scholarly journals Competitive pricing strategies of multi channel supply chain under direct servicing by the manufacturer

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amit Sarkar ◽  
Brojeswar Pal
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Alliance ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimum Level ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
The People ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Competitive Pricing

Internet and its accessible devices (e.g., mobiles, computers) are the unmitigated blessings to the people. Nowadays, internet connectivity almost eliminates all kinds of blockades for the verification of authentication, comparison of prices, and services for a product. Consequently, the market has been becoming more competitive compared to decision making.  In this paper, we construct a multi-channel supply chain (MCSC) frameworks with traditional channels as well as a direct channel (DC), where the manufacturer provides services to the customers for both the cases. Then the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailers are examined. The optimal pricing decisions and services are discussed and also compared the profits with one another under various cases (Stackelberg Settings, Strategic Alliance, and two types of NO Improved Service). Then the sensitivity of the service cost coefficients and the cross-channel price coefficients on the profits for each player and the supply chain is analyzed. We find out the best profitable strategies under the parameters such as service costs and the positive effects of the service on the demand rate. We also mark out the optimum level of the services so that the profit will be maximized for each player. Finally, we define an interval such that if the service costs belong to that interval, then the selling price of the DC would be lesser than the wholesale price. These findings help companies such as automobiles, electronic goods, etc. to implement the best strategies to increase their profit.

COORDINATING TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAINS UNDER STOCK AND PRICE DEPENDENT DEMAND RATE

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (02) ◽  
pp. 1250051 ◽  
Author(s):  
SHIBAJI PANDA
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Integrated System ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Inventory Level ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Implicit Information ◽  
Demand Rate

Coordination is imperative for improving supply chain performance. In this paper, we focus on coordination of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a price-setting retailer, which operates for a single product. Customer demand is influenced by retailer's instantaneous inventory level and selling price. The integrated system and the decentralized scenario, by considering manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader, are discussed. It is shown that conventional revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the system but revenue and cost sharing (RCS) contract is able to coordinate the system and leads to a win–win outcome. The key contract parameters — cost sharing fraction, along with revenue sharing fraction and wholesale price are determined under explicit and implicit information of retailer's cost structure. Finally, it is shown that range of cost sharing fraction that leads to win–win situation is independent of the format of cost structure of retailer. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the development of the model.

scholarly journals Effect of Capital Constraint in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Lang Xu ◽  
Jia Shi ◽  
Jihong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Capital constraint is a significant factor that mainly restricts the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises. This paper explores the channel strategy and pricing decision in a dual-channel supply chain, which consists of one supplier and one retailer. Adequate and inadequate capital constraints for the supplier are distinguished by determining whether open the retail channel to sell. The observations offer managerial insights into supply chain member. First, the results indicate that the capital constraint is a key factor affecting channel strategies and pricing decisions. With the increased value of capital constraint, the wholesale price of offline channel and the selling price of online channel firstly decrease and then remain constant. Second, the results demonstrate that, with capital constraint, the supplier pays more attention to consumers’ brand loyalty if it chooses to open the online channel only. Additionally, the price-sensitivity parameter has no effect on the strategy of opening only the offline channel. Moreover, when the channel competition is too intense, the supplier will choose to only open the online channel strategy and increase the online selling price if the capital is insufficient.

scholarly journals Dynamic Game and Coordination Strategy of Multichannel Supply Chain Based on Brand Competition

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Binshuo Bao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Tracking System ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Brand Competition ◽  
Adjustment Speed

In is very important for the corresponding author to have a linked ORCID (Open Researcher and Contributor ID) account on MTS. To register a linked ORCID account, please go to the Account Update page (http://mts.hindawi.com/update/) in our Manuscript Tracking System and after you have logged in click on the ORCID link at the top of the page. This link will take you to the ORCID website where you will be able to create an account for yourself. Once you have done so, your new ORCID will be saved in our Manuscript Tracking System automatically.”"?>this paper, two noncooperative dynamic pricing strategies are used in a supply chain. Two dynamic Stackelberg game models have been built involving both a manufacturer and a retailer assumed to be the leader in order. In the two models, the manufacturer sells national-brand (NB) product to an independent retailer or directly to consumers through a direct channel. The retailers sell a store-brand (SB) product when they sell the NB product coming from the manufacturer. Thus, there is competition both in different channels and in products with different brands. To analyze the complexity of the model, parameter bifurcation diagrams and strange attractor diagrams have been therefore plotted. The results show that the game leader has advantages when the market is stable, but it turns disadvantageous if the state falls into unstable as the game follower can quickly adjust the strategy to seize the market. The wholesale price and the direct selling price are high that they incur larger profits if the manufacturer is dominant, but it gets worse when the adjustment speed increases. While in the model where the retailer plays a dominant role, the increase in the adjustment speed is unfavorable to retailer. By controlling the total cost of the direct channel and increasing channel competition strength and brand competition strength, the manufacturers can increase their profits in the game dominated by the retailer. In addition, the stable region within the system will be narrow since the market is sensitive to the channel competition, brand competition, and advertising indifference.

scholarly journals The Influence of Buyer Power on Supply Chain Pricing with Downstream Competition

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 2924
Author(s):  
Qiu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Buyer Power ◽  
Downstream Competition ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Vertical Market

This paper aims to investigate the impact of buyer power on the wholesale price and retail price of, in the case, downstream competition. Based on a summary of the competitive characteristics of China’s retail market, a model of a vertical market was constructed to examine the influence of buyer power on the pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers, and to analyze the mechanism of price decisions. The results showed that the buyer power of national retailers reduced the wholesale price, but the impact on local retailers remained uncertain. Although increasing buyer power initially increased the local retailer’s wholesale price and caused the ‘waterbed effect’, we found that this effect reverted when the buyer power reached a point at which the ‘anti-waterbed effect’ appeared. The opposite was true of the retail price. However, buyer power reduced the average retail price, and consumer welfare improved.

