Optimal Income Taxation with Present Bias

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 298-327
Author(s):  
Benjamin B. Lockwood
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Optimal Income Taxation ◽  
Earned Income ◽  
Present Bias ◽  
Optimal Tax ◽  
Multiple Dimensions ◽  
Low Incomes ◽  
Marginal Tax Rates ◽  
The Face

Work often entails up-front effort costs in exchange for delayed benefits, and mounting evidence documents present bias over effort in the face of such delays. This paper studies the implications for the optimal income tax. Optimal tax rates are computed for present-biased workers who choose multiple dimensions of labor effort, some of which occur prior to compensation. Present bias reduces optimal tax rates, with a larger effect when the elasticity of taxable income is high. Optimal marginal tax rates may be negative at low incomes, providing an alternative, corrective rationale for work subsidies like the Earned Income Tax Credit. (JEL D91, H21, H24)

EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES UNDER THE FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX: DEATH BY ONE THOUSAND PIN PRICKS?

1998 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 553-564
Author(s):  
THOMAS A. BARTHOLD ◽  
THOMAS KOERNER ◽  
JOHN F. NAVRATIL
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Individual Income ◽  
Marginal Tax Rates ◽  
Individual Income Tax

scholarly journals PROBABILITY MODEL OF POVERTY CALCULATION SUBJECT TO DIFFERENT FORMS OF INCOME TAXATION

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (4) ◽  
pp. 101-111
Author(s):  
Andrej Vyacheslavovich Mikheev
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Probability Model ◽  
Single Stage ◽  
Income Taxation ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Total Income ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Low Incomes ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Tax Systems

The article highlights a probabilistic model constructed for calculating the number of poor and the total income tax levied on all taxpayers under different income tax systems. There is considered the proportional income tax system adopted in the Russian Federation, as well as single-stage systems with both fixed and variable tax rates, in which individuals with low incomes are exempted from income tax. For these tax systems there have been found the dependences of the expected value of the number of the poor and the total income tax on the tax rate, tax-free minimum, and also on the laws of probabilities distribution of total income and the living wage of an individual. A numerical simulation of the found dependences was carried out. The conditions under which the abolition of income tax for individuals with low incomes reduces the number of poor were determined. Mathematical criteria are formulated with the help of which it is possible to assess the feasibility of moving from a proportional system to single-stage income tax systems.

scholarly journals THE IMPACT OF TAX POLICY ON ECONOMIC GROWTH, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, AND ALLOCATION OF TAXES

2006 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 28-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Gwartney ◽  
Robert A. Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Income Distribution ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Personal Income Tax ◽  
Income Groups ◽  
Marginal Tax Rates ◽  
Tax Changes ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Distribution Of Income

Using a sample of seventy-seven countries, this paper focuses on marginal tax rates and the income thresholds at which they apply to examine how the tax changes of the 1980s and 1990s have influenced economic growth, the distribution of income, and the share of taxes paid by various income groups. Many countries substantially reduced their highest marginal rates during the 1985-1995 period. The findings indicate that countries that reduced their highest marginal rates grew more rapidly than those that maintained high marginal rates. At the same time, the income distribution in several of the tax cutting countries became more unequal while there was little change or even a reduction in income inequality in most countries that maintained high marginal rates. Finally, the evidence suggests that there was a shift in the payment of the personal income tax away from those with low and middle incomes and toward those with the highest incomes.

Welfarism, Libertarianism, and Fairness in the Economic Approach to Taxation

Taxation ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Fleurbaey
Keyword(s):  
Income Taxation ◽  
Fair Allocation ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Skilled Workers ◽  
Absolute Priority ◽  
Optimal Tax ◽  
Low Incomes ◽  
Utilitarian Approach ◽  
Selection Of

The economic theory of income taxation has recently been eager to apply philosophically prominent approaches to the selection of the optimal tax on earnings. This chapter presents and compares the consequentialist–utilitarian approach to taxation developed by Mirrlees and defended by Murphy and Nagel, to the fair allocation approach, as adapted to taxation problems by Fleurbaey and Maniquet. The fairness approach does retain an element of libertarianism and gives some value to market earnings. The two approaches have different recommendations for taxation, especially regarding low incomes, which are given absolute priority under the fairness approach, and may be submitted to lower tax rates out of respect for the diversity of preferences among the least skilled workers.

Taxes alone will not close the wealth gap in Africa

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Low Income ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Past ◽  
Revenue Sources ◽  
Low Incomes ◽  
Political Patronage ◽  
Per Capita

Subject Taxation effects on inequality in Africa. Significance Economic inequalities in African countries have failed to decline significantly despite gradual growth in per capita GDP over the past several years. Progressive taxation is weak in many countries, but improving this source of revenue alone will not close the inequality gap for some of the world's poorest. Impacts Political patronage and fear of elite emigration will discourage politicians from proposing progressive taxes. If introduced, higher taxes would only reduce inequality if collected transparently and invested in services for those with low incomes. Low income tax rates will limit revenue flows to fund major infrastructure projects, especially if other revenue sources are depressed.

Measuring Revenue-maximizing Elasticities of Taxable Income

2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Creedy ◽  
Norman Gemmell
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Tax System ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Taxable Income ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Us ◽  
Marginal Tax Rates ◽  
The Right

This article considers the question of whether marginal tax rates (MTRs) in the US income tax system are on the “right” side of their respective Laffer curves. Previous attention has tended to focus specifically on the top MTR. Conceptual expressions for these “revenue-maximizing elasticities of taxable income” (ETI L), based on readily observable tax parameters, are presented for each tax rate in a multi-rate income tax system. Applying these to the US income tax, with its complex effective marginal rate structure, demonstrates that a wide range of revenue-maximizing ETI values can be expected within, and across, tax brackets and for all taxpayers in aggregate. For some significant groups of taxpayers, these revenue-maximizing ETIs appear to be within the range of empirically estimated elasticities.

Taxation of Couples under Assortative Mating

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 155-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Frankel
Keyword(s):  
Assortative Mating ◽  
Optimal Taxation ◽  
Married Couples ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Optimal Tax ◽  
Marginal Tax Rates ◽  
Multidimensional Screening

I present a simple and tractable model of the optimal taxation of married couples, working off of the multidimensional screening framework of Armstrong and Rochet (1999). In particular, I study how the tax code varies with the degree of assortative mating. One result is that the “negative jointness” of marginal tax rates found in Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2007, 2009) for couples with uncorrelated earnings should be attenuated in the presence of assortative mating. When mating is sufficiently assortative, the optimal tax schedule is separable: an individual's taxes do not depend on his or her spouse's income. (JEL D82, H21, H24, J12)

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