scholarly journals The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine

2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 126-166
Author(s):  
Scott D. Sagan ◽  
Allen S. Weiner
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Chain Of Command ◽  
The Law ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality ◽  
The Military

Abstract In 2013, the U.S. government announced that its nuclear war plans would be “consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” and would “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” If properly applied, these legal principles can have a profound impact on U.S. nuclear doctrine. The prohibition against targeting civilians means that “countervalue” targeting and “minimum deterrence” strategies are illegal. The principle of distinction and the impermissibility of reprisal against civilians make it illegal for the United States, contrary to what is implied in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, to intentionally target civilians even in reprisal for a strike against U.S. or allied civilians. The principle of proportionality permits some, but not all, potential U.S. counterforce nuclear attacks against military targets. The precautionary principle means that the United States must use conventional weapons or the lowest-yield nuclear weapons that would be effective against legitimate military targets. The law of armed conflict also restricts targeting of an enemy's leadership to officials in the military chain of command or directly participating in hostilities, meaning that broad targeting to destroy an enemy's entire political leadership is unlawful.

The Nuclear Necessity Principle: Making U.S. Targeting Policy Conform with Ethics & the Laws of War

Daedalus ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 145 (4) ◽  
pp. 62-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Lewis ◽  
Scott D. Sagan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Just War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Collateral Damage ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Policy ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
Probability Of Success ◽  
Just War Doctrine

In 2013, Obama administration spokesmen stated that all U.S. nuclear war plans “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” We analyze U.S. nuclear policy documents and argue that major changes must be made if U.S. nuclear war plans are to conform to these principles of just war doctrine and the law of armed conflict. We propose that the U.S. president announce a commitment to a “principle of necessity,” committing the United States not to use nuclear weapons against any military target that can be destroyed with reasonable probability of success by a conventional weapon. Such a doctrinal change would reduce collateral damage from any nuclear strike or retaliation by the United States and would, we argue, make our deterrent threats more credible and thus more effective.

Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joan Fitzpatrick
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Terrorism ◽  
War On Terrorism ◽  
Law Of War ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Law ◽  
Military Commissions ◽  
The Military ◽  
Civil Courts

The Military Order issued on November 13,2001,1 by President George W. Bush does not offer a clear rationale for subjecting international terrorists, and persons suspected of links to them, to trial by military commissions. Military commissions can be designed for several purposes: (1) to prosecute violations of the law of war, as an alternative to courts-martial; (2) to fill a legal vacuum where armed conflict disables the civil courts; and (3) to impose swift and certain punishment against civilians suspected of specific crimes. While the first two purposes are legitimate and reflected in past United States practice, the third is questionable and a sharp departure from democratic traditions. The ambiguous nature of the “war” against international terrorism and the sweeping text of the November 13 Military Order obscure which objective(s) the order is intended to accomplish.

Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona S. Cunningham ◽  
M. Taylor Fravel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Chinese Language ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Force Structure ◽  
Alternative Sources

Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.

War and Peace

2019 ◽  
pp. 230-260
Author(s):  
Jean Drèze
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Social Development ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
The United States ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
Military Presence ◽  
Logical Fallacies ◽  
General Strike

This chapter is concerned with the abolition of violence, or at least of armed conflict, as an aspect of social development. While nuclear strategists pride themselves on being “realists”, their realism is collectively self‐defeating and creates a dangerous world where minor conflicts could easily escalate into a nuclear war. The chapter exposes the logical fallacies of “mutually assured destruction” and related doctrines, as well as the illusions behind India's “nuclear deal” with the United States. Two essays deal with the Kashmir conflict. In 2016, a massive popular uprising took place in Kashmir, mainly in the form of an extended general strike. This event, however, was barely reported in the mainstream Indian media, except for occasional reports of stone pelting. A first‐hand account of the strike brings out that the real purpose of India's massive military presence in Kashmir is to control the civilian population and suppress all protests, however peaceful.

Ethics, Technology, and Nuclear War, II : How do nuclear weapons affect our military policy?

Worldview ◽  
1963 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
Joseph I. Coffey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
World War ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
The U.S

Since the end of World War II, the United States has aimed at deterring aggression against this country or its allies by a judicious combination of longlange nuclear striking forces and other forces armed with both nuclear and conventional weapons. (The verb "to deter" is defined as "to inhibit" or, in a more absolute usage, as "to prevent." One of the ambiguities of the concept of deterrence is that no one, including ourselves, is clear as to which usage is meant, much less which may prevail.) Of late years, as the Soviet Union achieved and developed a nuclear capability, deterrence has increasingly rested on the ability of the United States to launch a devastating retaliatory blow against anyone attacking the U.S. or, by extension, our allies.

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