Lapsing Quickly into Fatalism: Bell on Backward Causation

This is a dialogue between Huw Price and Travis Norsen, loosely inspired by a letter that Price received from J. S. Bell in 1988. The main topic of discussion is Bell’s views about retrocausal approaches to quantum theory and their relevance to contemporary issues.

Werte beim frühen Carnap: Von den Anfängen bis zum Aufbau

ZusammenfassungDie frühesten Zeugnisse zu Carnaps philosophischer Entwicklung bekunden einen klaren und bewußten Nonkognitivismus, wie vor allem an einem Vortrag aus dem Jahre 1911 gezeigt wird. Wie man weiß, bekannte sich Carnap nach etwa 1929 auch zum Nonkognitivismus, dem er 1963 als erster sogar diesen Namen gab. Zwei Dokumente werden aber manchmal als Gegenbeispiele angeführt, ein nichtveröffentlichter Aufsatz über „Deutschlands Niederlage“ aus dem Jahre 1918, und der skizzenhafte § 152 des Aufbau; es fragt sich also, ob es eine Episode zwischen seinen philosophischen Anfängen und 1929 gab, in der Carnap seinen Nonkognitivismus zeitweise aufgab. Diese Frage wird anhand einer Interpretation dieser zwei Texte verneint. Es wird angedeutet, dass Carnaps Nonkognitivismus von Anfang an sich relativ geradlinig zu einem „Funktionalismus“ im weitesten Sinn entwickelte, in Richtung auf einen „globalen Funktionalismus“ wie ihn heute Huw Price vertritt.

What is Global Expressivism?

Global expressivism is the radical view that we should never think of any of our language and thought as representing the world. While interesting, global expressivism has not yet been clearly formulated, and its defenders often use unexplained terms of art to characterise their view. I fix this problem by carefully and clearly exploring the different ways in which we can interpret globalism. I reject almost all of them either because they are implausible or because they are bad interpretations of actual globalist views. I then argue that the most promising version of globalism, which we can find in the work of Huw Price, turns out to be completely compatible with the view of so-called ‘local’ expressivists. The debate between globalists and localists is therefore empty: the real interest in this topic lies not in this debate but in whether globalism is true and if so what follows from it.

Perspectivism with Objectivity, Causal and Temporal

It has been suggested that the only plausible way to integrate causality in the scientific image of the world is through a subjectivist causal perspectivism. Causation would exist only from the point of view of an agent capable of doing things. The conception of time associated with such causal perspectivism is certain temporal perspectivism that is also subjectivist. Following some ideas of Ramsey, Huw Price is a recent exponent of these approaches, which are rooted in Russell's critique of the notion of causality and in McTaggart’s irrealism about time. We analyze this line of thought and argue for an objectivist interpretation of those perspectivisms. It will be crucial a distinction between perspectives and the subjects capable of adopting them, as well as an analysis of the conditions for adopting perspectives.

The Alternative Conception of Language

Drawing on ideas of Wittgenstein’s and of Merleau-Ponty’s, this chapter presents a conception of language on which the method of cases—even after contextualist amendments—is fundamentally misguided and liable to lead us astray. The alternative conception combines context-sensitivity with pragmatist non-representationalism, or what Huw Price has called “functional pluralism,” while at the same time emphasizing the synchronic and diachronic plasticity of language. Following Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, as well as Austin, it argues that the basic unit of linguistic sense is the speech act, an act wherein a speaker—drawing more or less creatively on the history of her language—positions herself significantly by means of words, in relation to others and in a world shared with others. This sort of positioning is precisely what we do not do—or even so much as simulate—when we give our answers to the theorist’s questions.

Smile When You’re Winning: How to Become a Cambridge Pragmatist

This chapter traces the development of a particular current of thought known by the label ‘pragmatism’ during the last part of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first, and latterly associated with the work of Simon Blackburn and Huw Price. Three questions are addressed. First, how did this current of thought actually develop? Second, does this current of thought constitute a single, coherent, theoretical outlook? Third, does this current of thought constitute an attractive philosophical outlook? In answering these questions, attention is drawn to a tension between the two main proponents of this current of thought, namely the different attitudes they take to the naturalist ‘master narrative’ on which it depends.

Causation, Intervention, and Agency

In his influential book Making Things Happen (2003) and elsewhere, James Woodward has noted some affinities between his own interventionist account of causation and the view defended by Peter Menzies and Huw Price in ‘Causation as a Secondary Quality’ (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1993), but argued that the latter view is implausibly ‘subjective’. This chapter discusses Woodward’s criticisms. It argues (i) that the Menzies and Price view is not as different from Woodward’s own account as he believes; (ii) that insofar as it is different, it has some advantages whose importance Woodward misses; and (iii) that the Menzies and Price view lacks some elements whose importance Woodward rightly stresses. It also argues that when properly characterized, the ‘subjectivity’ of the Menzies and Price view survives unscathed—and that Woodward’s interventionism is stronger for embracing it.

Making a Difference

Making a Difference presents fifteen original essays on causation and counterfactuals by philosophers and political theorists. Collectively, they represent the state of the art on these topics. The essays in this volume are inspired by the work of the late Australian philosopher Peter Menzies (1953–2015), who himself made a very great difference to our contemporary understanding of these matters. Topics covered include: the semantics of counterfactuals, agency theories of causation, the context-sensitivity of causal claims, structural equation models, mechanisms, mental causation, the causal exclusion argument, and free will. Contributors: Helen Beebee, Thomas Blanchard, David Braddon-Mitchell, Rachael Briggs, Nancy Cartwright, Christopher Hitchcock, Christian List, Cei Maslen, Peter Menzies, Daniel Nolan, Philip Pettit, Huw Price, Jonathan Schaffer, Brad Weslake, James Woodward.