scholarly journals A stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises under uncertain environment

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shi Yin ◽  
Baizhou Li

AbstractConsidering the fact that the development of low carbon economy calls for the low carbon technology sharing between interested enterprises, this paper study a stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises. In the paper, we consider the random interference factors that include the uncertain external environment and the internal understanding limitations of decision maker. In the model, superior enterprises and inferior enterprises are separated entities, and they play Stacklberg master-slave game, Nash non-cooperative game, and cooperative game, respectively. We discuss the feedback equilibrium strategies of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises, and it is found that some random interference factors in sharing system can make the variance of improvement degree of low carbon technology level in the cooperation game higher than the variance in the Stackelberg game, and the result of Stackelberg game is similar to the result of Nash game. Additionally, a government subsidy incentive and a special subsidy that inferior enterprises give to superior enterprises are proposed.

2014 ◽  
Vol 644-650 ◽  
pp. 5966-5969
Author(s):  
Sun Jie ◽  
Hu Jiang Gong ◽  
Wen Feng Liu

This paper are based on the background of a low-carbon economy, with China's automobile using new energy as the research object, explores the development of new energy automotive industry under collaborative innovation system, as well as the problems it faced. According to it, this paper put forward rational proposals, which has provided great theoretical value and practical significance for the development of new energy automotive industry in China.


Author(s):  
André Tosi Furtado

The transition to low carbon economy requires deep changes in the energy systems of the great majority of developing countries. However, only a small group of these countries is engaging significant efforts to develop renewable energies. The success in the diffusion of renewable energy technologies requires dynamic systems of innovation. In this chapter we analyze the recent evolution Brazilian sugarcane innovation system that was pioneering in the development and diffusion of bioethanol. This system is increasingly challenged by the acceleration of the technological regime, which is provoked by the energy crisis and the transition to the low carbon economy. The Brazilian innovation system has different capacities to cope with this challenge. In this chapter we differentiate the agriculture subsystem, which function in a STI (Science, Technology, and Innovation) mode from the industrial subsystem, which operates in a DIU (Doing, Using, and Interacting) mode. The agricultural subsystem has demonstrated a better ability to cope with the technological challenges of the new biotech research methodologies while the capital goods industry has much less propensity to deal with the second generation technologies for bioethanol. We describe also the present ethanol supply crises and its probable causes.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Ling Li ◽  
Yao Song ◽  
Zhiqiang Zhang

An excellent ecological environment is conducive for improving economic benefits and social benefits. The environmental pollution control requires the cooperation of governments at all levels and a large amount of capital investment. However, under the system with Chinese characteristics, the intergovernmental relations present complex and dynamic characteristics: the central government is authoritative, the local governments are obedient and self-interested, and the environmental pollution control usually involves multiple government departments, while it has strong externality, which makes it easy to breed “free rider” behavior in the process of environmental pollution control. Therefore, the cross-regional environmental pollution control cooperation model of governments at all levels is a complex and worthwhile research problem. Based on this, the paper studies a tripartite game problem of environmental pollution control from both horizontal and vertical intergovernmental relations. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation was used to obtain the optimal effort strategy, environmental pollution control level, and environmental pollution losses under the Nash game model, the Stackelberg game model, and the Cooperative game model. The results show the following: firstly, the governments’ environmental pollution control efforts are positively related to their own execution ability and influence ability and negatively related to the cost coefficient; secondly, from the perspectives of environmental pollution control level and environmental pollution losses, the Cooperative game model is superior to the Nash game model and the Stackelberg game; thirdly, this paper analyzes the relationship between the loss-bearing ratio, the special financial funds, the effort level of government, and the environmental pollution control level; finally, the conclusions are verified by numerical analysis, which proves the validity of the models.


Author(s):  
André Tosi Furtado

The transition to low carbon economy requires deep changes in the energy systems of the great majority of developing countries. However, only a small group of these countries is engaging significant efforts to develop renewable energies. The success in the diffusion of renewable energy technologies requires dynamic systems of innovation. In this chapter we analyze the recent evolution Brazilian sugarcane innovation system that was pioneering in the development and diffusion of bioethanol. This system is increasingly challenged by the acceleration of the technological regime, which is provoked by the energy crisis and the transition to the low carbon economy. The Brazilian innovation system has different capacities to cope with this challenge. In this chapter we differentiate the agriculture subsystem, which function in a STI (Science, Technology, and Innovation) mode from the industrial subsystem, which operates in a DIU (Doing, Using, and Interacting) mode. The agricultural subsystem has demonstrated a better ability to cope with the technological challenges of the new biotech research methodologies while the capital goods industry has much less propensity to deal with the second generation technologies for bioethanol. We describe also the present ethanol supply crises and its probable causes.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Sheng Zhang

Considering the fact that transboundary pollution control calls for the cooperation between interested parties, this paper studies a cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric nations in infinite-horizon level. In this paper, we model two ways of transboundary pollution: one is an accumulative global pollutant with an uncertain evolutionary dynamic and the other is a regional nonaccumulative pollutant. In our model, firms and governments are separated entities and they play a Stackelberg game, while the governments of the two nations can cooperate in pollution reduction. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of governments and industrial firms, and it is found that the governments being cooperative in transboundary pollution control will set a higher pollution tax rate and make more pollution abatement effort than when they are noncooperative. Additionally, a payment distribution mechanism that supports the subgame consistent solution is proposed.


2014 ◽  
Vol 962-965 ◽  
pp. 2377-2380
Author(s):  
Xiao Man Sun ◽  
Jun Dong He ◽  
Juan Juan Liang

Heavy industry would consume a lot of energy and make serious pollution, so it is important to develop a low-carbon economy for the need of not only changing the mode of economic development, but also building an ecological city. However, in the process of developing a low-carbon economy, there are many problems such as slowly development of carbon alternative industry, backward technology level, short of financing method for low-carbon economy. Therefore, it is important to accelerate the transformation of resource-based cities, promote the recycling of resources, develop alternative and renewable energy resources, improve the financing environment for low-carbon economy, and improve the development of carbon trading.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (9) ◽  
pp. 1144
Author(s):  
Yinfei Xu ◽  
Yafei Zu ◽  
Hui Zhang

This paper investigates the optimal inter-organization control of collaborative advertising considering the myopic and far-sighted behaviors. Taking a two-echelon supply chain as an example, four kinds of differential game models including myopic Stackelberg game, far-sighted Stackelberg game, myopic cooperative game and far-sighted cooperative game are studied. The results show that the optimal advertising efforts of both manufacturer and retailer in the myopic situation decrease with time. But they remain constant in the far-sighted situation. The Pareto improvement applies to both game players from the non-cooperative game to the cooperative game. The numerical analyses are conducted to further investigate the theoretical results and to guide the inter-organization control of collaborative advertising in practice.


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