scholarly journals Supplier’s Joint Investments in Cost Reduction and Quality Improvement in a Decentralized Supply Chain

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hengyun Zhang ◽  
Dingjun Hong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Quality Improvement ◽  
Cost Reduction ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Investment ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
Do So

We consider a decentralized supply chain with a downstream manufacturer and an upstream supplier. The upstream supplier sells a product to the manufacturer, who faces a quality and price sensitive demand. The supplier has a chance to invest in both cost reduction and quality improvement of its product. We derive the optimal investment and pricing decisions for the supply chain members. We do so in both the centralized and the decentralized supply chains. We show that the optimal investment and pricing decisions in the decentralized supply chain may deviate from that in the centralized supply chain. We develop a mechanism to coordinate the decentralized supply chain. The developed mechanism contains four policies: wholesale price, sharing of revenue, sharing of cost reduction investment cost, and sharing of quality improvement investment cost. We also show that the developed coordination mechanism can lead to Pareto improvement.

scholarly journals Coordinating a Supply Chain When Manufacturer Makes Cost Reduction Investment in Supplier

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shilei Huang ◽  
Hong Fu ◽  
Yongkai Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Cost Reduction ◽  
Production Efficiency ◽  
Optimal Investment ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
Operating Decisions

We consider a supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier and a downstream manufacturer, in which the supplier provides a component to the manufacturer, facing a price-sensitive and uncertain demand. The manufacturer makes cost reduction investment in the supplier to improve the supplier’s production efficiency, which benefits the entire supply chain. We derive the optimal investment and operating decisions. Both the centralized and decentralized supply chains are studied. We show that the optimal investment and operating decisions in the decentralized setting may deviate from that in the centralized setting. To avoid the profit loss caused by such a deviation, we develop a coordination mechanism by introducing a combined policy of revenue-sharing policy and investment cost-sharing policy. We also show that the developed coordination mechanism can achieve Pareto improvement for the two players.

scholarly journals Manufacturer’s R&D Investment Strategy and Pricing Decisions in a Decentralized Supply Chain

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Hengyun Zhang ◽  
Dingjun Hong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Optimal Investment ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Investment Strategy ◽  
D Investment

Consider that a manufacturer Stackelberg supply chain consists of an upstream supplier and a downstream manufacturer. The manufacturer purchases a component from the supplier and then transforms it into a final product which is sold in a price and quality sensitive market. The manufacturer considers to make R&D investment to improve the product quality and reduce the production cost. We first investigate and derive the optimal investment strategy and pricing decisions by establishing a three-stage game model. We show that the optimal investment strategy and pricing decisions in the decentralized model may deviate from those in the centralized model. We then propose a mechanism to coordinate the decentralized supply chain, by introducing a profit sharing policy, a production cost sharing policy, and an investment cost sharing policy. Finally, we show that both the supplier and the manufacturer can benefit from participating in the proposed coordination mechanism.

scholarly journals Effect of Electrical Energy on the Manufacturing Setup Cost Reduction, Transportation Discounts, and Process Quality Improvement in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain Management under a Service-Level Constraint

Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 3733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irfanullah Khan ◽  
Jihed Jemai ◽  
Han Lim ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Quality Improvement ◽  
Energy Consumption ◽  
Cost Reduction ◽  
Electrical Energy ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Electrical Energy Consumption ◽  
Setup Cost ◽  
Setup Cost Reduction

The need for efficient electrical energy consumption has greatly expanded in the process industries. In this paper, efforts are made to recognize the electrical energy consumption in a two-echelon supply chain model with a stochastic lead-time demand and imperfect production, while considering the distribution free approach. The initial investments are made for quality improvement and setup cost reduction, which ultimately reduce electrical energy consumption. The inspection costs are considered in order to ensure the good qualities of the product. Centralized and decentralized strategies are used to analyze the proposed supply chain model. The main objective of this study is to reduce the overall cost through efficient electrical energy consumption in supply chain management by optimizing the lot size, the number of shipments, the setup cost, and the failure rate. A quantity-based transportation discount policy is applied to reduce the expected annual costs, and a service-level constraint is incorporated for the buyer to avoid a stockout situation. The impact of the decision variables on the expected total costs is analyzed, and sensitivity analysis is carried out. The results show a significant reduction in overall cost, with quality improvement and setup cost reduction ultimately reducing electrical energy consumption.

scholarly journals Research on the Fresh Agricultural Product Supply Chain Coordination with Supply Disruptions

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sun Guohua
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Planning Horizon ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Supply Disruptions ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Lump Sum ◽  
Coordination Contract

This paper develops a dynamic model in a one-supplier-one-retailer fresh agricultural product supply chain that experiences supply disruptions during the planning horizon. The optimal solutions in the centralized and decentralized supply chains are studied. It is found that the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the maximum total supply chain profit in the decentralized supply chain with wholesale price contract are less than that in the centralized supply chain. A two-part tariff contract is proposed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain with which the maximum profit can be achieved. It is found that the optimal wholesale price should be a decreasing piecewise function of the final output. To ensure that the supplier and the retailer both have incentives to accept the coordination contract, a lump-sum fee is offered. The interval of lump-sum fee is given leaving both the supplier and the retailer better off with the two-part tariff contract.

