Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 570-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Alspector-Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Closure

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 414-416
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
Misleading Evidence ◽  
Tacit Assumption ◽  
Knowledge Closure

The hangman/surprise-examination/prediction paradox is solved. It is not solved by denying knowledge closure (although knowledge closure is false). It is not solved by denying KK or denying that knowing p implies other iterated knowing attitudes (although these are false). It is not solved by misleading evidence causing the students to lose knowledge because students cannot lose knowledge this way. It is solved by showing that a tacit assumption (what is being said to the students/prisoner is informative) is overlooked and that inferences by contradiction are invalid if assumptions are left out. The phenomenology of the surprise-exam paradox is explored to explain why this solution has been missed. Crucial is that in many cases the students/prisoner know(s) there will be a surprise exam/execution because of an inference from what the teacher/judge meant to say, and not directly by the literal application of what he did say.

Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Melchior
Keyword(s):  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Closure

Usage Challenges to Fallibilism

2020 ◽  
pp. 343-385
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Knowledge Closure

A definition of fallibility shows that agents are fallible about necessary truths. It is shown that fallibility of agents implies a denial of parity reasoning. Moorean paradoxes appear to undercut fallibility, but they are due entirely to the factivity of “know.” Kripke’s dogmatism paradox is explained: the key is recognizing that knowledge fallibility applies to the knowledge that all evidence against something one knows is misleading. That we do not know we will lose a lottery is denied. Fallibility shows this. And that people argue over this also indicates this. Knowledge closure fails because of fallibility; so does aggregation of assumptions. Vagueness shows why debates about whether we know outcomes of lotteries before winning tickets are drawn are irresolvable. Irrational penny reasoning is analyzed; it applies to nonfactive attitudes such as being really really sure. Preface paradoxes are explained. That it is sometimes rational to believe contradictory propositions is explained.

Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious

Synthese ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 191 (12) ◽  
pp. 2617-2632
Author(s):  
Tim Kraft
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Closure

Attributing Knowledge

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
Rational Belief ◽  
Cognitive Ethology ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Correct Application ◽  
Mechanical Devices ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
The Lottery Paradox ◽  
Knowledge Closure

The word “know” is revealed as vague, applicable to fallible agents, factive, and criterion-transcendent. It is invariant in its meaning across contexts and invariant relative to different agents. Only purely epistemic properties affect its correct application—not the interests of agents or those who attribute the word to agents. These properties enable “know” to be applied correctly—as it routinely is—to cognitive agents ranging from sophisticated human knowers, who engage in substantial metacognition, to various animals, who know much less and do much less, if any, metacognition, to nonconscious mechanical devices such as drones, robots, and the like. These properties of the word “know” suffice to explain the usage phenomena that contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists invoke to place pressure on an understanding of the word that treats its application as involving no interests of agents, or others. It is also shown that the factivity and the fallibilist-compatibility of the word “know” explain Moorean paradoxes, the preface paradox, and the lottery paradox. A fallibility-sensitive failure of knowledge closure is given along with a similar failure of rational-belief closure. The latter explains why rational agents can nevertheless believe A and B, where A and B contradict each other. A substantial discussion of various kinds of metacognition is given—as well as a discussion of the metacognition literature in cognitive ethology. An appendix offers a new resolution of the hangman paradox, one that turns neither on a failure of knowledge closure nor on a failure of KK.

Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism

Epistemology ◽  
2008 ◽  
pp. 137-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marian David ◽  
Ted A. Warfield
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Closure

scholarly journals Dretske on knowledge closure

2006 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Luper
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Closure

scholarly journals An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moti Mizrahi
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
External World Skepticism ◽  
Knowledge Closure

In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion (i.e., thatSdoesn’t know thatp) without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical hypotheses or knowledge closure.

scholarly journals Arguing about Free Will

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (63) ◽  
pp. 375-403
Author(s):  
Danilo Šuster
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The Other ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Central Notion ◽  
Knowledge Closure ◽  
Best Argument

I explore some issues in the logics and dialectics of practical modalities connected with the Consequence Argument (CA) considered as the best argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. According to Lewis (1981) in one of the possible senses of (in)ability, the argument is not valid; however, understood in the other of its possible senses, the argument is not sound. This verdict is based on the assessment of the modal version of the argument, where the crucial notion is power necessity (“no choice” operator), while Lewis analyses the version where the central notion is the locution “cannot render false.”Lewis accepts closure of the relevant (in)ability operator under entailment but not closure under implication. His strategy has a seemingly strange corollary: a free predetermined agent is able (in a strong, causal sense) to falsity the conjunction of history and law. I compare a Moorean position with respect to radical skepticism and knowledge closure with ability closure and propose to explain Lewis’s strategy in the framework of his Moorean stance.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document