scholarly journals La imposible travesía del naturalismo entre el dualismo y la irrelevancia de lo mental

Author(s):  
Francisco José Soler Gil

Resumen: En este artículo se defiende la tesis de que la concepción naturalista de la mente es un planteamiento inestable, que tiende a derivar en uno de estos dos extremos opuestos e indeseados por el pensador naturalista: dualismo y escepticismo. Cuanto más se esfuerza un autor por evitar el epifenomenalismo de lo mental, con más sustantividad —y, por ende, autonomía frente al cerebro— nos presenta la mente; cuanto más se esfuerza por evitar el dualismo, tanto más superfluo e irrelevante se convierte el ámbito del pensa­miento. Este resultado arroja serias dudas sobre la viabilidad de la concepción naturalista de la mente. Palabras clave: naturalismo, mente, cerebro, dualismo, escepticismo, Plantinga, Dennett, Chalmers Abstract: This article defends the thesis that the naturalistic approach to mind is an unstable approach, which tends to lead to one of two opposite views: dualism or scepticism. (But both views are “abhorrent” for the naturalistic thinker). The more an author strives to avoid the epiphenomenalism of the mental, the more substantivity must be given to the mind. Thus the mind becomes more and more autonomous from the brain. On the other hand, the more he strives to avoid dualism, the more superfluous and irrelevant becomes the realm of thought. This result casts serious doubt on the viability of the naturalistic approach to mind. Keywords: naturalism, mind, brain, dualism, skepticism, Plantinga, Dennett, Chalmers Recibido: 02/11/2012 Aprobado: 18/04/2013

1917 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 557-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carroll G. Bull

Streptococci cultivated from the tonsils of thirty-two cases of poliomyelitis were used to inoculate various laboratory animals. In no case was a condition induced resembling poliomyelitis clinically or pathologically in guinea pigs, dogs, cats, rabbits, or monkeys. On the other hand, a considerable percentage of the rabbits and a smaller percentage of some of the other animals developed lesions due to streptococci. These lesions consisted of meningitis, meningo-encephalitis, abscess of the brain, arthritis, tenosynovitis, myositis, abscess of the kidney, endocarditis, pericarditis, and neuritis. No distinction in the character or frequency of the lesions could be determined between the streptococci derived from poliomyelitic patients and from other sources. Streptococci isolated from the poliomyelitic brain and spinal cord of monkeys which succumbed to inoculation with the filtered virus failed to induce in monkeys any paralysis or the characteristic histological changes of poliomyelitis. These streptococci are regarded as secondary bacterial invaders of the nervous organs. Monkeys which have recovered from infection with streptococci derived from cases of poliomyelitis are not protected from infection with the filtered virus, and their blood does not neutralize the filtered virus in vitro. We have failed to detect any etiologic or pathologic relationship between streptococci and epidemic poliomyelitis in man or true experimental poliomyelitis in the monkey.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-377
Author(s):  
Leonardo Niro Nascimento

This article first aims to demonstrate the different ways the work of the English neurologist John Hughlings Jackson influenced Freud. It argues that these can be summarized in six points. It is further argued that the framework proposed by Jackson continued to be pursued by twentieth-century neuroscientists such as Papez, MacLean and Panksepp in terms of tripartite hierarchical evolutionary models. Finally, the account presented here aims to shed light on the analogies encountered by psychodynamically oriented neuroscientists, between contemporary accounts of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system on the one hand, and Freudian models of the mind on the other. These parallels, I will suggest, are not coincidental. They have a historical underpinning, as both accounts most likely originate from a common source: John Hughlings Jackson's tripartite evolutionary hierarchical view of the brain.


2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (02) ◽  
pp. 111-118
Author(s):  
Jairo Diniz Filho ◽  
Teresa B. Ludermir

Neuronal groups projecting widely in the brain are being experimentally associated to attention and mood changes. Those groups are known to exert a modulatory effect over other larger groups. On the other hand, some people think of the brain functions as being performed by specialized modular systems. In this work, we propose an architecture of modular nature to explore a particular decision process. We show the importance of the modulatory effect of a special evaluation segment in that process.


1875 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 342-347
Author(s):  
John G. M'Kendrick

Certain individuals appear to be incapable of appreciating musical sounds. They cannot distinguish one melody from another; and if by many repetitions of the melody in their hearing, they at last appear to know it, the addition of one or more of the parts of the harmony again renders the music unrecognisable to them. The question naturally arises, Is this defect owing to any peculiarity in the structure of the internal ear of persons so constituted which prevents them hearing certain sounds, or is it to be referred to the condition of the brain? On the other hand, many have what is termed a “fine ear,” by which we understand the faculty of appreciating, remembering, and, in some cases, of successfully imitating musical sounds. Have those individuals the organ of hearing more delicately developed?


Panoptikum ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 109-129
Author(s):  
Barbara Szczekała

The article is a theoretical proposal which aims to create an alternative framework for mapping postclassical cinema. This framework is based on establishing various modes of relations between narration and spectacle, especially those represented by mind-game films and post-plot films. Instead of considering narration and spectacle as opposition, I suggest redescribing their complementary dynamics. I argue that there is visible feedback between mind-game films and the cinema of digital attractions, which I see as complementary processes of making “spectacular mind games” and “mind-gaming the spectacles”. The article contains an analysis of similar types of cinematic experiences delivered by “narration” and “attractions” and indicates the mutual influences between these two phenomena. Both narration and attraction may bring similar, affective sensations: the notion of shock and dissonance, discomfort, astonishment, kinesthetic impulse or cognitive stimulation. As for the article’s conclusion: postclassical cinema variously reshapes the distribution of narration and attraction. Mind-game films are becoming cinematic spectacles. On the other hand, more and more “post-plot” blockbusters are introducing the “mind-gaming the spectacle” strategy, and are engaging viewers with “cognitive” attractions as well.


