Optimal decisions of a retailer-owned dual-channel supply chain with demand disruptions under different power structures

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 277
Author(s):  
Song Huang ◽  
Shuting Chen ◽  
Hui Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

scholarly journals Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhou Xideng ◽  
Xu Bing ◽  
Xie Fei ◽  
Li Yu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Quality ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Reference Quality ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.

scholarly journals The Implication of Channel Discrepancy in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Zhenyang Pi ◽  
Weiguo Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
The Other ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Induction Method ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper studies the implication of channel discrepancy between the retail and direct channels in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of one common retailer and two manufacturers in which the manufacturers may have different market powers. Each manufacturer provides a substitutable product and opens an online channel to customers directly. We develop an analytical model to derive the optimal pricing strategies by using game theory and the backward induction method, and we examine related properties under three market power structures while considering channel discrepancy, including the Nash equilibrium, the Manufacturers leader Stackelberg, and the M1 leader Stackelberg models (denoted as the N, MS, and M1S models, respectively). Numerical simulations are examined to reveal and verify the effect of channel discrepancy on optimal prices, demands, and profits. We find that a higher level of channel discrepancy induces higher prices, demands, and profits for each member in both channels, while this kind of stimulating impact for the leader manufacturer who obtains a higher level of channel discrepancy will be more significant than it is for the other members in the three models. In addition, the profit of the supply chain in the N model is always higher than it is in the MS model, while it may be higher or lower than it is in the M1S model depending on the level of channel discrepancy.

scholarly journals Price and Service Competition of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Consumer Returns

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lili Ren ◽  
Yong He ◽  
Houfei Song
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Retail Industry ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Service Competition ◽  
Consumer Returns ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Additional Costs ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Products returned by consumers are common in the retail industry and result in additional costs to both the manufacturer and the retailer. This paper proposes dual-channel supply chain models involving consumer returns policies. Also, the price and service competition between retail channel and direct channel is considered in the models. According to the models, we analyze the optimal decisions in both centralized and decentralized scenarios. Then we design a new contract, coordinate the dual-channel supply chain, and enable both the retailer and the manufacturer to be a win-win.

scholarly journals Pricing decision and coordination mechanism of dual-channel supply chain dominated by a risk-aversion retailer under demand disruption

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Zhuo Chen ◽  
Yanping Liu ◽  
Xiaoxu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Total Production ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain composed of a retailer and a supplier, and discusses the optimal decisions of supply chain participants under decentralized decision-making without and with demand disruption, respectively. By comparing the optimal decisions in the two scenarios, we find that the optimal decision after demand disruption is a linear function of the demand disruption plus optimal decision before demand disruption. Additionally, when the demand disruption is in interval , the optimal total production of the supply chain is equal before and after demand disruption. Moreover, the profits of the supply chain members and the value of their recognizing demand disruption are largely affected by the scale of demand disruption. Finally, the results show that the improved revenue-sharing contract can effectively improve the supply chain performance.

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