scholarly journals Bilateral Coordination Strategy of Supply Chain with Bidirectional Option Contracts under Inflation

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nana Wan ◽  
Xu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Bilateral Coordination ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Option Contracts ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Optimal Ordering

As far as the price increase and the demand contraction caused by inflation are concerned, we establish a Stackelberg game model that incorporates bidirectional option contracts and the effect of inflation and derive the optimal ordering and production policies on a one-period two-stage supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer. Through using the model of wholesale price contracts as the benchmark, we find that the introduction of bidirectional option contracts can benefit both the supplier and the retailer under inflation scenarios. Based on the conclusions drawn above, we design the bilateral coordination mechanism from the different perspective of two members involved and discuss how bidirectional option contracts should be set to achieve channel coordination under inflation scenarios. Through the sensitivity analysis, we illustrate the effect of inflation on the optimal decision variables and the optimal expected profits of the two parties with bidirectional option contracts.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Bilateral Coordination with Option Contracts under Inflation Scenarios

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nana Wan ◽  
Xu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Model Framework ◽  
Bilateral Coordination ◽  
Option Contracts ◽  
Optimal Ordering ◽  
The Impact

There exist obvious changes in price and demand during the inflationary period, both of which are regarded as the key factors leading to supply chain uncertainty. In this paper, we focus our discussion on price increase and demand contraction caused by inflation, integrate the effect of inflation and option contracts within the model framework, and analyze how to use option contracts to achieve supply chain coordination under inflation scenarios. We consider a one-period two-stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer and explore the effect of inflation on the optimal ordering and production decisions under three different types of contracts: wholesale price contracts, option contracts, and portfolio contracts. Moreover, we explore the impact of option contracts on the supply chain through using wholesale price contracts model as the benchmark. We find that the retailer prefers adopting portfolio contracts, but the supplier prefers providing option contracts under inflation scenarios. Ultimately, option contracts will be implemented owing to the supplier’s market dominant position. In addition, we discuss the supply chain bilateral coordination mechanism with option contracts from the perspectives of two members and derive that option contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement under inflation scenarios.

scholarly journals Research on the supply chain model based on the differentiation of green agricultural products

2018 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. 02012
Author(s):  
Hui Su ◽  
Yuquan Cui ◽  
Bingjie Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Chain Model

This paper studies the supply chain of green agricultural products with "agricultural super docking" mode based on the different management. The "agricultural super docking" mode is a direct connection between supermarkets and farmers (or cooperatives), what the supermarket needs and what the farmers produce. The green degree is used to indicate the quality level of health, safety and nutrition of agricultural products. The greater the green degree is, the better the quality of agricultural products is. In order to meet the needs of all consumers, the supermarket decide to carry out different management. That is to say, supermarket sells ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products at the same time. This paper gives the consumer utility function for ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products separately. We analyze the consumers’ choice behaviors based on the consumer utility function .We discuss the optimal decision of supermarket choosing one farmer and supermarket choosing two farmers based on Stackelberg game. It can be seen from the comparison that supermarket can get more profits when it chooses two farmer to order separately. Finally, a "wholesale price + ordering subsidy" coordination mechanism is proposed to realize supply chain coordination. .

scholarly journals The role of voucher sale in advance for a capital-constrained supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haijun Wang ◽  
Guanmei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies voucher sale as an operational method to raise working capital for a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer takes advantage of an online platform to sell vouchers and to get access to borrowing from a bank. By formulating a Stackelberg game model, we show the retailer's possible order quantities in the cases without and with bank loan and analyze the impact of voucher sale on the retailer's optimal choice of order quantity and the supplier's optimal wholesale price. We find that a smaller voucher's price induces the retailer to be more likely to order with loan from a bank while a larger voucher's value induces an order quantity with the loan more difficult to be repaid. In addition, if voucher's price is large, the supplier decides a wholesale price which leads the retailer not to borrow from a bank; and if voucher's price is small, the supplier's optimal decision is obtained by anticipating the retailer to borrow from a bank. We also analyze the impact of voucher sale in the presence of trade credit financing on the firms' decisions. The results show that the voucher's price should be small so that the retailer can repay the supplier if voucher's value is large; otherwise, the retailer either does not borrow from the supplier or may not repay the supplier. Besides, the supplier decides a wholesale price so that the retailer does not borrow or can repay the supplier, except that the voucher's value is large and the voucher's price is medium.

scholarly journals Pricing and Coordination Mechanism of Supply Chain considering Product Recycling under Asymmetric Power

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Hangxin Guo ◽  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Bin Hu ◽  
Huidan Lin ◽  
Lihua Shi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Asymmetric Power ◽  
Coordination Effect ◽  
Product Recycling

The concept of “green supply chain” puts forward new requirements for the recycling management of waste products. The waste electronic products are taken as the research object, and a two-stage closed-loop supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a retailer, and consumers is considered in this paper. By constructing a Stackelberg game model, the pricing strategy and profit distribution of the supply chain under different decision modes considering asymmetric powers are studied. Finally, Python is used for simulation. The results show that the gross profit of supply chain under decentralized decision is always lower than that under centralized decision-making, and asymmetric power has an impact on the pricing decision-making of forward supply chain and reverse supply chain; compared with transfer cost, wholesale price has a greater impact on coordination effect.