2015 ◽  
pp. 153
Author(s):  
Gordana Matic

<div class="WordSection1"><p><strong>Resumen</strong></p><p>La fábula ha tenido desde siempre una función retórica e ilustrativa que se ha manifestado a lo largo de la historia de modo dual: mostraba para enseñar, lo que muchas veces implicaba el componente moralizador, o para criticar. Mientras se empeñaba en conseguir una de las dos intencionalidades, o las dos simultáneamente, ha podido ser revestida de un tono humorístico, burlón, irónico o sarcástico. Partiendo de las observaciones sobre el género de Fedro, Rodríguez Adrados o Mireya Camurati, en este trabajo nos proponemos analizar una selección de fábulas clásicas, medievales, dieciochescas y decimonónicas, para demostrar que el aspecto crítico e incluso subversivo del género se mantiene abiertamente activo aun en las épocas en las que se potencia su intención didáctico-moralizante.</p><p>Palabras clave: fábula, definiciones del género, estudio diacrónico, aspecto crítico, aspecto didáctico-moralizante</p><p> </p><p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>The fable has always had a rhetoric and illustrative function that manifested itself during its long history in two different ways: on one hand, it represented an example in order to teach, which usually implied the moral component, or on the other hand, to criticize. While it strived to achieve one of these intentions, or sometimes both simultaneously, it could have been written in a humorous, mocking, ironic or sarcastic tone. In this paper, we analyze a selection of classical and medieval, 18th and 19th century fables written in Spanish, with definitions proposed by Phaedrus, Rodríguez Adrados and Mireya Camurati as starting points, in order to show that the critical aspect of this genre was openly maintained and taken benefit of even in the historical periods when its didactic and moralizing intention was preferred and strongly emphasized.</p></div><p>Key words: fable, definition of genre, diachronic approach, critical aspect, didactic and moral aspect</p><p> </p>


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Barth

How are we to explain the fact that we can refer to objects by means of mental acts? And what accounts for our being conscious of mental acts? René Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz provide fascinating answers to these two central questions of the philosophy of mind. In this study, the concepts of both authors are analyzed in detail, compared with each other and related to current positions. The analyses show that Descartes represents a deflationary conception of consciousness (conscientia). Consciousness is "only" an aspect of intentionality that constitutes the essential feature of the Cartesian mind. The analyses of Leibniz unveil that he represents a far more complex and demanding conception of the mind in comparison to Descartes, which makes for a higher connectivity with contemporary convictions. The salient features of his position are the structural conception of intentionality and the distinction between two forms of consciousness (apperception and conscientia) that correspond to the phenomenal consciousness and the reflexive self-consciousness. In contrast to Descartes, Leibniz also assigns consciousness to non-rational animals in the form of apperception. Conscientia, on the other hand, is reserved for rational substances.


2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-77
Author(s):  
Claire Petitmengin

Abstract Both Buddhist meditation and micro-phenomenology start from the observation that our experience escapes us, we don’t see it as it is. Both offer devices that allow us to become aware of it. But, surprisingly, the two approaches offer few precise descriptions of the processes which veil experience, and of those which make it possible to dissipate these veils. This article is an attempt to put in parentheses declarative writings on the veiling and unveiling processes and their epistemological background and to collect procedural descriptions of this veiling and unveiling processes. From written and oral meditation teachings on the one hand, micro-phenomenological interviews applied to meditative experience and to themselves on the other hand, we identified four types of veiling processes which contribute to screen what is there, and ultimately to generate the naïve belief in the existence of an external reality independent of the mind: attentional, emotional, intentional and cognitive veils. The first part of the article describes these veiling processes and the processes through which they dissipate. It leads to the identification of several “gestures” conducive to this unveiling. The second part describes the devices used by meditation and by micro-phenomenology to elicit these gestures.


Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-260
Author(s):  
Franco Manni ◽  

From the ideas of Aristotle, De Saussure and Wittgenstein, philosopher Herbert McCabe elaborated an original anthropology. 'Meaning' means: the role played by a part towards the whole. Senses are bodily organs and sensations allow an animal to get fragments of the external world which become 'meaningful' for the behaviour of the whole animal Besides sensations, humans are ‘linguistic animals’ because through words they are able to 'communicate', that is, to share a peculiar kind of meanings: concepts. Whereas, sense-images are stored physically in our brain and cannot be shared, even though we can relate to sense-images by words (speech coincides with thought). However, concepts do not belong to the individual human being qua individual, but to an interpersonal entity: the language system. Therefore, on the one hand, to store images is a sense-power and an operation of the brain, whereas the brain (quite paradoxically!) is not in itself the organ of thought. On the other hand, concepts do not exist on their own.


2021 ◽  
pp. 159-176
Author(s):  
Stewart Duncan

Locke is officially agnostic about the nature of the human mind: he thinks we cannot know that materialism is true, but also that we cannot know that dualism is true. Despite this agnosticism, we can ask whether Locke thought one of those views was more likely than the other. The chapter considers arguments on both sides. A small number of texts suggest he thought dualism more likely. On the other hand, Lisa Downing has argued that Locke thought materialism more likely, on the basis of the similarities between human and animal minds. This chapter argues that the reasons she offers do not show us that Locke was inclined to materialism. Nevertheless, Locke did show the possibility of materialism, not just by saying it was possible, but by developing at length an account of the mind that did not depend upon its being an immaterial substance.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document