Fitting Attitudes, Wrong Kinds of Reasons, and Mind-Independent Goodness

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-364
Author(s):  
Heath White

AbstractThe 'fitting-attitudes analysis' aims to analyze evaluative concepts in terms of attitudes, but suffers from the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem. This article critiques some suggested solutions to the WKR problem and offers one of its own, which appeals to the aims of attitudes. However, goodness is not a concept that can be successfully analyzed according to the method suggested here. Reasons are given why goodness should be thought of, instead, as a mind-independent property.

Author(s):  
Wayne A. Davis

The property theory of de se belief denies that believing is a propositional attitude, maintaining instead that for Lingens to believe that he himself is lost is for him to self-attribute the property of being lost. For Lingens to believe that Lingens is lost is for him to self-attribute the independent property of being such that Lingens is lost. The chapter argues that this theory postulates differences where we expect uniformity, introduces unnecessary theoretical complexity, is false to a variety of linguistic and phenomenological facts, and fails to explain many psychological and linguistic facts. If “self-attribute a property” means “believing oneself to have the property,” then the theory provides no explanation of de se belief. The author sketches a propositional theory on which the objects of the attitudes are complexes of concepts (thoughts), de se attitudes involving one type of indexical concept.


Biomolecules ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 501
Author(s):  
Ptak-Kaczor Magdalena ◽  
Kwiecińska Klaudia ◽  
Korchowiec Jacek ◽  
Chłopaś Katarzyna ◽  
Banach Mateusz ◽  
...  

In the search for new carriers capable of transporting toxic drugs to a target, particular attention has been devoted to supramolecular systems with a ribbon-like micellar structure of which Congo red is an example. A special promise of the possible use of such systems for directing drugs to a target emerges from their particular affinity to immune complexes and as an independent property, binding many organic compounds including drugs by intercalation. Serum albumin also appeared able to bind micellar particles of such systems. It may protect them against dilution in transport. The mathematical tool, which relies on analysis of the distribution of polarity and hydrophobicity in protein molecules (fuzzy oil drop model), has been used to find the location of binding area in albumin as well as anchorage site for Congo red in heated IgG light chain used as a model presenting immunoglobulin-like structures. Results confirm the suggested formerly binding site of Congo red in V domain of IgG light chain and indicated the cleft between pseudo-symmetric domains of albumin as the area of attachment for the dye.


Author(s):  
Ulrike Heuer

There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of different attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as pro-attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire, in similar ways. Explaining it may therefore contribute significantly to understanding the nature of reasons and normativity in general. This chapter argues for two claims: (1) we should sharply distinguish the wrong kind of reasons problem as it arises for fitting attitude theories from other problems that come under the same name; (2) the wrong kind of reasons problem outside of fitting attitude theory doesn’t have a very clear shape. In particular, there is no similarity between reasons to believe and reasons to intend in this regard, and therefore no hope for a unified explanation of the alleged phenomenon.


Author(s):  
Tamler Sommers

This chapter argues that moral responsibility is not a mind-independent property like “transparent” that can be assigned objectively or universally when certain conditions are met. The answer to the question of whether we can be morally responsible boils down to a subjective all-things-considered judgment that takes many factors into account, including the ethical and practical consequences of each alternative. It examines the case for first-order skepticism or eliminativism about moral responsibility, and offers a very tentative endorsement of this position in the context of our environment, historical period, and circumstances. It begins by examining the moral and practical implications of denying moral responsibility and adopting the objective attitude on an exclusive basis. Next, it considers arguments that attempt to explain away or debunk the intuition that people can be morally responsible for their behavior. Finally, it discusses an important concession to compatibilism, one that prevents the author from arriving at a more confident endorsement of the eliminativist conclusion.


Author(s):  
Graham Oddie

This essay argues for an evaluative theory of desire—specifically, that to desire something is for it to appear, in some way or other, good. If a desire is a non-doxastic appearance of value then it is no mystery how it can rationalize as well as cause action. The theory is metaphysically neutral—it is compatible with value idealism (that value reduces to desire), with value realism (that it is not so reducible), and with value nihilism (all appearances of value are illusory). Despite this metaphysical neutrality the thesis opens up an epistemological gold mine. Non-doxastic value appearances can provide defeasible reasons for value judgments in roughly the same way that perceptual appearances provide defeasible reasons for perceptual judgments. The paper presents a new line of argument for the evaluative theory—drawing on recent work on fitting attitudes—and rebuts some of the most pressing criticisms.


2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (16) ◽  
pp. 1650195
Author(s):  
Wenhao Shu ◽  
Bo Wang ◽  
Hao Pei ◽  
Hongtao Li ◽  
Li Chen ◽  
...  

A new structure of microstructure reflection three-port beam splitter grating is described in this paper. The grating includes two dielectric layers and a metal slab on the substrate, where incident waves are reflected into the zeroth-order and the ± first-order with polarization-independent property. With the optimized grating profile, reflection efficiencies’ ratios between the first-order and the zeroth-order can reach 0.998 and 1.001 for TE and TM polarizations, respectively. Especially, the reflection grating can diffract efficiencies more than 30% into the ± first-order and the zeroth-order with the incident angular bandwidth of −1.9–1.9[Formula: see text] for TM polarization, which can have merits compared with single-layer transmission grating.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document