From Global Expressivism to Global Pragmatism

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 71-89
Author(s):  
John Capps
Keyword(s):  
Global Expressivism

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

2019 ◽  
Vol 86 ◽  
pp. 133-154
Author(s):  
Huw Price
Keyword(s):  
Global Expressivism ◽  
Canberra Plan ◽  
Error Theories

AbstractIn this piece I characterise global expressivism, as I understand it, by contrasting it with five other views: the so-called Canberra Plan; Moorean non-naturalism and platonism; ‘relaxed realism’ and quietism; local expressivism; and response-dependent realism. Some other familiar positions, including fictionalism, error theories, and idealism, are also mentioned, but as sub-cases to one of these five.

scholarly journals Global expressivism and the flight from metaphysics

Synthese ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 194 (12) ◽  
pp. 4781-4797 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Knowles
Keyword(s):  
Global Expressivism

scholarly journals Price on Expressionism and the Placement Problems

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Daniel Kalpokas
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Category Mistake ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Huw Price ◽  
Global Expressivism ◽  
Moral Facts

Resumen En “Naturalismo sin representacionalismo”, Huw Price propone una variedad de naturalismo –una que él denomina naturalismo del sujeto– que supuestamente puede evitar los problemas de la localización relacionados con entidades “incómodas” como son los hechos morales, los significados, las verdades matemáticas y otras similares. A partir de una concepción expresivista de todo el lenguaje, Price defiende que los problemas de la localización descansan sobre un error categorical: el error consiste en considerar que toda oración representa algún estado de hechos mundano. En nuestro trabajo, a partir de nuestra crítica al expresivismo de Price, cuestionaremos su respuesta a los problemas de la localización. Palabras clave: Naturalismo del sujeto, representacionalismo, expresivismo global, deflacionismo, verdad.  Abstract In his article “Naturalism Without Representationalism”, Price proposes a variety of naturalism –subject naturalism, as he calls it- that is supposedly able to avoid placement problems about “odd” entities such as moral facts, meanings, mathematical truths and the like. Assuming an expressivist conception about the entire language, Price argues that placement problems rest on a category mistake: the mistake of considering all sorts of sentences as representing worldly states of affairs. In this article, by arguing against Price’s expressivism, I call his response to placement problems into question. My thesis is that placement problems are genuine ontological problems.  Key Words: Subject Naturalism, Representationalism, Global Expressivism; Deflationalism; Truth.

Prospects for global expressivism

2013 ◽  
pp. 147-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huw Price ◽  
Huw Price ◽  
Simon Blackburn ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Paul Horwich ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Global Expressivism

Carnapian Voluntarism and Global Expressivism: Reply to Carus

The Monist ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 468-474
Author(s):  
Huw Price
Keyword(s):  
Global Expressivism

Neo-Expressivism: (Self-)Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth

2019 ◽  
Vol 86 ◽  
pp. 11-34
Author(s):  
Dorit Bar-On
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Test Case ◽  
First Person ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Global Expressivism ◽  
Present Tense ◽  
The One ◽  
Metaphysical Status

AbstractPhilosophers are often interested in explaining significant contrasts between ordinary descriptive discourses, on the one hand, and discourses – such as ethics, mathematics, or mentalistic discourse – that are thought to be more problematic in various ways. But certain strategies for ‘saving the differences’ can make it too difficult to preserve notable similarities across discourses. My own preference is for strategies that ‘save the differences’ without sacrificing logico-semantic continuities or committing to deflationism about truth, but also without embracing either truth-pluralism or global expressivism.I motivate my preference by examining, as a test case, mentalistic discourse. I begin by reconstructing three philosophical puzzles that have led philosophers to think of mentalistic discourse as problematic (Section 2). These puzzles concern the semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical status of contrasts between first-person present-tense attributions – ‘avowals’ – and all other ordinary contingent attributions. I then briefly present my own, neo-expressivist strategy for addressing the puzzles (Section 3). Unlike traditional ‘simple expressivism’ (which is the analogue in the mentalistic realm of ethical emotivism), neo-expressivism is not committed to avowals’ being non-truth-apt or having non-propositional meanings. And yet it does not require embracing either deflationism about truth or global expressivism. It preserves continuities between mentalistic and other discourses while allowing us to capture discontinuities. Moreover, it is possible to apply the neo-expressivist framework in other areas where the notion of expression is deemed explanatorily useful, as illustrated by considering ethical neo-expressivism (Section 4). In the final section (5), I make more general comments on truth and meaning and tease out some of the commitments of the approach I advocate.

A Non-substantial Meta-semantics for Global Expressivism

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-514
Author(s):  
Henrik Sova
Keyword(s):  
Global Expressivism
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