scholarly journals Gorgias’ Argument does not Include Actual Conditionals

Problemos ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 81-89
Author(s):  
Miguel López - Astorga

[straipsnis ir santrauka anglų kalba, santrauka lietuvių kalba] It can be thought that Gorgias’ argument on the non-existence consists of three sentences, the first one being an asseveration and the other two being conditionals. However, this paper is intended to show that there is no conditional in the argument, and that the second and third sentences only appear to be so. To do that, a methodology drawn from the framework of the mental models theory is used, which seems to lead to the true logical forms of these last sentences as well.

1997 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 358-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliet Richardson ◽  
Thomas C. Ormerod

Two experiments are reported that investigate whether the logical equivalence of conditionals and disjunctives is paralleled by a psychological equivalence. In these experiments, subjects rephrased from one form into the other. Experiment 1 demonstrated strong effects of familiarity and causality of rule content. Similar findings were found in Experiment 2 with a different conditional rule syntax. An account of the experiments is given in terms of mental models theory: In this account, task performance can be seen to depend upon the extent to which the model sets used by subjects to generate rephrasings are complete, task content being the most important factor affecting model set completion. A “Minimal Completion” strategy is proposed to operate in the absence of thematic content. The experiments also falsify the long-held assumption that conditionals with negative antecedents are always interpreted as their disjunctive equivalents. This raises doubts about the mental models explanation for matching bias in conditional reasoning.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moyun Wang

For the modal meanings of conditionals with the form if p then q, there are three existing psychological accounts: the original suppositional theory, the original and revised mental models theory. They imply different modal meanings of if p then q. Alternatively, we propose a revised suppositional theory with the unique prediction that the set from which the instance referred to by a true conditional was randomly drawn, necessarily includes pq cases, and possibly includes ¬pq / ¬p¬q cases, but impossibly includes p¬q cases. One experiment investigated whether category modal inferences from a conditional would be consistent with preceding instance modal inferences from it. The results revealed that (1) previous instance inferences did not affect subsequent category inferences; (2) relevant cases pq and p¬q tended to elicit consistent response patterns, but irrelevant cases ¬pq and ¬p¬q tended to elicit inconsistent response patterns; (3) the overall response pattern of category inferences is consistent with only the prediction of the revised suppositional theory. The latter implies that only the pq possibility is required by a true conditional, but the ¬pq / ¬p¬q possibility is unrequired. On the whole, these findings favor the revised suppositional theory over the other accounts.


2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Vargas ◽  
Sergio Moreno-Rios ◽  
Candida Castro ◽  
Geoffrey Underwood

Author(s):  
John R. Wilson ◽  
Andrew Rutherford

This review points out confusion surrounding the concept and use of mental models from the viewpoints of both human factors and psychology. Noted are the ways in which the notion is conceived according to the needs and approaches of different specialties, and the relationships of mental models to other forms of knowledge representation are considered. The manner in which the human factors community has and should utilize the concept in applications across a number of fields is addressed and discussed in relation to the psychological perspective.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nazli Turan ◽  
Catherine H. Tinsley ◽  
Laurie R. Weingart ◽  
Soroush Aslani

AbstractWhen involved in disputes, people’s stereotypes about one another and the situation can influence their attributions of motives and effectiveness at resolving the dispute. Stereotypes may be of particular concern when disputing parties have little knowledge about the individual across the table. In this study, we examined how respondents from different cultures evaluated the economic and relational goals of two disputing merchants - one from the West and the other from the Middle East. We tested the extent to which respondents’ expectations of the targets’ goals were driven by: 1) cultural information about each disputant (whether the merchant-disputant comes from the West or from the Middle East) and 2) the respondent’s own culturally-based mental model for approaches to resolving work-related disputes. We found very little evidence of cultural stereotyping in that respondents views of the Target Merchants’ goals were largely independent of the said culture of the Target Merchant. We did however find strong evidence that respondents from the United States, Turkey and Qatar hold different mental models about the goals a party has when resolving a work-related dispute. In particular, US respondents had a more variable-sum orientation than the other cultural groups, especially Qataris, whose mental model evidenced a fixed pie assumption regarding economic and relational goals. For example, Qataris and Turks viewed a goal of Maximizing one’s Own Gain as impeding a goal of Maximizing the Other Party’s Gain. Similarly, Qataris viewed Defending Honor as incompatible to the goals of Relationship Building and Giving Face, whereas Americans and Turks did not hold such a view. These differences, based on the country of the respondent, are discussed in detail.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 197-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
E.E. Rumyantseva ◽  
T.N. Samarina

We describe a study involving 72 mentally healthy adolescents (13-17 years), 24 young men (15 ± 1,4 years), 48 women (15 ± 1,4 years) and 8 children (13-18 years), 6 boys (15 ± 1,9 years) and 2 women (16 ± 2,1 years) who had undergone previous episode of schizophrenia (F 20, ICD-10) and at the time of the survey being in remission. We tested the hypotheses about differences in the development of the theory of mind in different groups of adolescents. The study was conducted using test of "Reading the mental state of the other by his gaze" and a test of social intelligence by Gilford and Sullivan. It was found that the healthy adolescents build better mental models of the other person than adolescents with schizophrenia (U = 102, p≤0,05). In the group of mentally healthy women, we found a statistically significant relationship between the understanding of mind by the gaze and social intelligence (r = 0,6; p = 0.01). The used test proved to be a representative tool for the study of mind in different groups of adolescents.


Perception ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 26 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 178-178
Author(s):  
S T Huang ◽  
G C-W Shyi

Constructing the 3-D mental structure from viewed 2-D orthographic displays may require establishing both the relative depth relation (RD) between adjacent areas in the orthographic displays and the exact magnitude of absolute depth (AD) for a given area. We examined the processes of depth assignment involved in 3-D model construction by asking subjects to mentally imagine the 3-D object portrayed by a pair of orthographic projections, and then choose among four alternative isometrics the one that matched the imagined 3-D model. One alternative corresponded to the previously shown orthographic views (ie, target). The other alternatives were distractors that differed from the target in terms of RD, AD, or both. Results from four experiments show that (a) when subjects mistook a distractor for target, they were more likely to misidentify the distractor sharing the same RD with target but with different AD, than to misidentify the distractor sharing the same AD but with different RD; (b) subjects could shorten their solution time by 40% without greatly compromising their performances when times available for imagining 3-D models were reduced in proportion to those consumed in a self-pacing condition. The implications of these results are discussed in terms of a model in which an observer may try to decide the relative depth prior to figuring out the exact absolute depth, although it is necessary to consider both aspects of depth assignment in the construction of 3-D mental models.


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