scholarly journals Knowledge Attributions in Iterated Fake Barn Cases

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Fake Barn

scholarly journals Knowledge attributions in iterated fake barn cases

Analysis ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Fake Barn

scholarly journals Knowledge Attributions in Iterated Fake Barn Cases

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Strong Tendency ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Behavioural Experiment ◽  
Ordinary Knowledge ◽  
Fake Barn Case ◽  
Fake Barn

In a single-iteration fake barn case, the agent correctly identifies an object of interest on the first try, despite the presence of nearby lookalikes that could have mislead her. In a multiple-iteration fake barn case, the agent first encounters several fakes, misidentifies each of them, and then encounters and correctly identifies a genuine item of interest. Prior work has established that people tend to attribute knowledge in single-iteration fake barn cases, but multiple-iteration cases have not been tested. However, some theorists contend that multiple-iteration cases are more important and will elicit a strong tendency to deny knowledge. Here I report a behavioural experiment investigating knowledge judgments in multiple-iteration fake barn cases. The main finding is that people tend to attribute knowledge in these cases too. Ironically, the results indicate that the presence of fakes could prevent iterated errors from lowering knowledge attributions. The results also provide evidence that ordinary knowledge attributions are based on attributions of cognitive ability.

Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Colaço ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
Stephen Stich
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Fake Barn

Human Fallibility and Fallibilism about Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Brown
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Concessive Knowledge Attributions ◽  
To Come ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Threshold Problem

This chapter distinguishes between fallibilism and infallibilism by appeal to entailment: infallibilists hold that knowledge that p requires evidence which entails that p; fallibilists deny that. It outlines some of the recent motivations for infallibilism, including the infelicity of concessive knowledge attributions, the threshold problem, closure, and the knowledge norm of practical reasoning. Further, we see how contemporary infallibilists attempt to avoid scepticism by appeal either to a generous conception of evidence or a shifty view of knowledge, such as contextualism. The chapter explains the book’s focus on non-shifty versions of infallibilism which defend a generous conception of evidence. It ends by defending the entailment definition of infallibilism over other potential definitions, and outlining the chapters to come.

Further Insights on Fake-Barn Cases and Intuition Variation

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Carsten Bergenholtz ◽  
Jacob Busch ◽  
Sara Kier Praëm
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Underlying Factor ◽  
Demographic Group ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Group Variation ◽  
Fake Barn

Abstract Studies in experimental philosophy claim to document intuition variation. Some studies focus on demographic group-variation; Colaço et al., for example, claim that age generates intuition variation regarding knowledge attribution in a fake-barn scenario. Other studies claim to show intuition variation when comparing the intuition of philosophers to that of non-philosophers. The main focus has been on documenting intuition variation rather than uncovering what underlying factor(s) may prompt such a phenomenon. We explore a number of suggested explanatory hypotheses put forth by Colaço et al., as well as an attempt to test Sosa's claim that intuition variance is a result of people ‘filling in the details’ of a thought experiment differently from one another. We show (i) that people respond consistently across conditions aimed at ‘filling in the details’ of thought experiments, (ii) that risk attitude does not seem relevant to knowledge ascription, (iii) that people's knowledge ascriptions do not vary due to views about defeasibility of knowledge. Yet, (iv) we find no grounds to reject that a large proportion of people appear to adhere to so-called subjectivism about knowledge, which may explain why they generally have intuitions about the fake-barn scenario that vary from those of philosophers.

Knowledge, belief, and moral psychology

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Mikhail
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Representations ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Strong Case ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
The Law

Abstract Phillips et al. make a strong case that knowledge representations should play a larger role in cognitive science. Their arguments are reinforced by comparable efforts to place moral knowledge, rather than moral beliefs, at the heart of a naturalistic moral psychology. Conscience, Kant's synthetic a priori, and knowledge attributions in the law all point in a similar direction.

Usage Traps in the Language of Iterated Knowledge Attributions

2020 ◽  
pp. 171-205
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Ground Floor ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Knowledge State

How we easily slip between metacognitive thought and assertion and ground-floor thought and assertion is illustrated; how, as a result, we easily confuse the two is also illustrated. “Do you know the time?” is often speaker-meant merely as a request for information as opposed to what it literally conveys, a question about the auditor’s knowledge state. Distinctions between having concepts, grasping one’s own concepts, and metacognizing one’s propositional attitudes (in various ways) are distinguished. Why it is so easy to confuse being aware of being in pain and being in pain is explained; that it seems it isn’t possible to be in pain without being aware of it illustrates metacognitive confusions. Similarly, kinds of justifications are distinguished that are often confused, ones that involve metacognition and ones that don’t. How “level confusions” bedevil philosophical arguments is illustrated.

Knowledge Attributions to Minimal Epistemic Agents

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-82
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Two Agents ◽  
Driverless Cars ◽  
Sensory Evidence ◽  
Usage Data

Widespread usage data for “know,” “learn,” “see,” “remember,” and other epistemic words are given. Such words are routinely and literally applied to animals ranging from sophisticated elephants and orcas to insects like ants and honeybees to nonconscious mechanisms like driverless cars, drones, and thermostats. Further, “S knows p” places no constraints on the agent S vis-à-vis the concepts exhibited in p: Rover need not have the concept of “cat” to know that a cat is trapped above him in a tree. How this data shows that a knowing agent need not know much, need not be self-conscious of what she knows, and need not be conscious or capable of metacognition is described. The modularity of agential knowledge is characterized: two agents may have the same sensory evidence for p, and yet one can know p while the other doesn’t because of other aspects of their methods for establishing p.

scholarly journals The Disappearance of Ignorance

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-20
Author(s):  
Robin McKenna
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Skeptical Problem

Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism. Where latter focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, the former focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of (and solution to) some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRose’s view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. First, it must explain how it is that we can know lots of things, such as that we have hands. Second, it must explain how it can seem that we don’t know these things. In slogan form, DeRose’s argument is that a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is needed to account for the “appearance of ignorance”—the appearance that we don’t know that skeptical hypotheses fail to obtain. In my critical discussion, I will argue inter alia that we don’t need a contextualist semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the “strength” of the appearance of ignorance is unclear, as is the need for a philosophical diagnosis of it.

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