scholarly journals Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 316-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bettina Rockenbach ◽  
Irenaeus Wolff
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Design Process ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Individual Contribution ◽  
Rule Sets ◽  
Over Time

Abstract Considerable experimental evidence has been collected on rules enhancing contributions in public goods dilemmas. These studies either confront subjects with prespecified rules or have subjects choose between different rule environments. In this paper, we completely endogenize the institution design process by asking subjects to design and repeatedly improve rule sets for a public goods problem in order to investigate which rules social planners facing a social dilemma ‘invent’ and how these rules develop over time. We make several noteworthy observations, in particular the strong and successful use of framing, the concealment of individual contribution information and the decreasing use of punishment.

Gossip and Reputation in Social Dilemmas

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-213
Author(s):  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interaction Partner ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
The Individual

In a social dilemma the interest of the individual is in conflict with that of the group. However, individuals will help their group, if they gain in reputation that pays off later. Future partners can observe cooperative or defective behavior or, more likely, hear about it through gossip. In Indirect Reciprocity games, Public Goods games, and Trust games gossip may be the only information a participant can use to decide whether she can trust her interaction partner and give away her holdings hoping for reciprocation. Even the mere potential for gossip can increase trust and trustworthiness thus promoting cooperation. Gossip is a cheap mechanism for disciplining free riders, potentially even extortioners. The temptation for manipulative gossip defines the gossiper’s dilemma. Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity help to avoid being manipulated. The danger of false gossip is reduced when multiple gossips exist.

Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas

2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elinor Ostrom
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Robust Solutions ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Graduated Sanctions ◽  
Over Time

AbstractGuala raises important questions about the misinterpretation of experimental studies that have found that subjects engage in costly punishment. Instead of positing that punishment is the solution for social dilemmas, earlier research posited that when individuals facing a social dilemma agreed on their own rules and used graduated sanctions, they were more likely to have robust solutions over time.

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

Coalition Formation and Selectorate Theory: An Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-275
Author(s):  
Andrew W. Bausch
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Target Individual ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Over Time

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine how different rules for re-selecting the leader of a group affects how that leader builds a winning coalition. Leaders play an inter-group game and then distribute winnings from that game within their group before standing for re-selection. The results of the experiment show that leaders of groups with large winning coalition systems rely heavily on distributing winnings through public goods, while leaders of groups with small winning coalition systems are more likely to target specific citizens with private goods. Furthermore, the experiment shows that supporters of small coalition leaders benefit from that support in future rounds by receiving more private goods than citizens that did not support the leader. Meanwhile, citizens that support a large coalition leader do not benefit from this support in future rounds. Therefore, small coalition leaders target individual citizens to maintain a coalition over time in a way not possible in a group with a large winning coalition. Finally, in the experiment, small coalition leaders increased their payoffs over time, suggesting that once power has been consolidated, small coalition leaders narrow their coalition.

Coördinatie tussen individuen en tussen teams: over het belang van inzicht in sociale dilemma's

2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjolein de Best-Waldhober ◽  
Carsten K.W. De Dreu ◽  
Daan van Knippenberg
Keyword(s):  
Term Structure ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Turn Taking ◽  
Group Negotiation

Coordination between individuals and between teams: the importance of insight in social dilemmas Coordination between individuals and between teams: the importance of insight in social dilemmas Marjolein de Best-Waldhober, Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Daan van Knippenberg, Gedrag & Organisatie, Volume 17, June 2004, nr. 3, pp. 187-203. In the context of a social dilemma, in which turn taking serves collective outcomes and only in the long run self-interest and personal outcomes, we studied long-term coordination, i.e. the alternation of sacrifice to achieve maximum joint outcomes. In particular, we studied the differences between individuals and dyads (two person groups) in coordination situations. Recent studies that compared individual with group negotiation seem to lead to opposite predictions. One paradigm predicts groups will perform better, because they outweigh individuals cognitively. The other paradigm predicts individuals will perform better, because they tend to have less fear and greed than groups. Results from the current study primarily support the first explanation. Dyads were less influenced by the complexity of the situation structure than individuals, because they have a better understanding of the long term structure of the situation.

scholarly journals Hierarchy, power, and strategies to promote cooperation in social dilemmas [pre-print]

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Junhui Wu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. Then how is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

2007 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 901-927 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Lange ◽  
John A. List ◽  
Michael K. Price
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Evidence
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