To What Extent Do U.S. Nuclear Forces Provide Useful Options against Rogue States With Weapons of Mass Destruction

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred B. Stoss ◽  
III
Keyword(s):  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Rogue States

A Moral Critique of the Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal

2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Lee
Keyword(s):  
Preventive Intervention ◽  
International Terrorism ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
United States Military ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Rogue States ◽  
Potential Availability

Preventive intervention, though an old practice, has recently come under widespread discussion due to concerns about international terrorism and the potential availability to rogue states or terrorists of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With the 2003 war in Iraq, the Bush administration made preventive intervention part of United States military policy. In a recent issue of Ethics & International Affairs, Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane argued that the preventive use of military force may be justified in some circumstances. In this essay I take issue with their argument.

scholarly journals Os herdeiros de todos os medos: a dissuasão nuclear para os EUA e a Rússia (2000-2005) / The heirs of all fears: nuclear deterrence for the U.S. and Russia (2000-2005)

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-339
Author(s):  
Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The U.S

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar as perspectivas para a dissuasão nuclear para as duas principais potências nuclearmente armadas - EUA e Rússia - durante os cinco primeiros anos da década de 2000. O argumento central aponta que as duas potências preocuparam-se com a dissuasão de ameaças advindas das principais potências, mas se mostraram mais preocupadas com as ameaças de potências regionais com armas de destruição em massa. Elas reduziram suas forças nucleares desde o fim da Guerra Fria, manifestaram um maior interesse em capacidades não-nucleares para a dissuasão e tentaram definir opções para o uso limitado de armas nucleares.     The aim of this paper is to examine the approaches for nuclear deterrence for the two greatest nuclear-weapon states - the U.S. and Russia - in the first half of the 2000s. The central argument shows that the two powers were concerned with deterrence of threats stemming from major powers, but were more concerned about the threats from regional powers with weapons of mass destruction. They have reduced their nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War, showed a greater interest in non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence and tried to define options for the limited use of nuclear weapons.      

Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters

2003 ◽  
Vol 102 (668) ◽  
pp. 426-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jasen J. Castillo
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Rogue States ◽  
Nuclear Terrorism ◽  
Conventional Methods

Although policy makers worry about the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, we should recognize that terrorist organizations have shown a remarkable tendency to fall back on well-tested conventional methods of attack. … Deterrence, when measured against prevention, still maintains enough credibility to prevent rogue states from sharing nuclear weapons with terrorists.

scholarly journals WMD, WMD, WMD: Securitisation through ritualised incantation of ambiguous phrases

2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
IDO OREN ◽  
TY SOLOMON
Keyword(s):  
Iraq War ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Rogue States ◽  
Run Up

AbstractWe seek to reinvigorate and clarify the Copenhagen School's insight that ‘security’ is not ‘a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance [‘security’] itself is the act’. We conceptualise the utterances of securitising actors as consisting not in arguments so much as in repetitive spouting of ambiguous phrases (WMD, rogue states, ethnic cleansing). We further propose that audience acceptance consists not in persuasion so much as in joining the securitising actors in a ritualised chanting of the securitising phrase. Rather than being performed to, the audience participates in the performance in the manner in which a crowd at a rock concert sings along with the artists. We illustrate our argument with a discussion of how the ritualised chanting of the phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction’ during the run-up to the Iraq War ultimately produced the grave Iraqi threat that it purportedly described.

The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Futter
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Nuclear Terrorism ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Impact

Since the end of the cold war, the global landscape of weapons of mass destruction has changed considerably. Three additional states have openly acquired a nuclear capability—India, Pakistan, and North Korea—and a fourth, Iran, may be trying to do the same. Meanwhile, other states were forced to give up or agreed to abandon their nuclear capabilities or ambitions. At the same time, the threat of ‘loose nukes’ and the associated challenge of nuclear security have acquired existential significance given the possibility of nuclear terrorism, the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the damage caused by the A. Q. Khan network. Europe remains a key ‘nuclear theatre’ with UK, French, Russian, and NATO nuclear forces deployed in the region, and this seems unlikely to change anytime soon. The aim of this chapter is to explore the nature and implications of a second nuclear age for European military thinking and strategy.

scholarly journals Getting Deterrence Right: The Case for Stratified Deterrence

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-40
Author(s):  
Brent Talbot
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Rogue States ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Potential Level

The potential for hostilities in the 21st Century is not likely to be deterred by a Cold War deterrence strategy. And while nuclear deterrence remains important, regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and accompanying long-range delivery capabilities are a rising concern. New technological breakthroughs in the space, cyber, and unforeseen realms could also provide asymmetric means of undermining deterrence. Moreover, the effort to achieve strategic stability in this day and age has become increasingly complicated in light of the changing relationship among the great powers. Today’s world has become one of “security trilemmas.” Actions one state takes to defend against another can, in-turn, make a third state feel insecure. There is great need for both nuclear diversity (theater and low-yield weapons) and increased conventional capabilities in the U.S. deterrent force to provide strategic stability in the decades ahead. In sum, we need a deterrence construct that both deters nuclear use by the great powers and terminates nuclear use by both regional powers and so called rogue states initiating nuclear wars on neighbors. I propose herein a policy of stratified deterrence which addresses deterrence needs at each potential level of conflict.

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