scholarly journals Must Psychoanalysis be Scientific?

1984 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 152-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. King
Keyword(s):  
Cell Membranes ◽  
The Other ◽  
Biological Approach ◽  
Receptor Sites ◽  
Brain Sciences ◽  
True Knowledge ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

In spite of the vast strides forward made by the brain sciences this century, the gap between our understanding of the brain and our understanding of the mind remains uncomfortably wide. At one end of the scale, physical scientists scratch patiently away at the chemistry of receptor sites on cell membranes, at the other, clinicians make brilliant deductions by sheer intuition, and in between is a hazy land. As the pendulum now swings back towards a biological approach to psychiatry, we hear again the old assertion that the only true knowledge can be obtained by objective observation; subjective intuition must therefore be suspect, an unreliable and intangible entity. What validity is there in this argument?

scholarly journals Evolution in the Brain, Evolution in the Mind: The Hierarchical Brain and the Interface between Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-377
Author(s):  
Leonardo Niro Nascimento
Keyword(s):  
Brain Evolution ◽  
The Other ◽  
Common Source ◽  
Evolutionary Models ◽  
Anatomy And Physiology ◽  
Psychodynamically Oriented ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Shed Light

This article first aims to demonstrate the different ways the work of the English neurologist John Hughlings Jackson influenced Freud. It argues that these can be summarized in six points. It is further argued that the framework proposed by Jackson continued to be pursued by twentieth-century neuroscientists such as Papez, MacLean and Panksepp in terms of tripartite hierarchical evolutionary models. Finally, the account presented here aims to shed light on the analogies encountered by psychodynamically oriented neuroscientists, between contemporary accounts of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system on the one hand, and Freudian models of the mind on the other. These parallels, I will suggest, are not coincidental. They have a historical underpinning, as both accounts most likely originate from a common source: John Hughlings Jackson's tripartite evolutionary hierarchical view of the brain.

The Physiology of some Phases of the Poetic Mind

1878 ◽  
Vol 24 (106) ◽  
pp. 233-243
Author(s):  
Frederick Treves
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Structural Position ◽  
Correct Conclusion ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Experienced Physician ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

To take one other example as illustrating a somewhat different aspect of this question. An experienced physician arrives in a moment at the diagnosis of a case presented to his notice, but a well read and well informed student may ponder long before attaining a correct conclusion under exactly similar circumstances. In what does the difference between the mental processes in the two individuals consist? It will be said to be a matter of experience merely; but what does this statement imply? In the process of arriving at a diagnosis of the case many facts will have to be observed, many points criticised, and many arguments weighed and valued. Now in the case of the senior observer all these facts, these points, these arguments will perhaps have been passed through the mind some hundreds of times before, in reviewing similar cases; the various steps whereby his final opinion is attained will, by frequent exercise and repetition, have become separately organised in the brain, and, however rapidly his conclusion may have been arrived at, the various steps will have been undertaken. But inasmuch as their influence is exercised automatically, he remains unconscious of their agency, until he stops to analyse the various reasons that have—to a very great extent unconsciously—laid the foundations of his diagnosis and the various details on which his opinion has been founded. The process may involve no more consciousness than is displayed in the movements of the envelope folder; one is aware that the envelope is folded, and the other that he has arrived at a definite opinion; but neither may be awake to the separate steps of the process until they deliberately investigate the details of the preceding movements. In the case of the immature observer, frequent repetition has not as yet made certain processes necessary to the diagnosis of the case familiar to his mind, and in consequence they have attained no sound structural position in his nerve centres; so, like the novice in the mystery of envelope folding, he has to consider each step, and proceed with deliberation, and under the acute guardianship of consciousness.

Bio-centric Views of the Origin of Consciousness: The Search for the Solution to the Hard Problem

2018 ◽  
pp. 78-122
Author(s):  
Arthur S. Reber
Keyword(s):  
Distinct Type ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Two strategies are used to review the many efforts to solve (or resolve or dissolve) the Hard Problem. One searches for the neurocorrelates of consciousness, the effort to answer the question: “How does the brain make the mind?” The other looks for the first appearance of true consciousness in phylogenesis. Both approaches are reviewed and found wanting. The reason is they all begin with human consciousness and use it as the basis for the explorations. This, it is argued, has lead to a “category error” where the H. sap. mind is treated as a distinct type and not as a token on the same existential continuum as other minds. It also reveals the existence of the “emergentist’s dilemma” or the difficulty of determining how consciousness could spring into existence when one cosmic moment before, it didn’t exist. The chapter ends by anticipating criticism of these arguments and of the CBC and providing prophylactic arguments.

