scholarly journals Cooperative Approaches to Managing Social Responsibility in a Market with Externalities

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1215-1233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Fang ◽  
Soo-Haeng Cho
Keyword(s):  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Environmental Standards ◽  
Cooperative Approach ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Partition Function Form ◽  
Careful Assessment ◽  
Independent Audit ◽  
Number Of Firms

Problem definition: This paper studies two cooperative approaches of firms in managing social responsibility violations of their supplier: auditing a common supplier jointly (joint auditing) and sharing independent audit results with other firms (audit sharing). We study this problem in a market with externalities and a large number of firms. Academic/practical relevance: With numerous firms procuring their materials and parts worldwide, there are many cases in which overseas suppliers violate safety, labor, or environmental standards. Those violations have externalities in the sense that one firm’s violation affects other firms in the same market. It is not clear how such externalities affect competing firms’ incentives to cooperate and the effectiveness of such cooperation. Methodology: We develop a model based on a cooperative game in partition function form, which enables us to analyze the competitive and cooperative interactions of a large number of firms in a market. Results: Although there has been concern about cooperation for fear of compromising a competitive advantage, firms have incentives to cooperate in managing their suppliers when one firm can be hurt by others’ violations, that is, the negative externality is high. However, neither cooperative approach necessarily improves social responsibility, especially when one firm can benefit from others’ violations, that is, the positive externality is high. Finally, even if agreement is not reached for cooperation before conducting individual audits, social responsibility can still be improved by incentivizing firms to share their private audit results with others under a properly designed mechanism. Managerial implications: The careful assessment of the externalities associated with social responsibility violations is a key to the success of joint auditing and audit sharing. Although firms cooperate voluntarily in some cases, a government agency or an industry association should intervene in other cases to motivate cooperation if it is beneficial. In addition, caution must be taken to monitor manufacturers’ audit efforts, especially when cooperative approaches are implemented in the market where competition is fierce and consumers switch brands easily.

Supplier Centrality and Auditing Priority in Socially Responsible Supply Chains

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1199-1214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiayu Chen ◽  
Anyan Qi ◽  
Milind Dawande
Keyword(s):  
Child Labor ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Supply Networks ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Negative Publicity ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Number Of Firms

Problem definition: A key question in socially responsible supply networks is as follows: When firms audit some, but not all, of their respective suppliers, how do the degree centralities of the suppliers (i.e., the number of firms to which they supply) affect their auditing priority from the viewpoint of the firms? To investigate, we consider an assembly network consisting of two firms and three suppliers; each firm has one independent supplier that uniquely supplies to that firm and one common supplier that supplies to both. Academic/practical relevance: Most supply networks are characterized by firms that source from multiple suppliers and suppliers that serve multiple firms, thus resulting in suppliers who differ in their degree centrality. In such networks, any negative publicity from suppliers’ noncompliance with socially responsible practices—for example, employment of child labor, unsafe working conditions, and excessive pollution—can significantly damage the reputation of the buying firms. To mitigate this impact, firms preemptively audit suppliers although resource and time considerations typically restrict the number of suppliers a firm can audit. Consequently, it becomes important to understand the impact of the degree centralities of the suppliers on the priority with which firms audit them. Methodology: Game-theoretic analysis. Results: Downstream competition between the firms drives them away from auditing the supplier with higher centrality, that is, the common supplier, in equilibrium, despite the fact that auditing this supplier is better for the aggregate profit of the firms. We show that this inefficiency is corrected when the firms cooperate (via a stable coalition) to jointly audit the suppliers and share the auditing cost in a fair manner. We also identify conditions under which joint auditing improves social welfare. Managerial implications: We have two main messages: (i) individual incentives can lead firms to deprioritize the auditing of structurally important suppliers, which is inefficient; (ii) the practice of joint auditing can correct this inefficiency.

scholarly journals Motivating Supplier Social Responsibility Under Incomplete Visibility

