19. Actions under the rule of Rylands v Fletcher

This chapter examines the rule from Rylands v Fletcher [1868]. The rule holds that where there has been an escape of a dangerous thing in the course of a non-natural use of land, the occupier of that land is liable for the damage to another caused as a result of the escape, irrespective of fault. The rule today is best understood through a trilogy of cases: Rylands v Fletcher, Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] and Transco v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004]. The development of the rule has led to an increased overlap with ideas from nuisance and negligence.

18. Trespass to land and nuisance

This chapter examines torts of trespass to land and nuisance. Trespass to land is concerned with direct harm, and the tort’s primary importance is the protection of property rights. Harm in this context does not necessarily mean actual damage to the land concerned. The harm lies in the fact that land owned by one party has been unjustifiably interfered with by another. Private nuisance deals with indirect and unreasonable interferences to land, including what might be called consequential interferences resulting from a direct action. Private nuisance regulates relationships and conflicts between neighbours, defining their mutual rights and obligations with respect to land use. Many aspects of the law of nuisance, including determining whether an injunction or damages is the appropriate remedy, have recently been clarified by the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence [2014].

16. Invasion of privacy

This chapter examines the nascent ‘tort’ of invasion of privacy. It first considers why no free-standing tort of invasion of privacy exists, before looking at breach of confidence—a legal concept straddling tort and equity and concerned with ‘secrets’ and judicially adapted to protect privacy by developing the new tort of misuse of private information. The chapter then asks whether developments in the law protecting privacy—particularly in the wake of the Human Rights Act 1998—threaten freedom of expression and therefore the general public’s ‘right’ to information, particularly about celebrities, including royalty and politicians.

15. Intentional interferences with the person

This chapter examines intentional interferences with the person, including the torts comprising trespass to the person—battery, assault and false imprisonment—the tort in Wilkinson v Downton [1897], and the statutory tort of harassment. The trespass to the person torts seek to protect an individual against an infringement of their personal or bodily integrity, that is, against the infliction, or fearing the infliction, of unlawful force (battery and assault) and the unlawful restriction of a person’s freedom of movement (false imprisonment). The three trespass to the person torts have the same characteristics: the defendant must have intended both the conduct itself and consequences of their action; the defendant’s action must cause direct and immediate harm; and they are actionable per se, that is, without proof of loss. The chapter also considers the tort in Wilkinson v Downton, which provides a remedy for physical and psychiatric harm deliberately caused by a false statement, and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which imposes both civil and criminal liability for harassing conduct.

12. Product liability

This chapter discusses the ways in which liability for defective products is regulated in tort law and which is primarily regulated by statute. The chapter considers manufacturers’ liability in negligence and the problems claimants may encounter when trying to sue. This leads to a later development relating to product liability—the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) 1987—enacted to ensure better protection of consumers from defective goods by making producers strictly liable for harms caused by the products they market. However, a claimant may still claim in negligence due to the statutory limitations in relation to certain types of claim.

2. Introduction to the tort of negligence

The chapter begins by mapping and explaining the historical development of the tort of negligence, and some of the key themes underpinning the tort, before placing the discussion in the context of the modern law of negligence. The chapter then outlines the essential ingredients of a claim in negligence—a duty of care, a breach of that duty and the damage caused by that breach—before going on to explore these in practice through a close examination of the first instance judgment in X & Y v London Borough of Hounslow [2008].

20. Vicarious liability

This chapter examines the principle of vicarious liability, a form of secondary liability through which employers may, in certain circumstances, be liable for the torts of their employees, even though the employer themselves may be entirely blameless. The imposition of vicarious liability is one of the most important exceptions to the general approach of the common law whereby liability for any wrongdoing is imposed on, and only on, the wrongdoer(s). A defendant will not be vicariously liable unless the following conditions are met: (a) there is an employer–employee relationship between the defendant and the person for whose actions they are being held liable; (b) the employee committed the tortious act while acting in the course of their employment.

13. Employers’ liability

This chapter discusses employers’ liability and, in particular, the non-delegable duty of care, which employers owe to their employees to ensure that they are reasonably safe when at work. The duty ensures that an employer remains responsible for key tasks even when their obligations have been delegated to another. The duty of care is typically said to have four components (building on Lord Wright’s statement in Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd [1938]) comprising the provision of: a competent workforce; adequate material and equipment; a safe system of working (including effective supervision); and a safe workplace.

11. Occupiers’ liability

This chapter discusses occupiers’ liability, which deals with the risks posed, and harms caused, by dangerous places and buildings. In such cases, the occupier of the premises may be liable where a person who comes onto their land is injured in or by unsafe premises if the occupier has not taken reasonable care to ensure that those entering are safe. The general principles of negligence have been incorporated into, and modified by, statute in the form of the Occupiers’ Liability Acts 1957 and 1984. Although the Acts define the circumstances in which a duty of care will be owed (and tell us something as to its extent, as well as matters relating to its discharge and limitation), questions of breach and causation still need to be established by reference to the ordinary principles of negligence.

4. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

This chapter examines the two separate but closely linked concepts of liability for omissions and for the actions of third parties. The first section considers when and why the courts have established that a duty of care should be owed by defendants when the harm was the result of their omission, and the second explores the situations when a defendant may owe a duty in relation to the action(s) of a third party. Ordinarily you can be liable only for things that you do, but when someone does not do something that they ought to have done a duty might be found. Similarly, while it appears odd that someone may be liable for harms that someone else caused, the courts have nonetheless found that in limited circumstances people who have responsibility for, or control over, others may incur a duty in respect of the harms caused by these third parties.