Truthful Mechanisms for Medical Surplus Product Allocation

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Can Zhang ◽  
Atalay Atasu ◽  
Turgay Ayer ◽  
L. Beril Toktay

Problem definition: We analyze a resource allocation problem faced by medical surplus recovery organizations (MSROs) that recover medical surplus products to fulfill the needs of underserved healthcare facilities in developing countries. The objective of this study is to identify implementable strategies to support recipient selection decisions to improve MSROs’ value provision capability. Academic/practical relevance: MSRO supply chains face several challenges that differ from those in traditional for-profit settings, and there is a lack of both academic and practical understanding of how to better match supply with demand in this setting where recipient needs are typically private information. Methodology: We propose a mechanism design approach to determine which recipient to serve at each shipping opportunity based on recipients’ reported preference rankings of different products. Results: We find that when MSRO inventory information is shared with recipients, the only truthful mechanism is random selection among recipients, which defeats the purpose of eliciting information. Subsequently, we show that (1) eliminating inventory information provision enlarges the set of truthful mechanisms, thereby increasing the total value provision; and (2) further withholding information regarding other recipients leads to an additional increase in total value provision. Finally, we show that under a class of implementable mechanisms, eliciting recipient valuations has no value added beyond eliciting preference rankings. Managerial implications: (1) MSROs with large recipient bases and low inventory levels can significantly improve their value provision by appropriately determining the recipients to serve through a simple scoring mechanism; (2) to truthfully elicit recipient needs information to support the recipient selection decisions, MSROs should withhold inventory and recipient-base information; and (3) under a set of easy-to-implement scoring mechanisms, it is sufficient for MSROs to elicit recipients’ preference ranking information. Our findings have already led to a change in the practice of an award-winning MSRO.

Author(s):  
Andrew M. Davis ◽  
Kyle Hyndman

Problem definition: We conduct a controlled human-subjects experiment in a two-tier supply chain where a supplier’s per-unit production cost may be private information while bargaining with a buyer. Academic/practical relevance: Academically, supply chain studies often assume full-information or highly structured bargaining. We consider private information with dynamic, unstructured bargaining. In practice, a buyer may not know its supplier’s cost exactly and interact with its supplier in a back-and-forth bargaining environment. Thus, understanding how a supplier’s private cost information affects both supply chain outcomes and bargaining is new to the literature and relevant to practice. Methodology: We employ insights from mechanism design to generate restrictions on the space of agreements and solve for a specific bargaining solution under private information to generate precise predictions. These predictions are then tested through a human-subjects experiment. Results: In our experiment, theory predicts that all supplier types should earn at least 50% of total profits when their cost information is private. However, we find that high-cost suppliers earn a disproportionately low share of total profits under private information, 20.16%. We show that this is because buyers, under private information, act as if they are bargaining with the lowest-cost supplier and suppliers do not appear to blame buyers for behaving this way. Based on these findings, we conduct an additional experiment where suppliers have the ability to communicate their private costs to buyers and observe that verifiable disclosure significantly increases profits for high-cost suppliers. Managerial implications: High-cost suppliers actually suffer from having their costs as private information, which runs counter to theory. However, if high-cost suppliers can credibly disclose their costs to buyers, they can significantly increase profits. Lastly, although private information does not lead to more disagreements, negotiations do take longer, which can be costly to firms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 906-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nektarios Oraiopoulos ◽  
Stylianos Kavadias

Problem definition: Is a committee composed of more or less cognitively diverse members better at approving the “good” projects and rejecting the “bad” ones? Academic/practical relevance: We contribute to the operations management literature by accounting for the fact that critical selection decisions are often made by a committee rather than a single decision maker. Understanding how the magnitude of diversity affects the decision quality of such a committee is an important consideration for practitioners. Methodology: We utilize a game-theoretic model to show that diverse perspectives are rarely “averaged out.” Results: Diversity leads to systematic biases in project selection. To mitigate the effect of diverse perspectives, managers need to uncover the sources of diversity: do they originate from different individual valuations and preferences, or do they express different assimilations of the information that arises during the project execution? We show that this distinction is crucial. Higher preference diversity always leads to higher likelihood of making the wrong decision. Higher interpretive diversity may be beneficial for the organization. Managerial implications: A clear managerial action is the need to identify and reduce such preference diversity. Senior management can achieve this by highlighting the need for more transparency in the pipeline of the business units. Moreover, our analysis shows that interpretive diversity can be a powerful managerial lever to influence the propensity for Type I and II errors. The latter might be easier to manage than the organizational structure.


