RÚXUÉ MĚIDÉ LÙN 儒学美德论 [ON CONFUCIAN VIRTUE THEORY]. ChénLái 陈来. Běijīng 北京: SDX Joint Publishing Company 生活•读书•新知三联书店, 2019. Pp. vii + 551. Hardback, ¥68.

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-437
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353
Author(s):  
George J. Aulisio ◽  

I show that Neo-Confucianism is practiced in two ways: (1) deontologically and (2) as a virtue ethical theory. When fully appreciated, Neo-Confucianism is a virtue ethical theory, but to set out on the path of the sage and behave like a junzi, Neo-Confucianism must first be practiced deontologically. I show this by examining the importance of Neo-Confucian metaphysics to ethical practice and by drawing out the major practical differences between “lesser learning” and “higher learning.” In my view, Neo-Confucianism can be practiced deontologically because some adherents may never move to practicing Neo-Confucianism as a virtue theory.


2016 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 328-341
Author(s):  
Lei Zhong

Author(s):  
Aaron Stalnaker

This chapter examines the early Confucian conception of virtuous mastery or expertise. It develops an account of early Confucian virtue theory, bolstered by sustained studies of ritual propriety and wisdom. It argues that virtues should be understood as forms of mastery that combine both skill and virtue. The chapter analyzes competing interpretations of Aristotle’s influential discussion of skill and virtue. It supports Russell and Annas, who accent the way Aristotelian virtues are like skills, or involve skill, against MacIntyre and others who find deep differences between skill and virtue. Virtue does not appear automatically, but is rather something people must practice to develop, and like other forms of mastery produces a spectrum of achievement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Bai ◽  
Grace Ching Chi Ho ◽  
Jin Yan

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