scholarly journals The Value of Behavioral Economics for EU Judicial Decision-Making

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-264
Author(s):  
Christoph K. Winter

AbstractThis Article analyzes the value of behavioral economics for EU judicial decision-making. The first part introduces the foundations of behavioral economics by focusing on cognitive illusions, prospect theory, and the underlying distinction between different processes of thought. The second part examines the influence of selected biases and heuristics, namely the anchoring effect, availability bias, zero-risk bias, and hindsight bias on diverse legal issues in EU law including, among others, the scope of the fundamental freedoms, the proportionality test as well as the roles of the Advocate General and Reporting Judge. The Article outlines how behavioral economic findings can be taken into account to improve judicial decision-making. Accordingly, the adaptation of judicial training concerning cognitive illusions, the establishment of a de minimis rule regarding the scope of the fundamental freedoms, and the use of economic models when determining the impact of certain measures on fundamental freedoms is suggested. Finally, an “unbiased jury” concentrating exclusively on specific factual issues such as causal connections within the proportionality test is necessary, if the hindsight bias is to be avoided. While it is of great importance to take behavioral economic findings into account, judicial decision-making is unlikely to become flawless based on natural intelligence. Despite bearing fundamental risks, artificial intelligence may provide means to achieve greater fairness, consistency, and legal certainty in the future.

Author(s):  
Eyal Zamir ◽  
Doron Teichman

This chapter discusses the rich behavioral research on judicial decision-making. It opens with general theories of the cognitive process of judicial decision-making, focusing on the story model and coherence-based reasoning. It examines how various heuristics and biases—such as the compromise and contrast effects, hindsight bias, omission bias, and anchoring—are reflected in judicial decision-making. Special attention is given to the limited ability of fact-finders to disregard inadmissible evidence, the interactions between race and judicial decision-making, the role of non-consequentialist moral judgments in judicial decision-making, and the impact of the choice between rules and standards on the predictability of judgments. Finally, the chapter discusses two fundamental questions in the behavioral analysis of judicial decision-making: group decision-making, and decision-making by judges (as opposed to laypersons).


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hubert Smekal ◽  
Jaroslav Benák ◽  
Monika Hanych ◽  
Ladislav Vyhnánek ◽  
Štěpán Janků

The book studies other than purely legal factors that influence the Czech Constitutional Court judges in their decision-making. The publication is inspired by foreign models of judicial decision-making and discusses their applicability in the Czech environment. More specifically, it focuses, for example, on the influence of the judge’s personality, collegiality, strategic decision-making or the impact of public opinion and the media. The book is based mainly on interviews with current constitutional judges.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 806-830
Author(s):  
Adebola Olaborede ◽  
Lirieka Meintjes-van der Walt

Several empirical research studies have shown that cognitive bias can unconsciously distort inferences and interpretations made by judges either at the hearing, ruling or sentencing stage of a court trial and this may result in miscarriages of justice. This article examines how cognitive heuristics affects judicial decision-making with seven common manifestations of heuristics such as availability heuristics, confirmation bias, egocentric bias, anchoring, hindsight bias, framing and representativeness. This article contends that the different manifestations of heuristics pose a potentially serious risk to the quality and objectivity of any criminal case, despite the professional legal training and experience of judges and magistrates. Therefore, suggestions on how best to avoid and minimise the effects of cognitive heuristics, especially within South African courts are proffered. These include creating awareness raising, cross-examination and replacement.


2021 ◽  
pp. 143-163
Author(s):  
Theodor Meron

This chapter assesses judicial decision-making and deliberations. The success of international criminal courts depends in no small part on the transparency of proceedings and reasoning of the judgements. Transparency is essential to building public confidence in the fair administration of justice. It also serves as an important safeguard against judicial arbitrariness and helps to ensure not only the fairness of the proceedings but the independence and impartiality of the Bench. This commitment to transparency in court proceedings is not absolute, however. It is limited by other factors, such as the importance of protecting witnesses and victims and the requirement that certain information be kept confidential. The chapter looks at the process of decision-making in the ICTY, ICTR, and the Mechanism. It draws attention to four specific issues: the uniqueness of the tribunals and the impact of their special status on decision-making; the diversity of decision-makers at the tribunals; the diverse backgrounds of the tribunals’ Judges and staff; and the process of decision-making.


2020 ◽  
Vol 228 (3) ◽  
pp. 226-228
Author(s):  
Anna Sagana ◽  
D. A. G. van Toor

Abstract. Despite the abundance of studies exposing heuristic and biased thinking in judicial decision-making, the influence of this empirical work in court is limited. In this commentary, we address this paradox and argue that the disconnect between empirical work and practice stems from the limited knowledge and consideration of procedural rules. These shortcomings increase the skepticism of legal scholars and practitioners of this research and give an excuse for dismissing the findings, deeming them inapplicable in court. We suggest that the only way forward is by diversifying our research methods and by building a culture of collaboration, fostering research partnerships between legal scholars and (legal) decision-making researchers. This approach aims to bridge the gap between legal and social sciences and to promote the impact of empirical studies of the legal system on current legal practice.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document