scholarly journals Linguistic inter-understanding gives evidence in favor of the mental models theory: Induction and comprehension

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-20
Author(s):  
Miguel López-Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Mental Models Theory

Deontic Reasoning, Mental Models Theory and Traffic Signs Information

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Vargas ◽  
Sergio Moreno-Rios ◽  
Candida Castro ◽  
Geoffrey Underwood
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Traffic Signs ◽  
Deontic Reasoning ◽  
Mental Models Theory

Mental Models: Theory and Application in Human Factors

1989 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 617-634 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Wilson ◽  
Andrew Rutherford
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Representation ◽  
Human Factors ◽  
Mental Models ◽  
Psychological Perspective ◽  
Forms Of Knowledge ◽  
Mental Models Theory

This review points out confusion surrounding the concept and use of mental models from the viewpoints of both human factors and psychology. Noted are the ways in which the notion is conceived according to the needs and approaches of different specialties, and the relationships of mental models to other forms of knowledge representation are considered. The manner in which the human factors community has and should utilize the concept in applications across a number of fields is addressed and discussed in relation to the psychological perspective.

Categorical Reasoning from Multiple Diagrams

2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell J. Roberts ◽  
Elizabeth D. A. Sykes
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
Multistep Process ◽  
Categorical Reasoning ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
Mental Models Theory

Syllogistic reasoning from categorical premise pairs is generally taken to be a multistep process. Quantifiers ( all, no, some, some …not) must be interpreted, representations constructed, and conclusions identified from these. Explanations of performance have been proposed in which errors may occur at any of these stages. The current paper contrasts (a) representation explanations of performance, in which errors occur because not all possible representations are constructed, and/or mistakes are made when doing so (e.g., mental models theory), and (b) conclusion identification explanations, in which errors occur even when information has been correctly and exhaustively represented, due to systematic difficulties that people may have when identifying particular conclusions, or in identifying conclusions in particular circumstances. Three experiments are reported, in which people identified valid conclusions from diagrams analogous to Euler circles, so that the first two stages of reasoning from premise pairs were effectively removed. Despite this, several phenomena associated with reasoning from premise pairs persisted, and it is suggested that whereas representation explanations may account for some of these phenomena, conclusion identification explanations, which have never previously been considered, are required for others.

scholarly journals Pseudo-conditionals and causal assertibles in Stoic logic

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 417
Author(s):  
Miguel López-Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Models ◽  
Semantic Analysis ◽  
Methodological Tool ◽  
Conditional Perfection ◽  
Stoic Logic ◽  
Mental Models Theory

http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p417The Stoics not only analyzed sentences showing to be clear conditionals. They also reviewed other kinds of sentences related to the conditional that are not exactly conditionals, for example, the pseudo-conditionals and the causal assertibles. In this paper, I try to argue that the Stoic account of such sentences reveals that certain problematic issues that contemporary cognitive science is concerned with, such as the ways the conditionals can be expressed or the pragmatic phenomenon of the conditional perfection, were already studied by the Stoics, and that they even gave their solutions to those problems. To do that, I resort to the semantic analysis of models usually made by the mental models theory, and use it as a methodological tool.

scholarly journals The Problems of the Mental Logic with the Double Negation: The Necessity of a Semantic Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-153
Author(s):  
Miguel López-Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Double Negation ◽  
Semantic Approach ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Ancient Times ◽  
Syntactic Theories ◽  
Mental Logic ◽  
Mental Models Theory

Abstract The double negation has always been considered by the logical systems from ancient times to the present. In fact, that is an issue that the current syntactic theories studying human reasoning, for example, the mental logic theory, address today. However, in this paper, I claim that, in the case of some languages such as Spanish, the double negation causes problems for the cognitive theories mainly based on formal schemata and supporting the idea of a universal syntax of thought in the human mind. Thus, I propose that, given those problems, semantic frameworks such as that of the mental models theory seem to be more appropriate for explaining the human inferential activity.

scholarly journals Mental Logic and the Denials of Conjunctions and Disjunctions

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel López-Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Mental Logic ◽  
Mental Models Theory

ABSTRACT: The mental models theory predicts that, while conjunctions are easier than disjunctions for individuals, when denied, conjunctions are harder than disjunctions. Khemlani, Orenes, and Johnson-Laird proved that this prediction is correct in their work of 2014. In this paper, I analyze their results in order to check whether or not they really affect the mental logic theory. My conclusion is that, although Khemlani et al.'s study provides important findings, such findings do not necessarily lead to questioning or to rejecting the mental logic theory.

scholarly journals There Can be a Syntax of Thought Related to Logical Forms

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 270-278
Author(s):  
Miguel López-Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Models ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Axiomatic System ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Basic Framework ◽  
The Way ◽  
Mental Models Theory

Abstract Nowadays, a very important theory, the mental models theory, is demonstrating that it is able to explain most of the results in reasoning experiments reported by the cognitive science literature. However, this has a consequence. The mental models theory is mainly focused on content and meaning, and its theses can lead to reject the idea that syntax plays a role in the human mind and that reasoning is logical. But, in this paper, I try to show that it is possible to accept the basic framework of the mental models theory and, at the same time, to continue to claim that there are syntactic and formal logical processes coherent with the way our mind works. To do that, I argue that, even accepting that the mental models theory describes correctly the processes why certain combinations of possibilities are detected, it can be stated that the relationships between such combinations indicated by the theory are consistent with, for example, the modal axiomatic system K.

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