scholarly journals Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule

Games ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 52
Author(s):  
Yukihiko Funaki ◽  
Jiawen Li ◽  
Róbert Veszteg
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
Institution Formation

scholarly journals Incomplete punishment networks in public goods games: experimental evidence

2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Leibbrandt ◽  
Abhijit Ramalingam ◽  
Lauri Sääksvuori ◽  
James M. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Public Goods Games

scholarly journals Institution Formation in Public Goods Games

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (4) ◽  
pp. 1335-1355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kosfeld ◽  
Akira Okada ◽  
Arno Riedl
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Formation Process ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Institution Formation ◽  
Group Welfare ◽  
Endogenous Formation

Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)

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