scholarly journals Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (1) ◽  
pp. 415-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Michelle Brock ◽  
Andreas Lange ◽  
Erkut Y Ozbay
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Behavioral Patterns ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Fairness Concerns

We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)

Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments: Reply

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 840-842 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Michelle Brock ◽  
Andreas Lange ◽  
Erkut Y. Ozbay
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Preference Model ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Fairness Concerns

In Brock, Lange, and Ozbay (2013), we experimentally investigate social preferences under risk. One of our conclusions is that a social preference model incorporating both ex ante and ex post fairness concerns may best describe behavior. Krawczyk and Le Lec (2016 ) argue that ex ante comparisons alone may account for our data. We address their points in this reply. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)

Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela Jakiela
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Important Determinant ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
The Status ◽  
Rural Kenya ◽  
Fairness Norms

We conduct a series of dictator games in which the status of the dictator relative to other players varies across treatments. Experiments are conducted in a conventional university lab and in villages in rural Kenya. We find that status is an important determinant of dictator game giving, but the relative importance of earned and unearned status differs across cultures.

scholarly journals Social Preferences under Risk: Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Outcome

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (7) ◽  
pp. 3084-3101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kota Saito
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Single Parameter ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Expected Payoffs

This paper axiomatizes a utility function for social preferences under risk. In the model, a single parameter captures a preference for equality of opportunity (i.e., equality of exante expected payoffs) relative to equality of outcome (i.e., equality of ex-post payoffs). In a deterministic environment, the model reduces to the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The model is consistent with recent experiments on probabilistic dictator games. (JEL C72, D71, D81)

Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments: Comment

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 836-839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Krawczyk ◽  
Fabrice Le Lec
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Implicit Assumption ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Do So ◽  
Observed Behavior

Based on experimental dictator games with probabilistic prospects, Brock, Lange, and Ozbay (2013) conclude that neither ex post nor ex ante comparisons can fully account for observed behavior. We argue that their conclusion that ex ante comparisons cannot explain the data is at best weakly supported by their results, and do so on three grounds: (i) the absence of significant differences between the most relevant treatments, (ii) the implicit assumption of subjects' risk neu trality, and (iii) the asymmetry of treatments regarding the disclosure of dictators' choice. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)

scholarly journals Decision under normative uncertainty

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Franz Dietrich ◽  
Brian Jabarian
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Normative Uncertainty ◽  
Alternative Theories

Abstract While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the ‘original position’, where one’s future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty – normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle – maximizing expected value (‘Expectationalism’) – has different formulations, namely Ex-Ante Expectationalism, Ex-Post Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.

scholarly journals A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter G. Moffatt ◽  
Graciela Zevallos
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Econometric Model ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Maximum Simulated Likelihood ◽  
Constrained Optimisation ◽  
Simulated Likelihood ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractWe consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data are used to estimate the parameters of a Stone–Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn–Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.

Behavioural Characterizations of Naivete for Time-Inconsistent Preferences

2019 ◽  
Vol 86 (6) ◽  
pp. 2319-2355 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S Ahn ◽  
Ryota Iijima ◽  
Yves Le Yaouanq ◽  
Todd Sarver
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Functional Form ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Actual Distribution ◽  
Mistaken Belief ◽  
Actual Behaviour ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Time Inconsistent ◽  
Non Parametric

Abstract We propose non-parametric definitions of absolute and comparative naivete. These definitions leverage ex ante choice of menu to identify predictions of future behaviour and ex post (random) choices from menus to identify actual behaviour. The main advantage of our definitions is their independence from any assumed functional form for the utility function representing behaviour. An individual is sophisticated if she is indifferent ex ante between retaining the option to choose from a menu ex post or committing to her actual distribution of choices from that menu. She is naive if she prefers the flexibility in the menu, reflecting a mistaken belief that she will act more virtuously than she actually will. We propose two definitions of comparative naivete and explore the restrictions implied by our definitions for several prominent models of time inconsistency.

scholarly journals Conformity and Influence

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Goldbaum
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Social Location ◽  
Leadership Traits ◽  
Autonomous Decision ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Multiple Leaders

AbstractI model the behavior of decision-makers seeking conformity and influence in a connected population. The model allows for one-sided linking, with information flowing from the target to the link’s originator. Conformity is achieved only with a social order, necessitating differentiated rewards despite ex ante homogeneity. The leader holds a strategic social location ex post, exerting influence independent of any leadership traits. A strong desire to influence produces non-conforming autonomous decision-makers. Socially detrimental multiple leaders can be sustained as well.

scholarly journals Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 493-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Fehr ◽  
Oliver Hart ◽  
Christian Zehnder
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Employment Relation ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
John Moore

Hart and John Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. We examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as reference points. The evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts—which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions—cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract. (JEL D44, D86, J41)

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