William Ockham, Theologian: Convicted for Lack of Evidence

1969 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-398
Author(s):  
Connor J Chambers
Keyword(s):  
William Ockham

scholarly journals Emotions and Cognitions. Fourteenth-Century Discussions on the Passions of the Soul

Vivarium ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominik Perler
Keyword(s):  
Functional Analysis ◽  
Fourteenth Century ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Complex Phenomenon ◽  
Emotional Conflict ◽  
Cognitive Component ◽  
Cognitive Components ◽  
Different Types ◽  
William Ockham ◽  
Intellectual Level

AbstractMedieval philosophers clearly recognized that emotions are not simply "raw feelings" but complex mental states that include cognitive components. They analyzed these components both on the sensory and on the intellectual level, paying particular attention to the different types of cognition that are involved. This paper focuses on William Ockham and Adam Wodeham, two fourteenth-century authors who presented a detailed account of "sensory passions" and "volitional passions". It intends to show that these two philosophers provided both a structural and a functional analysis of emotions, i.e., they explained the various elements constituting emotions and delineated the causal relations between these elements. Ockham as well as Wodeham emphasized that "sensory passions" are not only based upon cognitions but include a cognitive component and are therefore intentional. In addition, they pointed out that "volitional passions" are based upon a conceptualization and an evaluation of given objects. This cognitivist approach to emotions enabled them to explain the complex phenomenon of emotional conflict, a phenomenon that has its origin in the co-presence of various emotions that involve conflicting evaluations.

Intuitive Cognition, Certainty, and Scepticism in William Ockham

Traditio ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 389-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilyn McCord Adams
Keyword(s):  
Logical Possibility ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
William Ockham ◽  
Etienne Gilson

Ockham's doctrine of intuitive cognition lies at the heart of his epistemology. As Philotheus Boehner and Sebastian Day have quite rightly observed, one of the central aims of this doctrine is to answer the question how the intellect can have certain knowledge of contingent states of affairs (including the existence or non-existence of material particulars). A number of scholars, including Etienne Gilson and Anton Pegis, have charged, however, that far from achieving this goal, Ockham's doctrine (and especially what he says about the logical possibility of intuitive cognition of non-existents) leads to scepticism. Coming to Ockham's defense, Boehner and Day have rejected these criticisms as resting on misinterpretations of Ockham. I believe Boehner and Day have done much to clarify what Ockham actually meant. I should like to reopen the discussion, however, because I believe not all the consequences of Oekham's doctrine have been accurately drawn.

William Ockham on the Psychology of Christ

Quaestio ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 699-710
Author(s):  
Vesa Hirvonen
Keyword(s):  
William Ockham

The Expressive Power of Medieval Logic

Vivarium ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 511-521
Author(s):  
Terry Parsons
Keyword(s):  
Fourteenth Century ◽  
Expressive Power ◽  
Medieval Logic ◽  
Anaphoric Pronouns ◽  
William Ockham ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

Abstract This paper is about the development of logic in the Aristotelian tradition, from Aristotle to the mid-fourteenth century. I will compare four systems of logic with regard to their expressive power. 1. Aristotle’s own logic, based mostly on chapters 1-2 and 4-7 of his Prior Analytics 2. An expanded version of Aristotle’s logic that one finds, e.g., in Sherwood’s Introduction to Logic and Peter of Spain’s Tractatus 3-5. Versions of the logic of later supposition theorists such as William Ockham, John Buridan, and Paul of Venice. Version 4 is the logic without relatives (anaphoric pronouns); version 5 adds relatives. I am ignoring modals, conditionals that are not ut nunc, infinitizing negation, exclusives and exceptives, all exponibles, all insolubles, and terms with simple or material supposition, ampliation and restriction, and many other things.

scholarly journals William Ockham on the Scope and Limits of Consciousness

Vivarium ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 197-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Brower-Toland
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Regress Problem ◽  
Perception Theory ◽  
William Ockham ◽  
Limited Scope

William Ockham (ca. 1287-1347) holds what nowadays would be characterized as a “higher-order perception” theory of consciousness. Historically speaking, one of the most persistent objections to this type of theory is the charge that it gives rise to an infinite regress in higher-order states. In this paper, I examine Ockham’s efforts to respond to the regress problem, focusing in particular on his attempts to restrict the scope of consciousness so as to avoid it. In his earlier writings, Ockham holds that we are conscious only of those states to which we explicitly attend. This view, I go on to argue, is inadequate on both phenomenological and philosophical grounds. Interestingly, and perhaps for this very reason, in later works, Ockham goes on to develop an alternative explanation for his account of the limited scope of consciousness.

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