Author(s):  
Can Zhang ◽  
Atalay Atasu ◽  
Karthik Ramachandran

Problem definition: Faced with the challenge of serving beneficiaries with heterogeneous needs and under budget constraints, some nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have adopted an innovative solution: providing partially complete products or services to beneficiaries. We seek to understand what drives an NPO’s choice of partial completion as a design strategy and how it interacts with the level of variety offered in the NPO’s product or service portfolio. Academic/practical relevance: Although partial product or service provision has been observed in the nonprofit operations, there is limited understanding of when it is an appropriate strategy—a void that we seek to fill in this paper. Methodology: We synthesize the practices of two NPOs operating in different contexts to develop a stylized analytical model to study an NPO’s product/service completion and variety choices. Results: We identify when and to what extent partial completion is optimal for an NPO. We also characterize a budget allocation structure for an NPO between product/service variety and completion. Our analysis sheds light on how beneficiary characteristics (e.g., heterogeneity of their needs, capability to self-complete) and NPO objectives (e.g., total-benefit maximization versus fairness) affect the optimal levels of variety and completion. Managerial implications: We provide three key observations. (1) Partial completion is not a compromise solution to budget limitations but can be an optimal strategy for NPOs under a wide range of circumstances, even in the presence of ample resources. (2) Partial provision is particularly valuable when beneficiary needs are highly heterogeneous, or beneficiaries have high self-completion capabilities. A higher self-completion capability generally implies a lower optimal completion level; however, it may lead to either a higher or a lower optimal variety level. (3) Although providing incomplete products may appear to burden beneficiaries, a lower completion level can be optimal when fairness is factored into an NPO’s objective or when beneficiary capabilities are more heterogeneous.


Author(s):  
Tianqin Shi ◽  
Nicholas C. Petruzzi ◽  
Dilip Chhajed

Problem definition: The eco-toxicity arising from unused pharmaceuticals has regulators advocating the benign design concept of “green pharmacy,” but high research and development expenses can be prohibitive. We therefore examine the impacts of two regulatory mechanisms, patent extension and take-back regulation, on inducing drug manufacturers to go green. Academic/practical relevance: One incentive suggested by the European Environmental Agency is a patent extension for a company that redesigns its already patented pharmaceutical to be more environmentally friendly. This incentive can encourage both the development of degradable drugs and the disclosure of technical information. Yet, it is unclear how effective the extension would be in inducing green pharmacy and in maximizing social welfare. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model in which an innovative company collects monopoly profits for a patented pharmaceutical but faces competition from a generic rival after the patent expires. A social-welfare-maximizing regulator is the Stackelberg leader. The regulator leads by offering a patent extension to the innovative company while also imposing take-back regulation on the pharmaceutical industry. Then the two-profit maximizing companies respond by setting drug prices and choosing whether to invest in green pharmacy. Results: The regulator’s optimal patent extension offer can induce green pharmacy but only if the offer exceeds a threshold length that depends on the degree of product differentiation present in the pharmaceutical industry. The regulator’s correspondingly optimal take-back regulation generally prescribes a required collection rate that decreases as its optimal patent extension offer increases, and vice versa. Managerial implications: By isolating green pharmacy as a potential target to address pharmaceutical eco-toxicity at its source, the regulatory policy that we consider, which combines the incentive inherent in earning a patent extension on the one hand with the penalty inherent in complying with take-back regulation on the other hand, serves as a useful starting point for policymakers to optimally balance economic welfare considerations with environmental stewardship considerations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 6-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iryna Oleynikova ◽  
Zhanna Balabaniuk

Nowadays the main potential for growth comes from the ability to innovate and succeed with breakthrough ideas. However, despite growing importance of the subject matter, there are still no standard practices that would perform such a measurement and employ tendencies of human capital circulation. Various attempts have been made over recent years, but none have achieved general acceptance among experts in the business field. Although there is no universally accepted theory, each has its own strengths and weaknesses in the deriving approximate value of intellectual capital for various companies. In this work, we looked over some theories that have been suggested to estimate intellectual capital and analyzed data from Ukrainian IT companies in order to prove how important measurement of intellectual capital and human capital circulation trends to allow for much better representation of an organization’s competitive position. Additionally, the impact of intellectual capital on various Key Performance Indicators, such as Economic Value Added and Weighted Average Cost of Capital, was examined with supporting financial analysis performed. The paper concludes with an overview of methodological and managerial implications of the research, theoretical and practical limitations and possible improvements, and considerations for further research in the field of study.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adeline S.A. Du Toit ◽  
Nisha Sewdass

Orientation: This article compared competitive intelligence activities in Brazil, Malaysia, Morocco and South Africa.Research purpose: The purpose was to determine how these countries can use competitive intelligence to increase their competitiveness in the global economy.Motivation for the study: Competitive intelligence is a challenge in developing economies.Research design, approach and method: A questionnaire survey was sent to competitive intelligence professionals in the four study countries.Main findings: The most important primary information source used in all four countries is direct customer feedback and the most important secondary information source used is corporate websites. Companies in all four countries did not use advanced analysis techniques.Practical/managerial implications: It is recommended that all four countries should develop a competitive intelligence culture by creating awareness of competitive intelligence amongst their employees.Contribution/value added: It is crucial to apply competitive intelligence in the four countries in order to become more competitive in the global economy.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S413-S432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gungor Hacioglu ◽  
Osman Gök

