The Deontological Foundation of Neo-Confucian Virtue Ethics

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353
Author(s):  
George J. Aulisio ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Higher Learning ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Ethical Practice ◽  
Confucian Virtue

I show that Neo-Confucianism is practiced in two ways: (1) deontologically and (2) as a virtue ethical theory. When fully appreciated, Neo-Confucianism is a virtue ethical theory, but to set out on the path of the sage and behave like a junzi, Neo-Confucianism must first be practiced deontologically. I show this by examining the importance of Neo-Confucian metaphysics to ethical practice and by drawing out the major practical differences between “lesser learning” and “higher learning.” In my view, Neo-Confucianism can be practiced deontologically because some adherents may never move to practicing Neo-Confucianism as a virtue theory.

Virtues and Capabilities

2018 ◽  
pp. 586-599
Author(s):  
Steven Torrente ◽  
Harry D. Gould
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Capabilities Approach ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
International Political Theory ◽  
Modern Era ◽  
Ethical Systems

After a long dormancy in the modern era, virtue-based ethical thought has once again become a subject of serious consideration and debate in the field of philosophy. The normative orientation of most International Political Theory, however, still comes primarily from principles-based (deontological) or outcome-based (consequentialist) ethical systems. Virtue ethics differs from focus deontological and consequentialist ethics by emphasizing character, context, and way of life, rather than rule-governed action. This chapter reviews the emergence of contemporary virtue ethics as a challenge to overly abstract, language-based analysis of moral concepts, and its development into a broad and nuanced ethical theory. It then connects virtue ethics to the capabilities approach to human development, which is similarly focused.

scholarly journals De and Virtue in Early Confucian Texts: Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Xinzhong Yao
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Confucian Virtue ◽  
New Type

Abstract The introduction to this special issue describes the emergence of the virtue ethics approach within the study of Confucian virtues in recent decades. It will first examine scholarly contributions to the discussion of Confucian virtue ethics and then raises questions concerning whether or not de 德 in early Confucian texts is identical with arête or virtue. It will then investigate the meaning and implication of de in Confucian contexts and make an argument for a new type of Confucian de ethics. It will finally come to the project on de and virtue ethics in early Confucian texts and define its purpose and boundaries.

Objections to Virtue Ethics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frans Svensson ◽  
Jens Johansson
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Suitable Amount ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
Practical Guidance

Over the last few decades, virtue ethics has become established as a third position, next to consequentialism and deontology, in substantive ethical theorizing. Several objections have been raised against virtue ethics, however. This chapter focuses particularly on the objection that virtue ethics fails to provide a plausible criterion of rightness. If that is correct, as the authors are inclined to think it is, then it constitutes a severe blow to virtue ethics, since providing a criterion of rightness is generally regarded as one of the central aims of an ethical theory. One, in the view of the authors, less serious—though almost as common—objection to virtue ethics is that it fails to provide a suitable amount of practical guidance with respect to what should be done in particular situations. The chapter briefly indicates some ways in which virtue ethicists might respond to this objection.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Thick Concept ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

The Introduction summarizes the basic tenets of Target Centred Virtue Ethics. It begins with an account of the fundamental concepts of virtue ethics in general and shows that virtue ethics is a family of normative ethical theory with several genera and species. The target-centred version of virtue ethics developed in the book is one species of virtue ethics opposed to the orthodox neo-Aristotelian version in many respects. Central to all forms of virtue ethics is ‘Thick Concept Centralism’, and the ‘Centrality of Virtuousness’, whether the notion of virtuousness is applied to character, actions, rules or motives. The Introduction outlines these theses, and the notion of the targets of virtues, before summarizing the contents of the book, including the metaphysics of Target Centred Virtue Ethics, the nature of Target Centred Virtue Ethics, and broad issues surrounding the application of Target Centred Virtue Ethics.

Virtue ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Ancient World ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
The Good Life

Virtue ethics has its origin in the ancient world, particularly in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It has been revived following an article by G. E. M. Anscombe critical of modern ethics and advocating a return to the virtues. Some have argued that virtue ethics constitutes a third option in moral theory additional to utilitarianism and Kantianism. Utilitarians and Kantians have responded vigorously, plausibly claiming that their views already incorporate many of the theses allegedly peculiar to virtue ethics. Virtue theory, the study of notions, such as character, related to the virtues, has led to the recultivation of barren areas. These include: What is the good life, and what part does virtue play in it? How stringent are the demands of morality? Are moral reasons independent of agents’ particular concerns? Is moral rationality universal? Is morality to be captured in a set of rules, or is the sensitivity of a virtuous person central in ethics? From virtue ethics, and the virtue theory of which it is a part, have emerged answers to these questions at once rooted in ancient views and yet distinctively modern.

Virtue ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Ancient World ◽  
Virtue Theory ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
The Good Life

Virtue ethics has its origin in the ancient world, particularly in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It has been revived following an article by G.E.M. Anscombe critical of modern ethics and advocating a return to the virtues. Some have argued that virtue ethics constitutes a third option in moral theory additional to utilitarianism and Kantianism. Utilitarians and Kantians have responded vigorously, plausibly claiming that their views already incorporate many of the theses allegedly peculiar to virtue ethics. Virtue theory, the study of notions, such as character, related to the virtues, has led to the recultivation of barren areas. These include: What is the good life, and what part does virtue play in it? How stringent are the demands of morality? Are moral reasons independent of agents’ particular concerns? Is moral rationality universal? Is morality to be captured in a set of rules, or is the sensitivity of a virtuous person central in ethics? From virtue ethics, and the virtue theory of which it is a part, have emerged answers to these questions at once rooted in ancient views and yet distinctively modern.

The Tao of Confucian Virtue Ethics

1995 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
James T. Bretzke ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Confucian Virtue
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