Examining Double Marginalization Effect for Innovative Product Supply Chain

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjing Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Innovative Product ◽  
Double Marginalization ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Number Of Factors ◽  
Innovative Products ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Over Time

Double marginalization effect refers to the phenomenon that when both upstream and downstream firms have monopolistic power, customers pay higher retail price and firms make less profit than when the supply chain is vertically integrated (Tirole, 1988). Although double marginalization effect has been extensively studied in the context of supply chain management for mature products, very limited attention has been given to innovative products whose demand is generated through word-of-mouth effect. The authors study the pricing decisions in a supply chain that sells innovative products. Using a modified Bass diffusion model to capture demand trajectory over time, the authors identify the optimal way for the retailer and supplier to adjust prices when profit is not discounted, and also provide numerical examples when profit is discounted. The authors show that (1) when profit is not discounted the optimal retail prices are adjusted over time, while the optimal wholesale price should be kept as a constant, and (2) double marginalization effect also exists in an innovative product supply chain, but its degree depends on a number of factors, such as the innovation and imitation coefficients.

scholarly journals A Multi Item Integrated Inventory Model with Reparability and Manufacturing of Fresh Products

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 74
Author(s):  
Pinky Saxena ◽  
S. R. Singh ◽  
Isha Sangal
Keyword(s):  
Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Rate ◽  
Inventory Model ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Integrated Inventory Model ◽  
Integrated Inventory ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Fresh Products

<p>In this paper a multi item integrated inventory model is presented with reparability of returned items. It is assumed here that only a certain ratio of returned items can be repaired and the remaining stock of returned items is salvaged. By using these returned items, the waste can be reduced, which pollute the environment. This is a green supply chain where the demand for the products is selling price dependent and production rate is taken as a function of demand rate. The shortages are allowed here. A numerical example and sensitivity analysis are also presented to illustrate the model.</p>

scholarly journals Inventory and Pricing Decisions Under Wholesale Price Contract with Social Preferences

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuren Liu ◽  
Huina Chen ◽  
Lili Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

AbstractThis paper introduces the other-regarding preferences coefficients and studies the impact of social preferences on supply chain performance in the price-setting newsvendor setting. It is assumed that the stochastic demand is multiplicative. The manufacturer and retailer play a Stackelberg game. We analyze the impact of the decision-maker’s social preferences on the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price, the retailer’s optimal retail price and order quantity, the supply chain member’s profits and utilities, and the supply chain system’s profits and utilities under three different cases that only the retailer, only the manufacturer and both are with social preferences. We show that a manufacturer, as a leader, should find a spiteful retailer, while a retailer, as a follower, should find a manufacturer with generous liability, to improve the entire supply chain. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate these results.

Pricing and Distribution Strategies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 23-37
Author(s):  
Guangye Xu ◽  
Hanguang Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Distribution Strategy ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Brick And Mortar ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
New Distribution

Internet has revolutionized distribution channels. Online orders are forwarded to the brick-and-mortar store to make the fulfillment, which is a new distribution strategy in a dual-channel supply chain. However, there is little research on the value of using such distribution strategy in dual-channel setting. To fill this gap, this article considers a manufacturer marketing a product through a dual-channel supply chain, comprised of an online channel and an offline retail channel. We develop a game theory model to investigate the pricing decisions and the distribution strategies, as well as to examine the impacts of the new distribution strategy on price competition and the dual-channel supply chain member's profits. By comparing the results of the traditional distribution strategy and the new distribution strategy, we find that the new distribution strategy can soften price competition when the proportion of the revenue generated by the direct channel is high enough, while if the proportion is low enough, it may intensify price competition. We also find that the supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation when the wholesale price is higher, and the proportion is greater under the new distribution strategy.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions for a Sustainable Supply Chain in the Presence of Potential Strategic Customers

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinmin Liu ◽  
Kangkang Lin ◽  
Lei Wang ◽  
Lili Ding
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Purchase Behavior ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Purchasing Decisions ◽  
Strategic Customers ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Will Force

In service to sustainable development, consumers have begun to prefer green products for their special environmental characteristics, and many enterprises are introducing new products to improve their competitiveness, but this tactic may not work if customers are strategic, as they might choose to defer purchasing decisions while prices are high and wait for lower prices in the future. Considering the differences in purchase behavior, we divided customers into two groups—strategic customers and myopic customers. Furthermore, we distinguished three types of strategic customers according to their different preferences to analyze the optimal pricing and greenness strategies in sustainable supply chain in strategic customer scenarios. Our results led to the following conclusions. (1) Strategic customers’ individual preferences can affect optimum equilibrium and that a higher purchase price threshold can stimulate the manufacturer to improve greenness and set a higher price, while a higher greenness purchase threshold and purchase value threshold will force manufacturer to set a lower price. (2) We observed that strategic customers can increase demand and vender profit. As the number of strategic customers increases, selling price and greenness will experience downward trends in a price threshold scenario but upward trends in greenness threshold and value threshold scenarios. (3) A firm can take measures to mitigate the effects of strategic customers by adjusting price and greenness dynamically according to price and greenness sensitivity, which can play a leading role in actively influencing strategic customer behavior.

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