scholarly journals Substantive Innovation or Strategic Innovation? Research on Multiplayer Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Junqiang Li ◽  
Hao Ren ◽  
Changcheng Zhang ◽  
Qingxia Li ◽  
Kaifeng Duan
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Innovation Development ◽  
Innovation Research ◽  
Strategic Innovation ◽  
Model And Simulation ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
The Subject

Innovation subsidy is of great significance to promoting enterprise innovation development. However, in recent years, the frequent occurrence of R&D subsidy deception in China has greatly reduced effectiveness of innovation. From the perspective of the strategic choice motivation of the innovation subject (including the enterprises, research institutions, and local governments), this paper constructs a multiplayer stochastic evolutionary game model. The influence of each variable on the subject strategy adoption is analyzed by simulation. There are two important findings in this paper. First, the paper confirms that there is an optimal boundary for the high subsidies received by enterprises and academic institutions, and the “subsidy boundary” is solved through the model. Second, this paper analyzes the effectiveness of the regulation of each variable through simulation and provides management and policy implications.

scholarly journals Research on Air Pollution Control in China: From the Perspective of Quadrilateral Evolutionary Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Yang ◽  
Yunpeng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Air Pollution Control ◽  
Stable Points ◽  
The Ideal

By constructing a quadrilateral evolutionary game model involving the central government, local governments, polluting enterprises, and the public, this paper attempts to comprehensively analyze the development and implementation of China’s air pollution control policies. Through the quadrilateral evolutionary game model, this paper systematically studies the evolutionary stable strategies of the four parties involved and obtains 27 equilibrium points, strategy sets, and their corresponding policy performance with the help of the four-dimensional dynamic system. The research results show that there are five equilibrium points that represent the least ideal scenarios, 14 equilibrium points that represent the less than ideal scenarios, four equilibrium points that represent the ideal scenarios, three equilibrium points that represent the more than ideal scenarios, and one equilibrium point that represents the most ideal scenarios. By analyzing the eight equilibrium points that represent the ideal, more than ideal and most ideal scenarios, especially the four stable points, this paper has obtained the conditions as well as policy implications of the four stable points in China’s air pollution control campaign.

scholarly journals A Game Theory-Based Approach for Exploring Water Resource Exploitation Behavior in the Poyang Lake Basin, China

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 6237
Author(s):  
Tiangui Lv ◽  
Hualin Xie ◽  
Hua Lu ◽  
Xinmin Zhang ◽  
Lei Yang
Keyword(s):  
Water Resource ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Stable Equilibrium ◽  
Poyang Lake ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Lake Basin ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Resource Exploitation ◽  
Poyang Lake Basin

Exploring the relationship between competition and cooperation in water resource exploitation by applying a game model is crucial for achieving stable equilibrium in the presence of environmental externalities. To explore this, we used the Poyang Lake Basin, which is divided into three overly exploited sub-regions, as an example. This paper selected the different types of sub-regions of Poyang Lake Basin as the research subjects, and then proposed a game model to study evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategies. The results are as follows: (1) the behavior of the sub-regions of Poyang Lake Basin are affected by one another and cannot achieve equilibrium through independent games, which also need external forces to coordinate the three reaches; (2) the benefits improve gradually from the state of “non-cooperation” to “full cooperation” and reach an ideal equilibrium when all the sub-regions choose the strategy of cooperation; (3) the strategic choice of sub-reaches is difficult to maximize the overall benefits of the basin in the absence of external constraints. To ensure that the sub-regions choose the cooperative strategy, the central government should support the cooperative subsidies of local governments. In addition to improving the equilibrium state of the sub-reaches, this study proposes the following policy implications: constructing a basin plan and promoting fiscal transfer payments, inducing an industrial gradient transfer, and strengthening the payment for the use of water resources.

scholarly journals Security Regulation and Enterprise Innovation in Communication Industry

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Kai Gao ◽  
Lijun Ma
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Communication Industry ◽  
The Social ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
Security Regulations ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Government Security

This paper conducted an evolutionary game model of the interaction between the governments and communication enterprises and analyzed the impact of the government’s communication security regulation on the innovation decision-making of communication enterprises. The results show that the behavior of the governments depends on the social benefits, rent-seeking benefits, and regulating costs in strict and de security regulations. The communication enterprises’ behavior depends on the benefits of innovation and the costs in R&D and rent-seeking. When government subsidies are relatively inadequate, the communication enterprises’ strategy under government security regulation swings from not-innovation finally to innovation. The policy implications of this study indicate that appropriate de security regulation by the government will help communication enterprises generate a good atmosphere for innovation, and the appropriate increase in subsidies will be more conducive to driving enterprise innovation.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingyan Xu ◽  
Zhuoyun Zhou ◽  
Jianguo Du
Keyword(s):  
Point Source ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Intensive Management ◽  
Point Source Pollution ◽  
Synergy Effects ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Non Point Source Pollution

This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Model of Local Government Environmental Regulation with Media Participation

2021 ◽  
Vol 267 ◽  
pp. 01030
Author(s):  
Minxue Song ◽  
Tianhua Wang
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Economy ◽  
Pollution Prevention ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Clean Production ◽  
Evolutionary Equilibrium ◽  
Media Supervision ◽  
The Media

The battle for pollution prevention and control has been promoted in an all-round way, and the quality of the ecological environment has been significantly improved, but the results are not stable, and environmental problems are still prominent. With the development of social economy, media supervision is playing an increasingly important role in government actions and environmental issues. This paper considers the role of media supervision, constructs an evolutionary game model between local governments and enterprises, analyzes and explains the evolutionary equilibrium. The results show that the media exposure of corporate pollution and local government inaction is conducive to achieve evolutionary equilibrium {regulation, cleaner production}. Local governments give enterprises pollution control subsidies and environmental protection rewards, which can promote green and clean production of enterprises. The paper provides a useful reference for promoting clean production of enterprises and achieving high-quality development.

scholarly journals The evolutionary game analysis of cross-regional ecological compensation - based on the perspective of the main functional area

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 04043
Author(s):  
PAN He-si ◽  
LIU Hong-zhi
Keyword(s):  
Carrying Capacity ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Ecological Environment ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Functional Area ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Upper Limit

Under the new normal, the carrying capacity of ecological environment in China has reached or approached the upper limit. The root cause is the lack of an endogenous mechanism for the protection and compensation of forest resources. Therefore, clarifying the game relationship between stakeholders can help to break through the dilemma. An evolutionary game model between beneficiary regions and the protected regions was constructed, based on the “restraint-encouragement” mechanism of the central government.The results show that in cross-regional ecological compensation, the optimal strategy of “ protectioncompensation” depend on the net profits of local governments and the central government's fines.

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