What makes neuroethics possible?

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 32-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Vidal
Keyword(s):  
Full Range ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Political Organization ◽  
The Political ◽  
Successful Development ◽  
Beliefs And Practices ◽  
Brain Sciences ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Brain

Since its emergence in the early 2000s, neuroethics has become a recognized, institutionalized and professionalized field. A central strategy for its successful development has been the claim that it must be an autonomous discipline, distinct in particular from bioethics. Such claim has been justified by the conviction, sustained since the 1990s by the capabilities attributed to neuroimaging technologies, that somehow ‘the mind is the brain’, that the brain sciences can illuminate the full range of human experience and behavior, and that neuroscientific knowledge will have dramatic implications for views of the human, and challenge supposedly established beliefs and practices in domains ranging from self and personhood to the political organization of society. This article examines how that conviction functions as neuroethics’ ideological condition of possibility.

scholarly journals La imposible travesía del naturalismo entre el dualismo y la irrelevancia de lo mental

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco José Soler Gil
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Naturalistic Approach ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Resumen: En este artículo se defiende la tesis de que la concepción naturalista de la mente es un planteamiento inestable, que tiende a derivar en uno de estos dos extremos opuestos e indeseados por el pensador naturalista: dualismo y escepticismo. Cuanto más se esfuerza un autor por evitar el epifenomenalismo de lo mental, con más sustantividad —y, por ende, autonomía frente al cerebro— nos presenta la mente; cuanto más se esfuerza por evitar el dualismo, tanto más superfluo e irrelevante se convierte el ámbito del pensa­miento. Este resultado arroja serias dudas sobre la viabilidad de la concepción naturalista de la mente. Palabras clave: naturalismo, mente, cerebro, dualismo, escepticismo, Plantinga, Dennett, Chalmers Abstract: This article defends the thesis that the naturalistic approach to mind is an unstable approach, which tends to lead to one of two opposite views: dualism or scepticism. (But both views are “abhorrent” for the naturalistic thinker). The more an author strives to avoid the epiphenomenalism of the mental, the more substantivity must be given to the mind. Thus the mind becomes more and more autonomous from the brain. On the other hand, the more he strives to avoid dualism, the more superfluous and irrelevant becomes the realm of thought. This result casts serious doubt on the viability of the naturalistic approach to mind. Keywords: naturalism, mind, brain, dualism, skepticism, Plantinga, Dennett, Chalmers Recibido: 02/11/2012 Aprobado: 18/04/2013

The Physiology of some Phases of the Poetic Mind

1878 ◽  
Vol 24 (106) ◽  
pp. 233-243
Author(s):  
Frederick Treves
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Structural Position ◽  
Correct Conclusion ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Experienced Physician ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

To take one other example as illustrating a somewhat different aspect of this question. An experienced physician arrives in a moment at the diagnosis of a case presented to his notice, but a well read and well informed student may ponder long before attaining a correct conclusion under exactly similar circumstances. In what does the difference between the mental processes in the two individuals consist? It will be said to be a matter of experience merely; but what does this statement imply? In the process of arriving at a diagnosis of the case many facts will have to be observed, many points criticised, and many arguments weighed and valued. Now in the case of the senior observer all these facts, these points, these arguments will perhaps have been passed through the mind some hundreds of times before, in reviewing similar cases; the various steps whereby his final opinion is attained will, by frequent exercise and repetition, have become separately organised in the brain, and, however rapidly his conclusion may have been arrived at, the various steps will have been undertaken. But inasmuch as their influence is exercised automatically, he remains unconscious of their agency, until he stops to analyse the various reasons that have—to a very great extent unconsciously—laid the foundations of his diagnosis and the various details on which his opinion has been founded. The process may involve no more consciousness than is displayed in the movements of the envelope folder; one is aware that the envelope is folded, and the other that he has arrived at a definite opinion; but neither may be awake to the separate steps of the process until they deliberately investigate the details of the preceding movements. In the case of the immature observer, frequent repetition has not as yet made certain processes necessary to the diagnosis of the case familiar to his mind, and in consequence they have attained no sound structural position in his nerve centres; so, like the novice in the mystery of envelope folding, he has to consider each step, and proceed with deliberation, and under the acute guardianship of consciousness.

