Frankfurt in Fake Barn Country

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 529-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Levy
Keyword(s):  
Fake Barn

Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Colaço ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
Stephen Stich
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Fake Barn

Further Insights on Fake-Barn Cases and Intuition Variation

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Carsten Bergenholtz ◽  
Jacob Busch ◽  
Sara Kier Praëm
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Underlying Factor ◽  
Demographic Group ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Group Variation ◽  
Fake Barn

Abstract Studies in experimental philosophy claim to document intuition variation. Some studies focus on demographic group-variation; Colaço et al., for example, claim that age generates intuition variation regarding knowledge attribution in a fake-barn scenario. Other studies claim to show intuition variation when comparing the intuition of philosophers to that of non-philosophers. The main focus has been on documenting intuition variation rather than uncovering what underlying factor(s) may prompt such a phenomenon. We explore a number of suggested explanatory hypotheses put forth by Colaço et al., as well as an attempt to test Sosa's claim that intuition variance is a result of people ‘filling in the details’ of a thought experiment differently from one another. We show (i) that people respond consistently across conditions aimed at ‘filling in the details’ of thought experiments, (ii) that risk attitude does not seem relevant to knowledge ascription, (iii) that people's knowledge ascriptions do not vary due to views about defeasibility of knowledge. Yet, (iv) we find no grounds to reject that a large proportion of people appear to adhere to so-called subjectivism about knowledge, which may explain why they generally have intuitions about the fake-barn scenario that vary from those of philosophers.

scholarly journals UNREFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY

Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Difficult Problem ◽  
Knowledge Claim ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Is Success ◽  
The Core ◽  
Types Of Knowledge ◽  
Fake Barn ◽  
Lack Of Knowledge

AbstractVirtue epistemological accounts of knowledge claim that knowledge is a species of a broader normative category, to wit of success from ability. Fake Barn cases pose a difficult problem for such accounts. In structurally analogous but non-epistemic cases, the agents attain the relevant success from ability. If knowledge is just another form of success from ability, the pressure is on to treat Fake Barn cases as cases of knowledge. The challenge virtue epistemology faces is to explain the intuitive lack of knowledge in Fake Barn cases, whilst holding on to the core claim that knowledge is success from ability. Ernest Sosa's version of virtue epistemology promises to rise to this challenge. Sosa distinguishes two types of knowledge, animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. He argues that while animal knowledge is present in Fake Barn cases, reflective knowledge is absent and ventures to explain the intuition of ignorance by the absence of reflective knowledge. This paper argues that Sosa's treatment of Fake Barn cases fails as it commits Sosa to a number of highly counterintuitive results elsewhere in epistemology.

scholarly journals Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology

2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (125) ◽  
pp. 47-62
Author(s):  
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Complete Answer ◽  
Fake Barn Case ◽  
Fake Barn

Ernest Sosa’s latest epistemology remains a version of virtue epistemology, and I argue here that it faces two central problems, pressing a point I have made elsewhere, that virtue epistemology does not present a complete answer to the problem of the value of knowledge. I will press this point regarding the nature of knowledge through variations on two standard Gettier examples here. The first is the Fake Barn case and the second is the Tom Grabit case. I will argue that Sosa’s latest virtue epistemology fails to handle either case acceptably, and that as a result, cannot explain the value that knowledge has over that of the sum of any of its proper subparts.

scholarly journals Knowledge attributions in iterated fake barn cases

Analysis ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Fake Barn

Contextualism and the Problem of Knowledge Ascription

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 110-126
Author(s):  
Ekaterina V. Vostrikova ◽  
Petr S. Kusliy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Compositional Semantics ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Contextualist Approach ◽  
Fake Barn

The paper explores the contextualist approach towards the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. The authors discuss the relevance of these studies in semantics for the major issues in virtue epistemology. It is argued that despite the advantages that contextualism has over its alternatives (in particular, relativism and subject sensitive invariablisism), it still requires a more elaborated compositional semantics that it currently has. We review several concrete contextualsit proposals to the semantics of the verb know in light of their applicability to the well-known type of examples known as the fake barn example, point out some of their particular shortcomings, and propose a revision, which represents a variant of D. Lewis’s general approach to the semantics of know.

scholarly journals Knowledge Attributions in Iterated Fake Barn Cases

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Strong Tendency ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Behavioural Experiment ◽  
Ordinary Knowledge ◽  
Fake Barn Case ◽  
Fake Barn

In a single-iteration fake barn case, the agent correctly identifies an object of interest on the first try, despite the presence of nearby lookalikes that could have mislead her. In a multiple-iteration fake barn case, the agent first encounters several fakes, misidentifies each of them, and then encounters and correctly identifies a genuine item of interest. Prior work has established that people tend to attribute knowledge in single-iteration fake barn cases, but multiple-iteration cases have not been tested. However, some theorists contend that multiple-iteration cases are more important and will elicit a strong tendency to deny knowledge. Here I report a behavioural experiment investigating knowledge judgments in multiple-iteration fake barn cases. The main finding is that people tend to attribute knowledge in these cases too. Ironically, the results indicate that the presence of fakes could prevent iterated errors from lowering knowledge attributions. The results also provide evidence that ordinary knowledge attributions are based on attributions of cognitive ability.

KNOWING WHAT'S NOT UP THE ROAD BY SEEING WHAT'S RIGHT IN FRONT OF YOU: EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM'S FAKE BARN PROBLEM

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-412
Author(s):  
Michael Veber
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
The Road ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
Fake Barn

ABSTRACTEpistemological Disjunctivism (ED) is the view that rational support for paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge that P comes from seeing that P – a state that is both factive and reflectively accessible. ED has the consequence that if I see that there is a barn before me, I can thereby be in a position to know that I am not in fake barn country. It is argued that this is a problem. The problem is distinct from familiar complaints about Neo-Mooreanism and easy knowledge. Potential ways of avoiding this problem are proposed. It is argued that they do not succeed. There is a way out of ED's fake barn problem but many will likely find it inhospitable.

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