Comment: Laplace and Cognitive Illusions

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-172
Author(s):  
Daniel Kahneman ◽  
Maya Bar-Hillel
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 202358
Author(s):  
Alexandra K. Schnell ◽  
Maria Loconsole ◽  
Elias Garcia-Pelegrin ◽  
Clive Wilkins ◽  
Nicola S. Clayton

Jays hide food caches, steal them from conspecifics and use tactics to minimize cache theft. Jays are sensitive to the content of their own caches, retrieving items depending on their preferences and the perishability of the cached item. Whether jays impose the same content sensitivity when they steal caches is less clear. We adapted the ‘cups-and-balls’ magic routine, creating a cognitive illusion to test whether jays are sensitive to the (i) content of hidden items and (ii) type of displacement. Subjects were presented with two conditions in which hidden food was consistent with their expectations; and two conditions in which food was manipulated to violate their expectations by switching their second preferred food for their preferred food (up-value) or vice versa (de-value). Subjects readily accepted food when it was consistent with their expectations but were more likely to re-inspect the baited cup and alternative cup when their expectations were violated. In the de-value condition, jays exhibited longer latencies to consume the food and often rejected it. Dominant subjects were more likely to reject the food, suggesting that social factors influence their responses to cognitive illusions. Using cognitive illusions offers innovative avenues for investigating the psychological constraints in diverse animal minds.


2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 678-679 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Hertwig

The notion of “cognitive ability” leads to paradoxical conclusions when invoked to explain Inhelder and Piaget's research on class inclusion reasoning and research on the inclusion rule in the heuristics-and-biases program. The vague distinction between associative and rule-based reasoning overlooks the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inferences, and consequently, makes intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-264
Author(s):  
Christoph K. Winter

AbstractThis Article analyzes the value of behavioral economics for EU judicial decision-making. The first part introduces the foundations of behavioral economics by focusing on cognitive illusions, prospect theory, and the underlying distinction between different processes of thought. The second part examines the influence of selected biases and heuristics, namely the anchoring effect, availability bias, zero-risk bias, and hindsight bias on diverse legal issues in EU law including, among others, the scope of the fundamental freedoms, the proportionality test as well as the roles of the Advocate General and Reporting Judge. The Article outlines how behavioral economic findings can be taken into account to improve judicial decision-making. Accordingly, the adaptation of judicial training concerning cognitive illusions, the establishment of a de minimis rule regarding the scope of the fundamental freedoms, and the use of economic models when determining the impact of certain measures on fundamental freedoms is suggested. Finally, an “unbiased jury” concentrating exclusively on specific factual issues such as causal connections within the proportionality test is necessary, if the hindsight bias is to be avoided. While it is of great importance to take behavioral economic findings into account, judicial decision-making is unlikely to become flawless based on natural intelligence. Despite bearing fundamental risks, artificial intelligence may provide means to achieve greater fairness, consistency, and legal certainty in the future.


2019 ◽  
Vol 116 ◽  
pp. 126-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rayane Stephanie Gomes de Freitas ◽  
Diogo Thimoteo da Cunha ◽  
Elke Stedefeldt

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-177
Author(s):  
Joshua B. Miller ◽  
Andrew Gelman

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