Rational support platform for analyzing bridge replacement options-MiABCD

2014 ◽  
pp. 1536-1542
Author(s):  
A Mohammed ◽  
U Attanayake ◽  
H Aktan
Keyword(s):  
Rational Support

Author reply: Empathy Does Provide Rational Support for Decisions. But Is It the Right Decision?

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fritz Breithaupt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Author Reply ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

This article examines the relation of empathy and rational judgment. When people observe a conflict most are quick to side with one of the parties. Once a side has been taken, empathy with that party further solidifies this choice. Hence, it will be suggested that empathy is not neutral to judgment and rational decision-making. This does not mean, however, that the one who empathizes will necessarily have made the best choice.

scholarly journals ANALISA KONSEP UNIVERSALITAS NILAI ISLAM DAN PANCASILA (STUDI PEMIKIRAN YUDI LATIF)

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 99
Author(s):  
Rizaldy Purnomo Pedju
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Political Values ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
Islamic Values

This article discusses the analysis of the universality concept of Islamic Values and Pancasila in yudi latif's discussion contained in his works. The successor to the Pancasila pride, was able to actualize Pancasila with historical and rational support, by not forgetting the religious, social, cultural and political values in the ideology of Pancasila. The concept of yudi latif in the presentation of his thoughts is able to bring precepts in Pancasila using Indonesian specialties, by providing historical space in the narrative that supports and does not eliminate religiosity, diversity, consultative democracy and social justice. The concept of universality in the values of Islam and Pancasila is expected to be able to dismiss the narratives of radicalism, islamophobia which is developed rapidly developed. This latif thought, is able to provide ontological, epistemological, and axiological understanding between Islam and Pancasila as we.ll as the two things that interrelated to one another.                                                             Keywords : Yudi Latif;  Analysis; Universality; Islamic Value; Pancasila Value Artikel ini membahas tentang analisa konsep universalitas Nilai Islam dan Pancasila dalam pemikiran Yudi Latif yang termaktub dalam karya-karyanya. Bapak penerus marwah Pancasila ini, mampu megaktualisasikan Pancasila dengan pendekatan historis dan rasional, dengan tidak melupakan nilai agama, sosial, budaya dan politik dalam pengalian ideologi Pancasila. Konsep yudi latif dalam penyajian pemikirannya mampu membawa sila per sila dalam Pancasila kedalam khasanah khas keindonesiaan, dengan memberikan ruang sejarah dalam narasi pemikirannya serta tidak melupakan unsur religiusitas, sebagaimana dalam pembahasan penulis bahwa nilai islam dan nilai Pancasila terkandung dalam Ketauhidan, Kemanusiaan Universal, Persatuan dalam Keragaman, Demokrasi Permusyawaratan serta Keadilan Sosial. Konsep universalitas nilai islam dan Pancasila diharapkan mampu menepis narasi-narasi radikalisme, islamophobia yang marak berkembang belakangan ini. Pemikiran yudi latif secara aktual, mampu memberikan integrasi pemahaman antara islam dan Pancasila secara ontologis, epistemologis, dan aksiologis merupakan dua hal yang saling terhubung satu sama lainnya. Kata Kunci : Yudi Latif; Analisa; Universalitas; Nilai Islam; Nilai Pancasila

Scepticism, Evidentialism and the Party Argument: A Pascalian Perspective

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Holyer
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Positive Contribution ◽  
Important Place ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Epistemic Standards ◽  
Rational Support

Sceptical arguments, it is commonly claimed, may succeed in disarming some powerful objections to religious belief, but they do nothing more than establish a state of parity between the believer and the objector. For this reason, they make no positive contribution to the justification of religious belief and therefore are of value only to the fideist who insists that religious beliefs do not have and do not need rational support. However, while this opinion is widely held by philosophers of religion, it ignores the fact that sceptical arguments have given rise to a constructive tradition in epistemology: what is often referred to as naturalism. In what follows I shall develop a suggestion from this tradition, and that is that sceptical arguments lead not to an abandonment of claims to justified belief but to a revision and contextualization of our epistemic standards. Though this suggestion can be found in a number of philosophers in this tradition, my inspiration for it comes from Pascal, who made an important place for scepticism in the evidentialist argument for Christianity which we find in the Pensées. To develop this suggestion, I shall first sketch a position inspired by Pascal and then argue that the possibilities it suggests have been insufficiently considered in a number of recent discussions of the importance of sceptical arguments in the epistemology of religious belief.

Religious Experience and Rational Appraisal

1974 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith E. Yandell
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Rational Support

Appeal to experience for rational justification of religious belief is probably as old as the question whether religious belief has any rational support. The issues relevant to such appeal range widely, and I will have to be content to deal with only a few of them.

Peerage

Episteme ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl Conee
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
Special Force

ABSTRACTExperts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position.

scholarly journals Moral Realism and the Problem of Moral Aliens

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-321
Author(s):  
Thomas Grundmann ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Epistemic Peers ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
The One

In this paper, I discuss a new problem for moral realism, the problem of moral aliens. In the first section, I introduce this problem. Moral aliens are people who radically disagree with us concerning moral matters. Moral aliens are neither obviously incoherent nor do they seem to lack rational support from their own perspective. On the one hand, moral realists claim that we should stick to our guns when we encounter moral aliens. On the other hand, moral realists, in contrast to anti-realists, seem to be committed to an epistemic symmetry between us and our moral aliens that forces us into rational suspension of our moral beliefs. Unless one disputes the very possibility of moral aliens, this poses a severe challenge to the moral realist. In the second section, I will address this problem. It will turn out that, on closer scrutiny, we cannot make any sense of the idea that moral aliens should be taken as our epistemic peers. Consequently, there is no way to argue that encountering moral aliens gives us any reason to revise our moral beliefs. If my argument is correct, the possibility of encountering moral aliens poses no real threat to moral realism.

scholarly journals FIELD TEST ON THE RATIONAL SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR LARGE-SCALE TUNNEL

2004 ◽  
pp. 43-52
Author(s):  
Mamoru YOSHIDUKA ◽  
Koji MITANI ◽  
Hajime TANAKA ◽  
Isamu YOSHITAKE ◽  
Koji NAKAGAWA
Keyword(s):  
Field Test ◽  
Support System ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Rational Support

scholarly journals A computational framework for understanding the roles of simplicity and rational support in people's behavior explanations

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Jern
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Rational Agent ◽  
Computational Framework ◽  
Decision Networks ◽  
Series Of Experiments ◽  
Rational Support

When explaining other people's behavior, people generally find some explanations more satisfying than others. We propose that people judge behavior explanations based on two computational principles: simplicity and rational support -- the extent to which an explanation makes the behavior "make sense" under the assumption that the person is a rational agent. Furthermore, we present a computational framework based on decision networks that can formalize both of these principles. We tested this account in a series of experiments in which subjects rated or generated explanations for other people's behavior. In Experiments 1 and 2, the explanations varied in what the other person liked and disliked. In Experiment 3, the explanations varied in what the other person knew or believed. Results from Experiments 1 and 2 supported the idea that people rely on both simplicity and rational support. However, Experiment 3 suggested that subjects relied only on rational support when judging explanations of people's behavior that varied in what someone knew.

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