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1268-1286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Kraft ◽  
León Valdés ◽  
Yanchong Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Practical Relevance ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Problem definition: We examine how a profit-driven firm (she) can motivate better social responsibility (SR) practices by a supplier (he) when these practices cannot be perfectly observed by the firm. We focus on the firm’s investment in the supplier’s SR capabilities. To capture the influence of consumer demands, we incorporate the potential for SR information to be disclosed by the firm or revealed by a third party. Academic/practical relevance: Most firms have limited visibility into the SR practices of their suppliers. However, there is little research on how a firm under incomplete visibility should (i) invest to improve a supplier’s SR practices and (ii) disclose SR information to consumers. We address this gap. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model with asymmetric information to study a supply chain with one supplier and one firm. The firm makes her investment decision given incomplete information about the supplier’s current SR practices. We analyze and compare two settings: the firm does not disclose versus she discloses SR information to the consumers. Results: The firm should invest a high (low) amount in the supplier’s capabilities if the information she observes suggests the supplier’s current SR practices are poor (good). She should always be more aggressive with her investment when disclosing (versus not disclosing). This more aggressive strategy ensures better supplier SR practices under disclosure. When choosing between disclosing and not disclosing, the firm most likely prefers not to disclose when the supplier’s current SR practices seem to be average. Managerial implications: (i) Greater visibility helps the firm to better tailor her investment to the level of support needed. (ii) Better visibility also makes the firm more “truthful” in her disclosure, whereas increased third-party scrutiny makes her more “cautious.” (iii) Mandating disclosure is most beneficial for SR when the suppliers’ current practices seem to be average.

Sourcing from a Self-Reporting Supplier: Strategic Communication of Social Responsibility in a Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tao Lu ◽  
Brian Tomlin
Keyword(s):  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Strategic Communication ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Self Assessment ◽  
High Type ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
The Social ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Self Assessments

Problem definition: To manage supplier social responsibility (SR), some firms have adopted a self-assessment strategy whereby they ask suppliers to self-report SR capabilities. Self-reported information is difficult to verify, and this leads to an important credibility question: can a buyer expect truthful reporting? We examine whether a supplier’s SR capability can be credibly communicated through free and unverifiable self-reporting. Academic/practical relevance: SR is a strategic focus for firms because consumers care about ethical production. Some firms rely on supplier self-assessment as part of their SR strategy. It is important to understand the value and challenges of this approach. Methodology: We develop a cheap talk model of a supplier and a buyer. The supplier is endowed with a given SR level (privately known to the supplier) that represents the probability of no violation. The buyer sells in a market that is sensitive to publicized SR violations. The supplier first communicates its SR level to the buyer, and then the buyer chooses between two audit stringency levels to conduct on the supplier and also chooses how much to order. Results: Influential truthful communication may emerge in equilibrium if (i) the buyer orders a larger quantity from the high-type supplier but imposes a more stringent audit than the buyer would for the low type and (ii) the high-type supplier opts for this larger order, whereas the low-type, fearing audit failure, does not. The buyer can benefit as the audit becomes more expensive. Managerial implications: Supplier SR self-assessments can be a valuable strategy for buyers but only if the buyer has access to auditing capabilities of different levels and does not precommit to a particular level. It is valuable for firms to engage in an up-front auditing step to ensure a minimum SR capability of approved suppliers because very low-performing suppliers never truthfully report. Implementing supplier self-assessments may or may not help reduce the social damage resulting from potential SR violations; we identify situations when it helps and when it does not.

Conclusions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoff Moore
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Organizational Ethics ◽  
Stakeholder Approach ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Do So

The purpose of the concluding chapter is to review and draw some conclusions from all that has been covered in previous chapters. To do so, it first summarizes the MacIntyrean virtue ethics approach, particularly at the individual level. It then reconsiders the organizational and managerial implications, drawing out some of the themes which have emerged from the various studies which have been explored particularly in Chapters 8 and 9. In doing so, the chapter considers a question which has been implicit in the discussions to this point: how feasible is all of this, particularly for organizations? In the light of that, it revisits the earlier critique of current approaches to organizational ethics (Corporate Social Responsibility and the stakeholder approach), before concluding.

Partial Completion as a Nonprofit Strategy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Can Zhang ◽  
Atalay Atasu ◽  
Karthik Ramachandran
Keyword(s):  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Service Provision ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Product Service ◽  
Service Portfolio ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Partial Completion ◽  
Innovative Solution ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Level 3

