scholarly journals Research on an Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation of a Cluster Innovation Network Based on Fairness Preference-new manuscript v1 (protocols.io.8pdhvi6)

protocols.io ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Chuanyun ◽  
Xia Cao ◽  
Ming Chi
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Model And Simulation

scholarly journals Substantive Innovation or Strategic Innovation? Research on Multiplayer Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Junqiang Li ◽  
Hao Ren ◽  
Changcheng Zhang ◽  
Qingxia Li ◽  
Kaifeng Duan
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Innovation Development ◽  
Innovation Research ◽  
Strategic Innovation ◽  
Model And Simulation ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
The Subject

Innovation subsidy is of great significance to promoting enterprise innovation development. However, in recent years, the frequent occurrence of R&D subsidy deception in China has greatly reduced effectiveness of innovation. From the perspective of the strategic choice motivation of the innovation subject (including the enterprises, research institutions, and local governments), this paper constructs a multiplayer stochastic evolutionary game model. The influence of each variable on the subject strategy adoption is analyzed by simulation. There are two important findings in this paper. First, the paper confirms that there is an optimal boundary for the high subsidies received by enterprises and academic institutions, and the “subsidy boundary” is solved through the model. Second, this paper analyzes the effectiveness of the regulation of each variable through simulation and provides management and policy implications.

scholarly journals PREFABRICATED HOUSING SUBSIDY ANALYSIS IN CHINA BASED ON AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (7) ◽  
pp. 553-570
Author(s):  
Kaicheng Shen ◽  
Xiaodong Li ◽  
Xinying Cao ◽  
Zhihui Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Housing Price ◽  
Development Stage ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Housing Subsidy ◽  
Production Scale ◽  
Model And Simulation ◽  
Incentive Policies ◽  
The Government ◽  
End Times

Prefabricated housing and cast-in-site housing are two alternatives for selection by developers and customers. The government, as the policy maker, creates incentive policies to encourage developers and customers to choose prefabricated housing. This paper aims to analyze the subsidy mechanism to theoretically confirm the subsidies’ scopes, amounts and end times through an evolutionary game model and simulation. In the game model, government subsidies affect the interactions between developers and customers in the decision-making process. The findings are as follows: 1) The developer housing subsidy can lower the housing price, while the customer housing subsidy can increase the price; 2) The government should first offer the developers a larger subsidy amount during the early development stage and then offer the customers a smaller subsidy amount later; 3) The government should determine the end time based on the proportion of developers and customers who choose prefabricated housing; 4) A higher prefabrication ratio may not always improve the development of prefabricated housing, and there is an optimal production scale that creates the best development situation. The empirical analysis shows that this model can help the government develop reasonable and optimal subsidy policies within the limit of budget to stimulate developers and customers.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Innovation Behavior of Industrial Cluster Based on Subject Adaptability

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cooperative Innovation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

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