The Nuclear Necessity Principle: Making U.S. Targeting Policy Conform with Ethics & the Laws of War

Daedalus ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 145 (4) ◽  
pp. 62-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Lewis ◽  
Scott D. Sagan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Just War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Collateral Damage ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Policy ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
Probability Of Success ◽  
Just War Doctrine

In 2013, Obama administration spokesmen stated that all U.S. nuclear war plans “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” We analyze U.S. nuclear policy documents and argue that major changes must be made if U.S. nuclear war plans are to conform to these principles of just war doctrine and the law of armed conflict. We propose that the U.S. president announce a commitment to a “principle of necessity,” committing the United States not to use nuclear weapons against any military target that can be destroyed with reasonable probability of success by a conventional weapon. Such a doctrinal change would reduce collateral damage from any nuclear strike or retaliation by the United States and would, we argue, make our deterrent threats more credible and thus more effective.

scholarly journals The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine

2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 126-166
Author(s):  
Scott D. Sagan ◽  
Allen S. Weiner
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Chain Of Command ◽  
The Law ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality ◽  
The Military

Abstract In 2013, the U.S. government announced that its nuclear war plans would be “consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” and would “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” If properly applied, these legal principles can have a profound impact on U.S. nuclear doctrine. The prohibition against targeting civilians means that “countervalue” targeting and “minimum deterrence” strategies are illegal. The principle of distinction and the impermissibility of reprisal against civilians make it illegal for the United States, contrary to what is implied in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, to intentionally target civilians even in reprisal for a strike against U.S. or allied civilians. The principle of proportionality permits some, but not all, potential U.S. counterforce nuclear attacks against military targets. The precautionary principle means that the United States must use conventional weapons or the lowest-yield nuclear weapons that would be effective against legitimate military targets. The law of armed conflict also restricts targeting of an enemy's leadership to officials in the military chain of command or directly participating in hostilities, meaning that broad targeting to destroy an enemy's entire political leadership is unlawful.

Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona S. Cunningham ◽  
M. Taylor Fravel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Chinese Language ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Force Structure ◽  
Alternative Sources

Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.

War and Peace

2019 ◽  
pp. 230-260
Author(s):  
Jean Drèze
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Social Development ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
The United States ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
Military Presence ◽  
Logical Fallacies ◽  
General Strike

This chapter is concerned with the abolition of violence, or at least of armed conflict, as an aspect of social development. While nuclear strategists pride themselves on being “realists”, their realism is collectively self‐defeating and creates a dangerous world where minor conflicts could easily escalate into a nuclear war. The chapter exposes the logical fallacies of “mutually assured destruction” and related doctrines, as well as the illusions behind India's “nuclear deal” with the United States. Two essays deal with the Kashmir conflict. In 2016, a massive popular uprising took place in Kashmir, mainly in the form of an extended general strike. This event, however, was barely reported in the mainstream Indian media, except for occasional reports of stone pelting. A first‐hand account of the strike brings out that the real purpose of India's massive military presence in Kashmir is to control the civilian population and suppress all protests, however peaceful.

Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism – A Reply to Silja N. U. Vöneky

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 871-878 ◽  
Author(s):  
John B. Bellinger
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
War On Terrorism ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Developing Area

I wanted to begin by thanking Dr. Voneky for her thoughtful contribution to this rapidly developing area of international law. One of the purposes of the ongoing dialogue with my European counterparts on the legal framework for the use of force and detention of combatants in an armed conflict with non-state actors is to spur dialogue to arrive at a common approach on these issues. I agree with many things in Dr. Voneky's article. I am pleased that, unlike many critics of the United States, she recognizes that it is possible to use force in self defense from armed attacks not directly linked to the actions of any state, and that the law of armed conflict would govern that use of force. I also appreciate that she notes that actions against terrorist groups outside a state's country are not necessarily simply transnational police actions. I wanted to take this brief opportunity to note three areas where there may be some misunderstandings regarding the views of the United States, and then discuss my thoughts on the way forward.

scholarly journals The end of application of international humanitarian law

2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (893) ◽  
pp. 163-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Milanovic
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
General Rule ◽  
The United States ◽  
Al Qaeda ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict

AbstractThis article provides an overview of the rules governing the end of application of international humanitarian law (IHL), or the law of armed conflict. It articulates the general principle that, unless there is a good reason of text, principle or policy that warrants an exception, the application of IHL will cease once the conditions that triggered its application in the first place are no longer met. For IHL to apply, its distinct thresholds of application – international armed conflict, belligerent occupation and non-international armed conflict – must continue to be satisfied at any given point in time. The article also examines situations in which a departure from the general rule is warranted, as well as the factors that need to be taken into account in determining the end of each type of armed conflict. In doing so, the article analyzes terminating processes and events, which generally end the application of IHL (but not necessarily all of it), and transformative processes and events, which end the application of one IHL sub-regime but immediately engage another. Finally, the article briefly looks at the (putative) armed conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda and its seemingly imminent end.

