scholarly journals Self-Defense or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-316
Author(s):  
Michael Lacey
2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Brown

In his address at West Point on June 1, 2002, President George W. Bush appeared to be signaling America's willingness to regard the mere possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by potential enemies as grounds for an anticipatory war. Historically, however, a clear distinction has been drawn between preemptive and preventive, or anticipatory, war, with the latter regarded as illegitimate. The National Security Strategy announced by the president on September 20, 2002, was more conventional in its approach to preemption, but doubts remain as to whether the old distinction can be preserved. And this discussion is taking place in the context of a specific problem, namely the apparent desire of Iraq to obtain WMD and the determination of the United States, and, less clearly expressed, the UN Security Council, to prevent this from happening.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 599-607 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Sapiro

The United States articulated a new concept of preventive self-defense last fall that is designed to preclude emerging threats from endangering the country. Rising like a phoenix from the ashes of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the preventive approach to national security is intended to respond to new threats posed by “shadowy networks of individuals [who] can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.” The Bush administration wisely concluded that it could not rely solely upon a reactive security posture, due to the difficulty in deterring potential attacks by those determined to challenge the United States and the magnitude of harm that could occur from weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. Although the administration has characterized its new approach as “preemptive,” it is more accurate to describe it as “preventive” self-defense. Rather than trying to preempt specific, imminent tiireats, the goal is to prevent more generalized threats from materializing.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 576-585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Wedgwood

At long last, the people of Iraq are freed from the brutality of Saddam Hussein. The swift success of the coalition’s military campaign has been followed by predictable difficulties in organizing a hew government, restoring an economy, rebuilding civic society, and quelling violence from remnants of the old regime. But these challenges are kept in scale by recalling a dictator who murdered three hundred thousand fellow citizens. Saddam chose weapons of mass destruction as the central symbol of his domestic and international swagger—using the same internal security apparatus to parry United Nations inspectors and to extinguish domestic political dissent. Removing Iraq’s Ba’athist regime has ended a looming danger to regional neighbors, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The crucial hopes for Middle East peace may also be enhanced by the change. And a new government in Baghdad lessens the chance that weapons matériel will be transferred to ill-intentioned nonstate actors.


Author(s):  
Louis René Beres

Going forward, Israel’s foreign policy and defense planners will face increasingly complex challenges to the country’s national security. Such core challenges will present themselves in military and jurisprudential terms, and will need to be confronted together, sometimes in their more-or-less plausible interactions or synergies. One area of especially great significance will concern prospective enemy crimes of “perfidy”. Of most plainly urgent importance in this regard would be those circumstances wherein Palestinian and/or Shiite Arab terror attacks could involve weapons of mass destruction. To best avoid such dire circumstances, Israel will have to pay growing attention to certain measured strategies of preemption or “anticipatory self-defense.” Throughout its pertinent military operations, Jerusalem/Tel Aviv will need to heed the always binding expectations of “distinction,” “proportionality,” and “military necessity”, and to acknowledge the ongoing primacy of dispassionate intellectual analysis over any more narrowly political assessments.


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