scholarly journals Optimal Ordering Policy and Coordination Mechanism of a Supply Chain with Controllable Lead-Time-Dependent Demand Forecast

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Hua-Ming Song ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
Jian-Qiang Luo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Ordering Policy ◽  
Controllable Lead Time ◽  
Optimal Ordering Policy ◽  
Optimal Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Ordering

This paper investigates the ordering decisions and coordination mechanism for a distributed short-life-cycle supply chain. The objective is to maximize the whole supply chain's expected profit and meanwhile make the supply chain participants achieve a Pareto improvement. We treat lead time as a controllable variable, thus the demand forecast is dependent on lead time: the shorter lead time, the better forecast. Moreover, optimal decision-making models for lead time and order quantity are formulated and compared in the decentralized and centralized cases. Besides, a three-parameter contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain and alleviate the double margin in the decentralized scenario. In addition, based on the analysis of the models, we develop an algorithmic procedure to find the optimal ordering decisions. Finally, a numerical example is also presented to illustrate the results.

scholarly journals Inventory Financing with Overconfident Supplier Based on Supply Chain Contract

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weifan Jiang ◽  
Jian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Joint Decision ◽  
Supply Chain Contract ◽  
Psychological Behavior ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Inventory Financing

Overconfidence is a universal psychological behavior. Overconfidence on demand awareness will have a significant impact on operation decisions. The supplier estimated the demand with excessive precision which influences the inventory financing decision-making deeply. We built the demand function based on the supplier’s overconfidence. Then we established the retailer, supplier, and the Bank’s profit function, respectively. Through the analysis of the bilevel Stackelberg game, we obtained the order quantity of the retailer with the capital constraint, the wholesale price of overconfident supplier, and the loan-to-value ratio of Bank, and we analyzed the influence of overconfidence on the decision variables. We have several findings as follows. First, the overconfidence makes the decisions of the retailer, supplier, and Bank deviate from the rational decisions. Second, the space of the market profit will affect the decision variables in the joint decision-making. Third, the financing supply chain (including the Bank and supply chain) should have a positive attitude towards the overconfidence of the supplier. Forth, in the joint decision-making, the supplier need determines the buyback price according to the capital demand; and in the decentralized decision-making, the supplier should try to use high buyback price strategy.

Coordination Contracts of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Advertising Cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-89
Author(s):  
Xue-Mei Zhang ◽  
Ying-Ying Li ◽  
Zhi Liu ◽  
Qian-Wen Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Marketing Channel ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

To study the impact of advertising cooperation on the decisions of dual-channel supply chain, a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is considered. The manufacturer can sell products to customers either through a direct marketing channel or through a traditional retail channel. This paper analyses the level of advertising investment and supply chain profits of centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chains based on a Stackelberg game. Then, the decision models of dual-channel supply chain under different contracts are constructed, and how manufacturers can optimize the profits of both sides through an effective coordination mechanism is analyzed. The research results show that the improved advertising costs and revenue sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the dual-channel supply chain system. Numerical experiments illustrate the impacts of parameters on the optimal decision results.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

Procedural fairness concerns in supply chain with retailer promotional effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tengfei Nie ◽  
Hualin Liu ◽  
Yilun Dong ◽  
Shaofu Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Procedural Fairness ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Fair Process ◽  
Slotting Allowances ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Distributional Fairness

Purpose The existing literature has a lack of modeling of procedural fairness concerns in the supply chain level. This paper aims to investigate how procedural fairness concerns affect channel decisions, performance and coordination. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer who have procedural fairness concerns in a classic Stackelberg game setting. The model is set in sales promotional environment. According to the existing literature, engagement is used to depict fair process. Some findings are made through analyzing respective decisions of the supplier and the retailer under the influence of procedural fairness concerns. Findings The results show that the channel efficiency can be improved when the retailer exhibits procedural fairness concerns, but if the aversion to unfair process exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer cannot benefit from it. Besides, the retailer profits more when he cares about distributional fairness, although the whole channel surplus can be improved by procedural fairness concerns. Originality/value This is the first paper to study the influences of procedural fairness concerns on supply chain decisions and channel performance. Finally, a mechanism combining a wholesale price contract with slotting allowances is proposed to coordinate the supply chain.

scholarly journals Game Analysis and Coordination of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain: Perspective of Components Reuse Strategy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 9681
Author(s):  
Xiaomin Zhao ◽  
Xueli Bai ◽  
Zhihui Fan ◽  
Ting Liu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Elasticity ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Game Analysis

This paper studies a closed-loop supply chain that covers three key members: Manufacturer, new components supplier, and recycled-components supplier. Considering the power of each member in the chain, we use game theory to analyze the optimal decision and coordination, particularly investigating the economic value of components reuse strategy. The results show that, in a decentralized setting, the value of components reuse highly depends on the attributes of the products. For the products with low price elasticity, reuse strategy is only beneficial to the recycled-components suppliers. Further investigation shows the manufacturer can use wholesale price contracts to coordinate and improve the supply chain’s performance.

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