Problem definition: Faced with the challenge of serving beneficiaries with heterogeneous needs and under budget constraints, some nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have adopted an innovative solution: providing partially complete products or services to beneficiaries. We seek to understand what drives an NPO’s choice of partial completion as a design strategy and how it interacts with the level of variety offered in the NPO’s product or service portfolio. Academic/practical relevance: Although partial product or service provision has been observed in the nonprofit operations, there is limited understanding of when it is an appropriate strategy—a void that we seek to fill in this paper. Methodology: We synthesize the practices of two NPOs operating in different contexts to develop a stylized analytical model to study an NPO’s product/service completion and variety choices. Results: We identify when and to what extent partial completion is optimal for an NPO. We also characterize a budget allocation structure for an NPO between product/service variety and completion. Our analysis sheds light on how beneficiary characteristics (e.g., heterogeneity of their needs, capability to self-complete) and NPO objectives (e.g., total-benefit maximization versus fairness) affect the optimal levels of variety and completion. Managerial implications: We provide three key observations. (1) Partial completion is not a compromise solution to budget limitations but can be an optimal strategy for NPOs under a wide range of circumstances, even in the presence of ample resources. (2) Partial provision is particularly valuable when beneficiary needs are highly heterogeneous, or beneficiaries have high self-completion capabilities. A higher self-completion capability generally implies a lower optimal completion level; however, it may lead to either a higher or a lower optimal variety level. (3) Although providing incomplete products may appear to burden beneficiaries, a lower completion level can be optimal when fairness is factored into an NPO’s objective or when beneficiary capabilities are more heterogeneous.

The Effects of Patent Extension and Take-Back Regulation on Green Pharmacy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tianqin Shi ◽  
Nicholas C. Petruzzi ◽  
Dilip Chhajed
Keyword(s):  
Pharmaceutical Industry ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Technical Information ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Innovative Company ◽  
Take Back ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
European Environmental Agency ◽  
Managerial Implications

Problem definition: The eco-toxicity arising from unused pharmaceuticals has regulators advocating the benign design concept of “green pharmacy,” but high research and development expenses can be prohibitive. We therefore examine the impacts of two regulatory mechanisms, patent extension and take-back regulation, on inducing drug manufacturers to go green. Academic/practical relevance: One incentive suggested by the European Environmental Agency is a patent extension for a company that redesigns its already patented pharmaceutical to be more environmentally friendly. This incentive can encourage both the development of degradable drugs and the disclosure of technical information. Yet, it is unclear how effective the extension would be in inducing green pharmacy and in maximizing social welfare. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model in which an innovative company collects monopoly profits for a patented pharmaceutical but faces competition from a generic rival after the patent expires. A social-welfare-maximizing regulator is the Stackelberg leader. The regulator leads by offering a patent extension to the innovative company while also imposing take-back regulation on the pharmaceutical industry. Then the two-profit maximizing companies respond by setting drug prices and choosing whether to invest in green pharmacy. Results: The regulator’s optimal patent extension offer can induce green pharmacy but only if the offer exceeds a threshold length that depends on the degree of product differentiation present in the pharmaceutical industry. The regulator’s correspondingly optimal take-back regulation generally prescribes a required collection rate that decreases as its optimal patent extension offer increases, and vice versa. Managerial implications: By isolating green pharmacy as a potential target to address pharmaceutical eco-toxicity at its source, the regulatory policy that we consider, which combines the incentive inherent in earning a patent extension on the one hand with the penalty inherent in complying with take-back regulation on the other hand, serves as a useful starting point for policymakers to optimally balance economic welfare considerations with environmental stewardship considerations.

Truthful Mechanisms for Medical Surplus Product Allocation

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Can Zhang ◽  
Atalay Atasu ◽  
Turgay Ayer ◽  
L. Beril Toktay
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Information Provision ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Preference Ranking ◽  
Additional Increase ◽  
Healthcare Facilities ◽  
Selection Decisions ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Recipient Selection

Problem definition: We analyze a resource allocation problem faced by medical surplus recovery organizations (MSROs) that recover medical surplus products to fulfill the needs of underserved healthcare facilities in developing countries. The objective of this study is to identify implementable strategies to support recipient selection decisions to improve MSROs’ value provision capability. Academic/practical relevance: MSRO supply chains face several challenges that differ from those in traditional for-profit settings, and there is a lack of both academic and practical understanding of how to better match supply with demand in this setting where recipient needs are typically private information. Methodology: We propose a mechanism design approach to determine which recipient to serve at each shipping opportunity based on recipients’ reported preference rankings of different products. Results: We find that when MSRO inventory information is shared with recipients, the only truthful mechanism is random selection among recipients, which defeats the purpose of eliciting information. Subsequently, we show that (1) eliminating inventory information provision enlarges the set of truthful mechanisms, thereby increasing the total value provision; and (2) further withholding information regarding other recipients leads to an additional increase in total value provision. Finally, we show that under a class of implementable mechanisms, eliciting recipient valuations has no value added beyond eliciting preference rankings. Managerial implications: (1) MSROs with large recipient bases and low inventory levels can significantly improve their value provision by appropriately determining the recipients to serve through a simple scoring mechanism; (2) to truthfully elicit recipient needs information to support the recipient selection decisions, MSROs should withhold inventory and recipient-base information; and (3) under a set of easy-to-implement scoring mechanisms, it is sufficient for MSROs to elicit recipients’ preference ranking information. Our findings have already led to a change in the practice of an award-winning MSRO.

