Prior’s Turn to Medieval Logic

The peculiar aspect of medieval logic, that the truth-value of propositions changes with time, gradually disappeared as Europe exited the Renaissance. In modern logic, it was assumed by W.V.O. Quine that one cannot appreciate modern symbolic logic if one does not take it to be tenseless. A.N. Prior’s invention of tense-logic challenged Quine’s view and can be seen as a turn to medieval logic. However, Prior’s discussion of the philosophical problems related to quantified tense-logic led him to reject essential aspects of medieval logic. This invites an evaluation of Prior’s formalisation of tense-logic as, in part, an argument in favour of the medieval view of propositions. This article argues that Prior’s turn to medieval logic is hampered by his unwillingness to accept essential medieval assumptions regarding facts about objects that do not exist. Furthermore, it is argued that presentists should learn an important lesson from Prior’s struggle with accepting the implications of quantified tense-logic and reject theories that purport to be presentism as unorthodox if they also affirm Quine’s view on ontic commitment. In the widest sense: philosophers who, like Prior, turn to the medieval view of propositions must accept a worldview with facts about individuals that, in principle, do not supervene (present tense) on being, for they do not yet exist.

One More Thing

A medieval pragmatic orientation in grammar emerged from both theoretical and practical knowledge. Medieval pragmatic approaches to language actualized an alternate (Laclau and Mouffe [2000] would say “antagonistic”) hegemony, a discursive space of thinking differently about language, meaning, and communication. Pragmatically oriented grammarians reanalyzed many examples of (propositional) speech found in medieval logic texts and more formalist grammatical writing and arrived at different conclusions. They found descriptive value and analytic productivity in what others regarded as fallacies and errors. In effect, pragmatically oriented grammarians actualized as meaningful potential alternatives in the linguistic system. Some of those alternatives are exemplified in poetic discourse and how heretics talk.

Chaucer’s “Summoner’s Tale” and the Logic of Literature

This essay discusses the fart joke that ends Geoffrey Chaucer’s “Summoner’s Tale.” It argues that the joke uses the language of medieval philosophy to satirize the work of medieval Scholastic philosophers. The essay begins by examining Chaucer’s relationship to philosophy more broadly and the scholarly controversies over Chaucer’s familiarity with this field of knowledge. It focuses on the way Chaucer uses disciplinary-specific jargon from philosophy, and from medieval logic more particularly, in “The Summoner’s Tale.” The language and content of the joke in “The Summoner’s Tale” are a burlesque play on the interests of the Merton Calculators, who used the logical thinking Scholasticism had developed in response to theological problems to investigate problems associated with natural philosophy. Chaucer’s joke reveals the way that the logical work of philosophers like Thomas Aquinas and the Merton Calculators relies on formal qualities more closely associated with literature, namely, character and narrative. In making a case that literature and logic rely on these same formal structures, Chaucer affirms literature’s capacity to present examples, concrete manifestations of philosophical or logical problems. He suggests that logic is attempting to make stories to work out problems, something that literature can do more effectively.

Baroco: The Logic of English Baroque Poetics

As many scholars, including the editors of the Oxford English Dictionary, continue to cite false etymologies of the baroque, this article returns to a Scholastic syllogism called baroco to demonstrate the relevance of medieval logic to the history of aesthetics. The syllogism is connected to early modern art forms that Enlightenment critics considered excessively complicated or absurdly confusing. Focusing on the emergence of baroque logic in Neo-Latin rhetoric and English poetics, this article traces the development of increasingly outlandish rhetorical practices of copia during the sixteenth century that led to similarly far-fetched poetic practices during the seventeenth century. John Stockwood’s Progymnasma scholasticum (1597) is read alongside Richard Crashaw’s Epigrammatum sacrorum liber (1634) and Steps to the Temple (1646) to reveal the effects of Erasmian rhetorical exercises on English educational practices and the production of English baroque poetry. In the end, the article demonstrates the conceptual unity of the baroque by showing the consistency between critiques of baroco, critiques of English metaphysical poetry, and critiques of baroque art during the Enlightenment.