The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense

2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 576-585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Wedgwood

At long last, the people of Iraq are freed from the brutality of Saddam Hussein. The swift success of the coalition’s military campaign has been followed by predictable difficulties in organizing a hew government, restoring an economy, rebuilding civic society, and quelling violence from remnants of the old regime. But these challenges are kept in scale by recalling a dictator who murdered three hundred thousand fellow citizens. Saddam chose weapons of mass destruction as the central symbol of his domestic and international swagger—using the same internal security apparatus to parry United Nations inspectors and to extinguish domestic political dissent. Removing Iraq’s Ba’athist regime has ended a looming danger to regional neighbors, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The crucial hopes for Middle East peace may also be enhanced by the change. And a new government in Baghdad lessens the chance that weapons matériel will be transferred to ill-intentioned nonstate actors.

Author(s):  
I. Saienko ◽  
А. Iefimenko ◽  
O. Rozmaznin ◽  
A. Efimenko

The article deals with the problem of providing a unified information policy and the formation of a single information space in the territory of modern Ukraine in the context of escalating threats, faced by our state in the humanitarian sphere, Analysis of the peculiarities of the information-propaganda defining component of modern wars on the example of Russian Federation aggression in Ukraine. The disclosure of this issue in the context of the presented work is caused by the need of a scientific generalization of an existing theoretical and practical operational experience which should help clarify issues not reflected in open domestic and have no thorough, systematic analysis of the aforementioned wars and threats. Solving a certain problem will help ensure the national security of Ukraine through timely decision-making to prevent and eliminate the threats of the so-called "hybrid war". Impossible in modern conditions is to maintain frontal aggressive warfare, the use of weapons of mass destruction. This explains the spread of information wars. They achieve political objectives through global (strategic) psychological operations to shape the positive attitude of the international community to such actions, through the implementation of the psychological treatment of the conflict region, which are subjected to servicemen and the people of enemy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 427-450
Author(s):  
Huw Dylan ◽  
David V. Gioe ◽  
Michael S. Goodman

This chapter focuses on ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, the Iraq War, and one of the key justifications, the claim that Saddam was developing weapons of mass destruction and had to be stopped. Intelligence was crucial to this judgement; but it was wrong. This chapter examines why. It focuses on the challenge of analysis, particularly against mysterious and deceptive targets. How was the CIA to determine that Saddam Hussein had nothing to hide when his actions indicated otherwise? Document: Misreading Intentions: Iraq’s Reaction to Inspections Created Picture of Deception Iraq WMD Retrospective Series.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Brown

In his address at West Point on June 1, 2002, President George W. Bush appeared to be signaling America's willingness to regard the mere possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by potential enemies as grounds for an anticipatory war. Historically, however, a clear distinction has been drawn between preemptive and preventive, or anticipatory, war, with the latter regarded as illegitimate. The National Security Strategy announced by the president on September 20, 2002, was more conventional in its approach to preemption, but doubts remain as to whether the old distinction can be preserved. And this discussion is taking place in the context of a specific problem, namely the apparent desire of Iraq to obtain WMD and the determination of the United States, and, less clearly expressed, the UN Security Council, to prevent this from happening.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 599-607 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Sapiro

The United States articulated a new concept of preventive self-defense last fall that is designed to preclude emerging threats from endangering the country. Rising like a phoenix from the ashes of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the preventive approach to national security is intended to respond to new threats posed by “shadowy networks of individuals [who] can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.” The Bush administration wisely concluded that it could not rely solely upon a reactive security posture, due to the difficulty in deterring potential attacks by those determined to challenge the United States and the magnitude of harm that could occur from weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. Although the administration has characterized its new approach as “preemptive,” it is more accurate to describe it as “preventive” self-defense. Rather than trying to preempt specific, imminent tiireats, the goal is to prevent more generalized threats from materializing.


2003 ◽  
Vol 102 (662) ◽  
pp. 129-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael T. Klare

As part of our occasional post–September 11 series on terrorism, contributing editor Michael Klare examines the motives behind America's decision to make Iraq a central objective in the war on terrorism. “If concerns about weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the export of democracy do not explain the administration's determination to oust Saddam Hussein, what does? The answer [can be found in] the pursuit of oil and the preservation of America's status as the paramount world power.”


Author(s):  
Louis René Beres

Going forward, Israel’s foreign policy and defense planners will face increasingly complex challenges to the country’s national security. Such core challenges will present themselves in military and jurisprudential terms, and will need to be confronted together, sometimes in their more-or-less plausible interactions or synergies. One area of especially great significance will concern prospective enemy crimes of “perfidy”. Of most plainly urgent importance in this regard would be those circumstances wherein Palestinian and/or Shiite Arab terror attacks could involve weapons of mass destruction. To best avoid such dire circumstances, Israel will have to pay growing attention to certain measured strategies of preemption or “anticipatory self-defense.” Throughout its pertinent military operations, Jerusalem/Tel Aviv will need to heed the always binding expectations of “distinction,” “proportionality,” and “military necessity”, and to acknowledge the ongoing primacy of dispassionate intellectual analysis over any more narrowly political assessments.


Author(s):  
Adeed Dawisha

This chapter discusses political developments in Iraq following the US and UK's military campaign in 2003. The publicly stated reason for the invasion of Iraq was Saddam's possession of weapons of mass destruction and his links with international Islamist terrorists. However, is probably more likely that from the very beginning the Bush Administration, or more precisely influential elements within it, made the removal of Saddam Husayn a central plank of the administration's policy. Whatever the reasons for the invasion, the United States found itself on April 9, 2003 the hegemonic power in Iraq, faced with the responsibilities of governance. And indeed until June 28, 2004, when sovereignty was transferred to the Iraqis, the United States (with some input by the British) ruled Iraq directly through a mostly American administration in Baghdad called the Coalition Provisional Authority.


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