scholarly journals An examination of linkages between corporate social responsibility and firm performance: Evidence from Moroccan listed firms

2021 ◽  
pp. 636-646
Author(s):  
Souhaila Kammoun ◽  
Youssra Ben Romdhane ◽  
Sahar Loukil ◽  
Abdelmajid Ibenrissoul
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Social Enterprises ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Corporate Social

This article analyzes the complexity of the linkages between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm performance in Morocco and to decompose this complexity through a bidirectional sense of causality. Using data surveyed from 74 Moroccan listed firms, we conduct an econometric modeling to measure this relationship bilaterally and to investigate the underlying factors behind this association. The empirical study proves the existence of a positive association between CSR and firm performance in both directions in the Moroccan context and suggests that the more social enterprises are, the more they achieve better financial results. The mutual linkage between social and financial aspects allows us to draw some managerial implications and set up further research directions.

scholarly journals PENGARUH TATA KELOLA PERUSAHAAN DAN KARAKTERISTIK PERUSAHAAN TERHADAP PENGUNGKAPAN TANGGUNG JAWAB SOSIAL PERUSAHAAN

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 572-590
Author(s):  
Yulius Kurnia Susanto ◽  
Daves Joshua
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Firm Age ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Independent Audit ◽  
Firm Characteristic

The purpose of this study was to get empirical evidence about the effect of corporate governance and firm characteristic on corporate social responsibility disclosure. The corporate governance include board size, board independent, audit committee, ownership concentration, foreign ownership and public ownership. The firm characteristic include firm size, leverage, firm age, type of industry and profitability. Sample of this study consisted of 690 data from 179 non finance companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2014 and selected by purposive sampling method. Data were analyzed by multiple regression analysis. The results showed thatboard independent, audit committee, ownership concentration, public ownership, firm size and type of industry have an effect on corporate social responsibility disclosure. While the board size, foreign ownership, leverage, firm age and profitability have no effect on corporate social responsibility disclosure.The better the corporate governance, the control and supervision of management to disclose information about corporate social responsibility is increasing. The bigger the company, the greater the demand for the company to disclose information about corporate social responsibility.

Managing Congestion in Matching Markets

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Arnosti ◽  
Ramesh Johari ◽  
Yash Kanoria
Keyword(s):  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Contact Potential ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Face Search ◽  
Uniqueness Of Equilibrium ◽  
Never Screened

Problem definition: Participants in matching markets face search and screening costs when seeking a match. We study how platform design can reduce the effort required to find a suitable partner. Practical/academic relevance: The success of matching platforms requires designs that minimize search effort and facilitate efficient market clearing. Methodology: We study a game-theoretic model in which “applicants” and “employers” pay costs to search and screen. An important feature of our model is that both sides may waste effort: Some applications are never screened, and employers screen applicants who may have already matched. We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and characterize welfare for participants on both sides of the market. Results: We identify that the market operates in one of two regimes: It is either screening-limited or application-limited. In screening-limited markets, employer welfare is low, and some employers choose not to participate. This occurs when application costs are low and there are enough employers that most applicants match, implying that many screened applicants are unavailable. In application-limited markets, applicants face a “tragedy of the commons” and send many applications that are never read. The resulting inefficiency is worst when there is a shortage of employers. We show that simple interventions—such as limiting the number of applications that an individual can send, making it more costly to apply, or setting an appropriate market-wide wage—can significantly improve the welfare of agents on one or both sides of the market. Managerial implications: Our results suggest that platforms cannot focus exclusively on attracting participants and making it easy to contact potential match partners. A good user experience requires that participants not waste effort considering possibilities that are unlikely to be available. The operational interventions we study alleviate congestion by ensuring that potential match partners are likely to be available.

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