Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments: Comment

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 836-839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Krawczyk ◽  
Fabrice Le Lec
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Implicit Assumption ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Do So ◽  
Observed Behavior

Based on experimental dictator games with probabilistic prospects, Brock, Lange, and Ozbay (2013) conclude that neither ex post nor ex ante comparisons can fully account for observed behavior. We argue that their conclusion that ex ante comparisons cannot explain the data is at best weakly supported by their results, and do so on three grounds: (i) the absence of significant differences between the most relevant treatments, (ii) the implicit assumption of subjects' risk neu trality, and (iii) the asymmetry of treatments regarding the disclosure of dictators' choice. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)

scholarly journals Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (1) ◽  
pp. 415-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Michelle Brock ◽  
Andreas Lange ◽  
Erkut Y Ozbay
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Behavioral Patterns ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Fairness Concerns

We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)

Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments: Reply

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 840-842 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Michelle Brock ◽  
Andreas Lange ◽  
Erkut Y. Ozbay
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Preference Model ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Fairness Concerns

In Brock, Lange, and Ozbay (2013), we experimentally investigate social preferences under risk. One of our conclusions is that a social preference model incorporating both ex ante and ex post fairness concerns may best describe behavior. Krawczyk and Le Lec (2016 ) argue that ex ante comparisons alone may account for our data. We address their points in this reply. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)

Let’s Talk: What FinReg Can Learn from New Governance (and Vice Versa)

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (04) ◽  
pp. 1241-1250
Author(s):  
Kimberly D. Krawiec
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Outcome Measures ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Law ◽  
Endogenous Process ◽  
Do So

Lauren Edelman’s Working Law: Courts, Corporation, and Symbolic Civil Rights (2016) is remarkably relevant to the study of financial regulation. In particular, three factors that Edelman identifies as contributing to legal endogeneity and symbolic compliance—ambiguous law, a lack of clear outcome measures, and the presence of legal intermediaries—are especially salient in this context. It has long been recognized that powerful financial institutions and the lawyers, lobbyists, and other agents who serve them have the ability to influence the law ex ante, through political lobbying. Edelman’s work reinforces the point that they may also do so ex post through an endogenous process of interpretation, implementation, and, ultimately, enshrinement of symbolic compliance with ambiguous law.

scholarly journals Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 493-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Fehr ◽  
Oliver Hart ◽  
Christian Zehnder
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Employment Relation ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
John Moore

Hart and John Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. We examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as reference points. The evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts—which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions—cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract. (JEL D44, D86, J41)

Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Performance of Optimal REIT Portfolios

CFA Digest ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-9
Author(s):  
Ann C. Logue
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Erreurs de prévision ex ante et ex post

1993 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-138
Author(s):  
Pierre Malgrange ◽  
Silvia Mira d'Ercole
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante
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