Discriminating Altruisms

1993 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Hardin
Keyword(s):  
Oxford English Dictionary ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mental Functions ◽  
Physical Thing ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Sooner or later discussions of population problems raise the issue of altruism. Why should I refrain from exploiting the environment because posterity may some day wish that I had? Or because today's poor want a larger share of the world's wealth? Is altruism natural? Is it safe? Altruism, like "will," may be one of those topics on which universal agreement is impossible. In both cases opposing arguments seem quite convincing—until you listen to the other side! In general, having names for things makes for clarity in discussion; but one wonders if that is so in this instance. For thousands of years people worried about the best balance between self-considering actions and actions that focus on the interests of others, but the disputes may have become more acute since neat names were coined. The earliest use of the word "egoism" recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary is 1722, with "altruism" appearing in 1853. Often the creation of a noun ("substantive") seems to presume the presence of a substance, a physical thing. Students of mental functions used to waste a great deal of time looking for the "faculties" of the mind; ultimately psychologists abandoned that substantive. Should "egoism" and "altruism" also be jettisoned? Perhaps not yet: but many arguments can be curtailed if we note two different referents of the word altruism. Sometimes the reference is to the motives inside the mind of the altruist; at other times we are interested in the consequences of the action. Philosophical and religious writers are more concerned with the former; students of politics and bioethics with the latter. Religions are interested in promoting virtuous thought, but all assertions about motives suffer from the "egocentric predicament," the inability of each of us to really know what is going on inside any other mind. (Assertions made by the other do not help because how can I know he is telling the truth?) Determinations of consequences do not have this shortcoming since consequences lie outside the brain of the actor. Bioethicists adopt a consequential approach to altruism. This is the path followed here.

Benjamin Libet’s Big Experiment

2019 ◽  
pp. 186-199
Author(s):  
Alan J. McComas
Keyword(s):  
Electrical Activity ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sensory Stimulus ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Evoked Responses ◽  
Temporal Reference ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter describes Benjamin Libet’s finding that electrical activity in the brain precedes conscious awareness. Libet’s work had shown that, no matter how brief it was, a sensory stimulus evoked responses in the cortex that lasted hundreds of milliseconds. He also suggested that, just as the somatosensory cortex was able to refer sensations to a particular point on the opposite side of the body (“spatial reference”) so it could refer sensations to an earlier moment—the time when impulse activity had first been initiated in the cortex following the stimulus (“temporal reference”). These were important conclusions and inevitably became the subjects of debate following their publication. But Libet was soon to deliver a greater surprise when he discovered that a decision only entered consciousness when the underlying neural activity was already far advanced. Rather than the mind controlling the brain—thought by thought—it was the other way round and “free will,” seemingly so self-evident, was an illusion.

Bimodal bilingualism reveals mechanisms of cross-language interaction

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUDITH F. KROLL ◽  
KINSEY BICE
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Second Language ◽  
First Language ◽  
Minority Language ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Cross Language ◽  
L1 And L2 ◽  
The Brain

In the recent swell of research on bilingualism and its consequences for the mind and the brain, there has been a warning that we need to remember that not all bilinguals are the same (e.g., Green & Abutalebi, 2013; Kroll & Bialystok, 2013; Luk & Bialystok, 2013). There are bilinguals who acquired two languages in early childhood and have used them continuously throughout their lives, bilinguals who acquired one language early and then switched to another language when they entered school or emigrated from one country to another, and others who only acquired a second language (L2) as an adult. Among these forms of bilingualism there are differences in both the context and amount of time spent in each language and differences in the status of the languages themselves. The L2 may be a majority language, spoken by almost everyone in the environment, or a minority language, spoken only by a few. The native or first language (L1) may also be the dominant language or may have been overtaken by the influence of the L2 given the circumstances imposed by the environment. Likewise, the L1 and L2 may vary in how similar they are structurally, whether they share the same written script, or whether one language is spoken and the other signed.

The nontrivial doctrine of cognitive neuroscience

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 839-839
Author(s):  
Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Brain Sciences ◽  
The Future ◽  
Future Direction ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Gold & Stoljar's “trivial” neuron doctrine is neither a truism in cognitive science nor trivial; it has serious consequences for the future direction of the mind/brain sciences. Not everyone would agree that these consequences are desirable. The authors' “radical” doctrine is not so radical; their division between cognitive neuroscience and neurobiology is largely artificial. Indeed, there is no sharp distinction between cognitive neuroscience and other areas of the brain sciences.

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