Supply Chain Coordination under Asymmetric Disruptive Demand

2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 96-100
Author(s):  
Chuan Bo Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Capacity ◽  
Capacity Reservation ◽  
Chain Operation ◽  
Baseline Case ◽  
Supply Chain Operation ◽  
Better Than

Under the circumstance of disruptive demand, the decision-making and coordination of enterprise’s capacity is directly related to the efficiency of supply chain operation. On the basis of the baseline case, capacity reservation contract sees that the performance of decentralized supply chain is equal to the centralized supply chain, and better than the level of the optimal supply chain capacity under the wholesale price contract. For disruptive demand, this paper discusses the conditions of capacity expansion and supply chain coordination through the capacity reservation contract in two cases, i.e., symmetric disruptive information, asymmetric disruptive information, and compares the optimal capacity and the corresponding profit.

scholarly journals Competitive pricing strategies of multi channel supply chain under direct servicing by the manufacturer

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amit Sarkar ◽  
Brojeswar Pal
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Alliance ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimum Level ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
The People ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Competitive Pricing

Internet and its accessible devices (e.g., mobiles, computers) are the unmitigated blessings to the people. Nowadays, internet connectivity almost eliminates all kinds of blockades for the verification of authentication, comparison of prices, and services for a product. Consequently, the market has been becoming more competitive compared to decision making.  In this paper, we construct a multi-channel supply chain (MCSC) frameworks with traditional channels as well as a direct channel (DC), where the manufacturer provides services to the customers for both the cases. Then the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailers are examined. The optimal pricing decisions and services are discussed and also compared the profits with one another under various cases (Stackelberg Settings, Strategic Alliance, and two types of NO Improved Service). Then the sensitivity of the service cost coefficients and the cross-channel price coefficients on the profits for each player and the supply chain is analyzed. We find out the best profitable strategies under the parameters such as service costs and the positive effects of the service on the demand rate. We also mark out the optimum level of the services so that the profit will be maximized for each player. Finally, we define an interval such that if the service costs belong to that interval, then the selling price of the DC would be lesser than the wholesale price. These findings help companies such as automobiles, electronic goods, etc. to implement the best strategies to increase their profit.

scholarly journals Research on the Maritime Logistics Pricing Model of Risk-Averse Retailer-Dominated Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (s2) ◽  
pp. 107-116
Author(s):  
Qing Fang ◽  
Zeping Tong ◽  
Liang Ren ◽  
Ao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Maritime Logistics ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
On Line ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Abstract Price decision is studied in a risk-averse retailer-dominated dual-channel supply chain, which consisting of one manufacturers and one retailer with both off-line and on-line channels. Firstly, two mean-variance models in centralized and decentralized supply chain are established. Secondly, the optimal solutions under the two decision modes are compared and analyzed. The results shows that the price of dual-channel of retailer decreased with the increase of retailers’ risk- aversion coefficient and the standard deviation of the fluctuation of market demand, while the wholesale price changes is on the contrary; in addition, when the market demand is greater than a certain value, the prices of dual channel are correspondingly higher in decentralized supply chain than in centralized supply chain, and vice versa. In addition, when the retailer’s risk aversion is in a certain interval, the expected utility of the whole supply chain is greater in centralized supply chain than in decentralized decision, and vice versa. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the above conclusions.

scholarly journals Decentralized Supply Chains under Random Price-Dependent Demand: Noncooperative Equilibria vs. Coordination with Cost-Sharing Contracts

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yanpeng Sun ◽  
Cheng Ma ◽  
Qi Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Lost Sales ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Equilibrium Response ◽  
Buy Back ◽  
Dependent Demand

It is common for a supplier to sell products to multiple retailers. In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of a decentralized supply chain with multiple retailers facing a random price-dependent demand in the additive form. Here, we consider two kinds of demand functions: the distribution of the demand depends only on the retailer’s own retail price (noncompeting retailers) and not only on his own retail price but also on that of the other retailers (competing retailers). We present appropriate wholesale price, buy-back, and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts to coordinate the total supply chain, so that when all the retailers adopt their equilibrium response, the supply chain system coordination is also achieved. Furthermore, the coalition formation among retailers is also analyzed. We find that with buy-back and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts and linear price-dependent demand function, retailers always prefer being in the grand coalition to forming any other coalition.

scholarly journals Research on the supply chain model based on the differentiation of green agricultural products

2018 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. 02012
Author(s):  
Hui Su ◽  
Yuquan Cui ◽  
Bingjie Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Chain Model

This paper studies the supply chain of green agricultural products with "agricultural super docking" mode based on the different management. The "agricultural super docking" mode is a direct connection between supermarkets and farmers (or cooperatives), what the supermarket needs and what the farmers produce. The green degree is used to indicate the quality level of health, safety and nutrition of agricultural products. The greater the green degree is, the better the quality of agricultural products is. In order to meet the needs of all consumers, the supermarket decide to carry out different management. That is to say, supermarket sells ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products at the same time. This paper gives the consumer utility function for ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products separately. We analyze the consumers’ choice behaviors based on the consumer utility function .We discuss the optimal decision of supermarket choosing one farmer and supermarket choosing two farmers based on Stackelberg game. It can be seen from the comparison that supermarket can get more profits when it chooses two farmer to order separately. Finally, a "wholesale price + ordering subsidy" coordination mechanism is proposed to realize supply chain coordination. .

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