Minority Shareholder Protection in SMEs: A Question of Information Ex Post and Bargaining Power Ex Ante?

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Bertil Andersson
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Minority Shareholder ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Minority Shareholder Protection ◽  
Ex Ante

Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 847-850 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARIA MONTERO ◽  
JUAN J. VIDAL-PUGA
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Morelli (1999) provides a model of government formation in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli's main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. We provide a counterexample in which the leading party is able to obtain the entire payoff; furthermore, there are coalitions for which proportional payoff division does not occur for any order of moves.

scholarly journals Quantifying Brexit: from ex post to ex ante using structural gravity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Felbermayr ◽  
Jasmin Gröschl ◽  
Marina Steininger
Keyword(s):  
Economic Integration ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Trade Costs ◽  
Production Networks ◽  
Trade Model ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Substantial Heterogeneity

AbstractExploiting changes in the geography of economic integration in Europe, this paper quantifies the effects of Brexit from ex post to ex ante using structural gravity. By isolating the directional treatment effects of EU agreements for the UK, the analysis reveals important heterogeneity across agreements, sectors, and within pairs. We find that these directional effects matter for the size and distribution of the welfare effects of Brexit—the withdrawal of the UK from EU agreements resulting into a return of trade costs to the situation quo ante. We make this point with the help of a modern multi-sector trade model that is able to capture inter- and intranational production networks. In line with other papers, the welfare costs of Brexit are higher in the UK than in most other EU countries. However, heterogeneity tends to attenuate overall costs while giving rise to substantial heterogeneity between EU27 members and sectors. A scenario that could shift bargaining power eliminates asymmetries in the costs of Brexit as soon as the UK fully liberalizes its market.

Ex ante and Ex post Subcontracting between Two Competing Bidders

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (01) ◽  
pp. 1950035
Author(s):  
Sijing Deng ◽  
Jiayan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Competitive Bidding ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Bid Price ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Capacity Constrained ◽  
Relative Capacity

We consider a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction between two capacity constrained bidders. Either bidder, due to the capacity constraint, is unable to fulfill the auctioned project from a buyer. We consider two formats of capacity cooperation between the two competing bidders: ex ante subcontracting and ex post subcontracting. In the former case, two bidders first bargain over the capacity cooperation contract and then compete with each other by bidding for the buyer’s project. In the latter case, two bidders first submit bids to the buyer and then bargain over the capacity cooperation contract. With ex ante or ex post subcontracting, two bidders have the so-called co-opetition relationship: they compete to win the auction but cooperate through subcontracting. We find that bidders’ subcontract timing has a fundamental impact on their competitive bidding behavior and profits. Both bidders will benefit from the ex ante subcontracting, and submit higher equilibrium bid prices, compared to the case without subcontracting. The ex post subcontracting, however, will lower the equilibrium bid price and may hurt the bidder with capacity advantage when bidders’ relative bargaining power is not consistent with the relative capacity advantage.

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