This study explores which metrics are considered important in measuring marketing performance in Turkish firms. In addition, the study examines the effects of sectoral differences and market dynamism, and the relationship between the importance attached to metrics and firm performance. The data collected from a sample of 145 Turkish firms via a structured questionnaire derived from the literature reveals that the most importance is attached to consumers’ attitudes metrics. Economic value added and customer lifetime value are the least important metrics in performance evaluation. No significant relationship occurs between the importance that executives attach to metrics and firm performance. Managerial implications and future research opportunities will be presented at the end. The study is, as far as is known, the first attempt at aiming to explore marketing metrics in Turkey, and one of a limited number of studies in emerging economies.


Author(s):  
Nick Arnosti ◽  
Ramesh Johari ◽  
Yash Kanoria

Problem definition: Participants in matching markets face search and screening costs when seeking a match. We study how platform design can reduce the effort required to find a suitable partner. Practical/academic relevance: The success of matching platforms requires designs that minimize search effort and facilitate efficient market clearing. Methodology: We study a game-theoretic model in which “applicants” and “employers” pay costs to search and screen. An important feature of our model is that both sides may waste effort: Some applications are never screened, and employers screen applicants who may have already matched. We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and characterize welfare for participants on both sides of the market. Results: We identify that the market operates in one of two regimes: It is either screening-limited or application-limited. In screening-limited markets, employer welfare is low, and some employers choose not to participate. This occurs when application costs are low and there are enough employers that most applicants match, implying that many screened applicants are unavailable. In application-limited markets, applicants face a “tragedy of the commons” and send many applications that are never read. The resulting inefficiency is worst when there is a shortage of employers. We show that simple interventions—such as limiting the number of applications that an individual can send, making it more costly to apply, or setting an appropriate market-wide wage—can significantly improve the welfare of agents on one or both sides of the market. Managerial implications: Our results suggest that platforms cannot focus exclusively on attracting participants and making it easy to contact potential match partners. A good user experience requires that participants not waste effort considering possibilities that are unlikely to be available. The operational interventions we study alleviate congestion by ensuring that potential match partners are likely to be available.


Author(s):  
Hanlin Liu ◽  
Yimin Yu

Problem definition: We study shared service whereby multiple independent service providers collaborate by pooling their resources into a shared service center (SSC). The SSC deploys an optimal priority scheduling policy for their customers collectively by accounting for their individual waiting costs and service-level requirements. We model the SSC as a multiclass [Formula: see text] queueing system subject to service-level constraints. Academic/practical relevance: Shared services are increasingly popular among firms for saving operational costs and improving service quality. One key issue in fostering collaboration is the allocation of costs among different firms. Methodology: To incentivize collaboration, we investigate cost allocation rules for the SSC by applying concepts from cooperative game theory. Results: To empower our analysis, we show that a cooperative game with polymatroid optimization can be analyzed via simple auxiliary games. By exploiting the polymatroidal structures of the multiclass queueing systems, we show when the games possess a core allocation. We explore the extent to which our results remain valid for some general cases. Managerial implications: We provide operational insights and guidelines on how to allocate costs for the SSC under the multiserver queueing context with priorities.


Author(s):  
Yanzhe (Murray) Lei ◽  
Stefanus Jasin ◽  
Joline Uichanco ◽  
Andrew Vakhutinsky

Problem definition: We study a joint product framing and order fulfillment problem with both inventory and cardinality constraints faced by an e-commerce retailer. There is a finite selling horizon and no replenishment opportunity. In each period, the retailer needs to decide how to “frame” (i.e., display, rank, price) each product on his or her website as well as how to fulfill a new demand. Academic/practical relevance: E-commerce retail is known to suffer from thin profit margins. Using the data from a major U.S. retailer, we show that jointly planning product framing and order fulfillment can have a significant impact on online retailers’ profitability. This is a technically challenging problem as it involves both inventory and cardinality constraints. In this paper, we make progress toward resolving this challenge. Methodology: We use techniques such as randomized algorithms and graph-based algorithms to provide a tractable solution heuristic that we analyze through asymptotic analysis. Results: Our proposed randomized heuristic policy is based on the solution of a deterministic approximation to the stochastic control problem. The key challenge is in constructing a randomization scheme that is easy to implement and that guarantees the resulting policy is asymptotically optimal. We propose a novel two-step randomization scheme based on the idea of matrix decomposition and a rescaling argument. Managerial implications: Our numerical tests show that the proposed policy is very close to optimal, can be applied to large-scale problems in practice, and highlights the value of jointly optimizing product framing and order fulfillment decisions. When inventory across the network is imbalanced, the widespread practice of planning product framing without considering its impact on fulfillment can result in high shipping costs, regardless of the fulfillment policy used. Our proposed policy significantly reduces shipping costs by using product framing to manage demand so that it occurs close to the location of the inventory.


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