilities. Philosophical situationists argue that results from empirical psychology should make us doubt that we have either sort of epistemic virtue, thereby discrediting virtue epistemology’s empirical adequacy. I evaluate this situationist challenge and outline a successor to virtue epistemology: abilism . Abilism delivers all the main benefts of virtue epistemology and is as empirically adequate as any theory in philosophy or the social sciences could hope to be.

scholarly journals Why Hope Cannot Be an Intellectual Virtue: Rationality of Hope Considered from an Analytic Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-37
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz
Keyword(s):  
Rational Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Standard Account ◽  
Recent Account

There are two aims of the paper. The first is to critically analyse the claim that hope can be regarded as an intellectual virtue, as proposed by Nancy E. Snow (2013) in her recent account of hope set within the project of regulative epistemology. The second aim is to explore the problem of rationality of hope. Section one of the paper explains two different interpretations of the key notion of hope and discusses certain features to be found in hope-that and hope-in. Section two addresses the question of whether hope could be interpreted as an intellectual virtue. To develop an argument against that view, a brief account of the notion of epistemic virtue is provided. Section three analyses the problem of rationality of hope and the parallels between rational belief and rational hope; the section focuses on what exactly makes a particular hope-that a rational and justified hope. Belief that p is possible/probable is part of the meaning of hope that p; therefore, it is assumed that rationality of hope cannot be considered in isolation from rationality of belief. It is argued that the “standard account” of the reasonableness of hope, which is found in the analytic literature, does not meet the standards of epistemic responsibility and needs rectifying.

scholarly journals Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan E. Adler
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Social Agents ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Social Nature ◽  
The Social

A teoria das virtudes epistêmicas (VE) sustenta que as virtudes dos agentes, tais como a imparcialidade ou a permeabilidade intelectual, ao invés de crenças específicas, devem estar no centro da avaliação epistêmica, e que os indivíduos que possuem essas virtudes estão mais bem-posicionados epistemicamente do que se não as tivessem, ou, pior ainda, do que se tivessem os vícios correspondentes: o preconceito, o dogmatismo, ou a impermeabilidade intelectual. Eu argumento que a teoria VE padece de um grave defeito, porque fracassa ao se ajustar à natureza social dos questionamentos (epistêmicos) típicos. Esse e outros defeitos relacionados a esse infectam o paralelo que os teóricos VE traçam entre virtudes epistêmicas e morais. Ao prometer o incremento na proporção de crenças verdadeiras sobre crenças falsas, ou ignorância, as virtudes epistêmicas não podem desempenhar um papel paralelo àquele que Aristóteles reserva às virtudes morais ao prometer o incremento em nossa felicidade e no bem-estar da comunidade. A minha rota para essas críticas é feita das razões sobre por que os agentes (sociais) devem buscar a obtenção de seus objetivos morais e epistêmicos diferentemente nos papéis que atribuem às virtudes. PALAVRAS-CHAVES – Virtude epistêmica. Divisão de trabalho epistêmico. Diversidade. Conhecimento. Falibilidade. Virtude moral. ABSTRACT Epistemic Virtue (EV) theory holds that virtues of agents, like impartiality or openmindedness, rather than specific beliefs, should be at the center of epistemological evaluation, and that individuals with those virtues are better positioned epistemically than if they lacked them or, worse, if they instead had the corresponding vices: prejudice, dogmatism, or close-mindedness. I argue that EV theory suffers from a serious flaw because it fails to accommodate to the social nature of typical (epistemic) inquiries. This and related flaws infect the parallel that EV theorists allege between epistemic and moral virtues. In promising to improve our ratio of true beliefs to either false beliefs or ignorance, the epistemic virtues cannot play a roll parallel to that which Aristotle claims for the moral virtues in promising to increase our happiness and the well-being of the community. The path to these criticisms I introduce by offering reasons for why (social) agents should seek to realize their epistemic and moral goals very differently in the respective roles they accord to the virtues. KEY WORDS – Epistemic virtue. Division of epistemic labor. Diversity. Knowledge. Fallibility. Moral virtue.

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