A Confucian Virtue Theory of Supererogation

2016 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 328-341
Author(s):  
Lei Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Confucian Virtue

The Deontological Foundation of Neo-Confucian Virtue Ethics

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353
Author(s):  
George J. Aulisio ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Higher Learning ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Ethical Practice ◽  
Confucian Virtue

I show that Neo-Confucianism is practiced in two ways: (1) deontologically and (2) as a virtue ethical theory. When fully appreciated, Neo-Confucianism is a virtue ethical theory, but to set out on the path of the sage and behave like a junzi, Neo-Confucianism must first be practiced deontologically. I show this by examining the importance of Neo-Confucian metaphysics to ethical practice and by drawing out the major practical differences between “lesser learning” and “higher learning.” In my view, Neo-Confucianism can be practiced deontologically because some adherents may never move to practicing Neo-Confucianism as a virtue theory.

Virtue, Skill, and Mastery

2019 ◽  
pp. 79-132
Author(s):  
Aaron Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Ritual Propriety ◽  
Confucian Virtue ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines the early Confucian conception of virtuous mastery or expertise. It develops an account of early Confucian virtue theory, bolstered by sustained studies of ritual propriety and wisdom. It argues that virtues should be understood as forms of mastery that combine both skill and virtue. The chapter analyzes competing interpretations of Aristotle’s influential discussion of skill and virtue. It supports Russell and Annas, who accent the way Aristotelian virtues are like skills, or involve skill, against MacIntyre and others who find deep differences between skill and virtue. Virtue does not appear automatically, but is rather something people must practice to develop, and like other forms of mastery produces a spectrum of achievement.

Does virtue lead to status? Testing the moral virtue theory of status attainment.

2020 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Bai ◽  
Grace Ching Chi Ho ◽  
Jin Yan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Status Attainment ◽  
Virtue Theory

scholarly journals Mandevillian Virtues

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mandi Astola
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Collective Intelligence ◽  
Cognitive Task ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
The Core ◽  
Cognitive Traits ◽  
Collaborative Activities ◽  
Do So

AbstractStudies in collective intelligence have shown that suboptimal cognitive traits of individuals can lead a group to succeed in a collective cognitive task, in recent literature this is called mandevillian intelligence. Analogically, as Mandeville has suggested, the moral vices of individuals can sometimes also lead to collective good. I suggest that this mandevillian morality can happen in many ways in collaborative activities. Mandevillian morality presents a challenge for normative virtue theories in ethics. The core of the problem is that mandevillian morality implies that individual vice is, in some cases, valuable. However, normative virtue theories generally see vice as disvaluable. A consequence of this is that virtue theories struggle to account for the good that can emerge in a collective. I argue that normative virtue theories can in fact accommodate for mandevillian emergent good. I put forward three distinctive features that allow a virtue theory to do so: a distinction between individual and group virtues, a distinction between motivational and teleological virtues, and an acknowledgement of the normativity of “vicious” roles in groups.

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