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Security Studies ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Empirical Record

What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the United States needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory, including Robert Jervis’s seminal book, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, argues that the explanation is simple—policymakers are wrong. This book takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy. It argues that military nuclear advantages above and beyond a secure, second-strike capability can contribute to a state’s national security goals. This is primarily because nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its resolve, providing it with coercive bargaining leverage, and enhancing nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most intractable puzzles in international security studies. The book also explains why, in a world of growing dangers, the United States must possess, as President Donald J. Trump declared, a nuclear arsenal “at the top of the pack.”

scholarly journals Why Arms Control?

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Jon Brook Wolfsthal
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

America survived the nuclear age through a complex combination of diplomatic and military decisions, and a good deal of luck. One of the tools that proved its value in both reducing the risks of nuclear use and setting rules for the ongoing nuclear competition were negotiated, legally binding, and verified arms control agreements. Such pacts between the United States and the Soviet Union arguably prevented the nuclear arms racing from getting worse and helped both sides climb off the Cold War nuclear precipice. Several important agreements remain in place between the United States and Russia, to the benefit of both states. Arms control is under threat, however, from domestic forces in the United States and from Russian actions that range from treaty violations to the broader weaponization of risk. But arms control can and should play a useful role in reducing the risk of nuclear war and forging a new agreement between Moscow and Washington on the new rules of the nuclear road.

The Impact of the Nicaragua Case on Matters of Evidence and Fact-Finding

2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-156
Author(s):  
PAUL S. REICHLER
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pulp Mills ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Government ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Day To Day Operations ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThe Nicaragua case demonstrates the Court's competence in receiving and interpreting evidence, and in making reasoned findings of fact, even in the most complicated evidentiary context, as is often presented in cases involving use of force and armed conflict. The Court applied well-established standards for evaluating the conflicting evidence presented to it. In particular, the Court determined that greater weight should be given to statements against interest made by high-level government officials than to a state's self-serving declarations. The Court also determined that statements by disinterested witnesses with first-hand knowledge should receive greater weight than mere statements of opinion or press reports. In applying these guidelines, the Court found, correctly, that (i) the United States had used military and paramilitary force against Nicaragua both directly and indirectly, by organizing, financing, arming, and training the Contra guerrillas to attack Nicaragua; (ii) the evidence did not support a finding that the United States exercised direct control over the Contras’ day-to-day operations; and (iii) there was no evidence that Nicaragua supplied arms to guerrillas fighting against the government of El Salvador during the relevant period, or carried out an armed attack against that state. While Judge Schwebel's dissent criticized the last of these findings, in fact, the evidence fully supported the Court's conclusion. In subsequent decisions during the past 25 years, the Court has continued to rely on the approach to evidence first elaborated in the Nicaragua case and has continued to demonstrate its competence as a finder of fact, including in cases involving armed conflict (Bosnia Genocide) and complex scientific and technical issues (Pulp Mills).

scholarly journals Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Acton
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Early Warning ◽  
The United States ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Organizational Reform ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Cyber Espionage ◽  
Damage Limitation ◽  
And Control

Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict. This form of “entanglement” between nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities creates the potential for Chinese or Russian nonnuclear strikes against the United States or U.S. strikes against either China or Russia to spark inadvertent nuclear escalation. Escalation pressures could be generated through crisis instability or through one of two newly identified mechanisms: “misinterpreted warning” or the “damage-limitation window.” The vulnerability of dual-use U.S. early-warning assets provides a concrete demonstration of the risks. These risks would be serious for two reasons. First, in a conventional conflict against the United States, China or Russia would have strong incentives to launch kinetic strikes on U.S. early-warning assets. Second, even limited strikes could undermine the United States' ability to monitor nuclear attacks by the adversary. Moreover, cyber interference with dual-use early-warning assets would create the additional danger of the target's misinterpreting cyber espionage as a destructive attack. Today, the only feasible starting point for efforts to reduce the escalation risks created by entanglement would be unilateral measures—in particular, organizational reform to ensure that those risks received adequate consideration in war planning, acquisition decisions, and crisis decisionmaking. Over the longer term, unilateral measures might pave the way for more challenging cooperative measures, such as agreed restrictions on threatening behavior.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document