scholarly journals Differential Game Analyses of Logistics Service Supply Chain Coordination by Cost Sharing Contract

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haifeng Zhao ◽  
Bin Lin ◽  
Wanqing Mao ◽  
Yang Ye
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Relationship Of

Cooperation of all the members in a supply chain plays an important role in logistics service. The service integrator can encourage cooperation from service suppliers by sharing their cost during the service, which we assume can increase the sales by accumulating the reputation of the supply chain. A differential game model is established with the logistics service supply chain that consists of one service integrator and one supplier. And we derive the optimal solutions of the Nash equilibrium without cost sharing contract and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the integrator as the leader who partially shares the cost of the efforts of the supplier. The results make the benefits of the cost sharing contract in increasing the profits of both players as well as the whole supply chain explicit, which means that the cost sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism in the long-term relationship of the members in a logistics service supply chain.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

scholarly journals The Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, we study the supply chain coordination problem between a manufacturer and a retailer regarding consumers’ low-carbon preferences. The retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity; the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the retailer’s order quantity. We consider four cases, including the non-emission abatement, the emission abatement of decentralized decision-making, the centralized decision-making and the retailer providing a cost-sharing contract. By comparing the four cases, we find that the case of a retailer providing a cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, achieving a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer and retailer. In addition, we use the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the cost-sharing ratio. Finally, numerical simulations are given to analyze the impact of the cost-sharing ratio on the equilibrium results, including the profit and the emission abatement level. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the cost-sharing ratio and consumers’ low-carbon awareness on the profits of the members in the supply chain. We find that the equilibrium results, including the order quantity, the emission abatement level and the profits of the members in the supply chain under contract, are higher than the ones under centralized decision-making. The results show that in the higher low-carbon awareness market, retailers should formulate a reasonable cost-sharing ratio to achieve emission reduction coordination.

scholarly journals Research on Coordination Complexity of E-Commerce Logistics Service Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Yaoguang Zhong ◽  
Fangfang Guo ◽  
Huajun Tang ◽  
Xumei Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Global Optimum ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Coordination Strategies ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Business Logistics ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
Last Mile

With the rapid growth of E-commerce business, logistics service, especially the last-mile distribution, has become one bottleneck, which leads to the rise of coordination complexity of logistics service supply chain (LSSC). This research, based on Stackelberg’s game theory, studies the coordination of a new three-echelon LSSC consisting of an E-commerce mall, an express company, and a terminal distribution service provider and investigates the optimal solutions and profits for each party within the semicentralized and centralized LSSC alliances, respectively. To accomplish this, it firstly shows that the three-echelon LSSC can lead to global optimum under the centralized decision-making scenario and then deploys the contract coordination schemes, including revenue sharing, cost sharing, and unit delivery price contracts, in three semicentralized alliances, so as to achieve the same performance of the centralized decision-making scenario, in which each party in the LSSC can achieve the win-win situation. Finally, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the feasibility and the effectiveness of the proposed coordination strategies. This study enriches the coordination theory in the field of LSSC and provides managerial insights for decision makers in LSSC.

scholarly journals Sharing Logistics Service Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing vs. Cost-Sharing Contracts

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Ying Luo ◽  
Qiang Wei ◽  
Xinyu Gou ◽  
Dai Dai ◽  
Yiran Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
Distribution Company ◽  
Feasible Solutions ◽  
Study Designs

The purpose of this study is to explore the design of equity cooperation mechanism in the sharing logistics service supply chain. This study designs a two-echelon logistics service supply chain composed of an urban joint distribution company and N logistics companies. The urban joint distribution company is jointly established by N logistics companies based on specific shares of equity investment. We establish sharing logistics service supply chain models under revenue-sharing or cost-sharing contracts. Revenue-sharing factor or cost-sharing factor is the equity cooperation parameter. When the members of the supply chain choose to cooperate in revenue-sharing or cost-sharing mechanism, not all cooperation scenarios considered in the study can achieve Pareto improvement of the total profit of the supply chain, but at least one situation can achieve Pareto improvement. This study provides feasible solutions for logistics companies to join the sharing logistics service platform and provides a reference for the operation of a joint distribution platform established by logistics companies. New results and managerial insights are derived by the sharing logistics service supply chain with revenue-sharing vs cost-sharing contracts, which enriches the interfaces of the operation of the sharing logistics service supply chain.

scholarly journals Can cost sharing contracts coordinate green supply chains based on manufacturers’ overconfidence

2021 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 04014
Author(s):  
Hui Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Numerical Experimentation ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Green Supply Chains ◽  
The Impact

Cost sharing contracts is one of the most common contracts to coordinate green supply chains. In this paper, we examine whether it can coordinate green supply chains in the set up of overconfidence. We assume that the manufacturer is overconfident and the retailer is rational. The manufacturer overestimates consumers’ sensitivity to product greenness and accurately estimates the uncertainty of demand. The overconfident manufacturer and the rational retailer cooperate through cost sharing contracts. Then, we construct a game theoretical model to analyze the impact of manufacturers’ overconfident on product greenness, pricing, profit and supply chain cooperation. At last, a numerical experimentation is presented. We find that, (1) the product greenness, wholesale price and retail price increase with the manufacturer’s overconfidence as well as the retailer’s cost sharing proportion. (2) no matter how much the cost sharing proportion is, the profit of manufacturers and retailers decreases with the manufacturer’s overconfidence level. (3) cost sharing contracts can achieve the green supply chain coordination in rational setting. But under manufacturers’ overconfidence, it cannot.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document