Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation of Incentive Mechanism for Knowledge Transfer Based on Multi-agent

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yang
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Transfer ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Model And Simulation ◽  
Multi Agent

scholarly journals Substantive Innovation or Strategic Innovation? Research on Multiplayer Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Junqiang Li ◽  
Hao Ren ◽  
Changcheng Zhang ◽  
Qingxia Li ◽  
Kaifeng Duan
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Innovation Development ◽  
Innovation Research ◽  
Strategic Innovation ◽  
Model And Simulation ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
The Subject

Innovation subsidy is of great significance to promoting enterprise innovation development. However, in recent years, the frequent occurrence of R&D subsidy deception in China has greatly reduced effectiveness of innovation. From the perspective of the strategic choice motivation of the innovation subject (including the enterprises, research institutions, and local governments), this paper constructs a multiplayer stochastic evolutionary game model. The influence of each variable on the subject strategy adoption is analyzed by simulation. There are two important findings in this paper. First, the paper confirms that there is an optimal boundary for the high subsidies received by enterprises and academic institutions, and the “subsidy boundary” is solved through the model. Second, this paper analyzes the effectiveness of the regulation of each variable through simulation and provides management and policy implications.

scholarly journals An Incentive Mechanism for Reporting Phishing E-Mails Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mengli Wang ◽  
Lipeng Song
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Important Link ◽  
E Mail

The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingyan Xu ◽  
Zhuoyun Zhou ◽  
Jianguo Du
Keyword(s):  
Point Source ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Intensive Management ◽  
Point Source Pollution ◽  
Synergy Effects ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Non Point Source Pollution

This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.

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