Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas

2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elinor Ostrom
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Robust Solutions ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Graduated Sanctions ◽  
Over Time

AbstractGuala raises important questions about the misinterpretation of experimental studies that have found that subjects engage in costly punishment. Instead of positing that punishment is the solution for social dilemmas, earlier research posited that when individuals facing a social dilemma agreed on their own rules and used graduated sanctions, they were more likely to have robust solutions over time.

scholarly journals Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 316-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bettina Rockenbach ◽  
Irenaeus Wolff
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Design Process ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Individual Contribution ◽  
Rule Sets ◽  
Over Time

Abstract Considerable experimental evidence has been collected on rules enhancing contributions in public goods dilemmas. These studies either confront subjects with prespecified rules or have subjects choose between different rule environments. In this paper, we completely endogenize the institution design process by asking subjects to design and repeatedly improve rule sets for a public goods problem in order to investigate which rules social planners facing a social dilemma ‘invent’ and how these rules develop over time. We make several noteworthy observations, in particular the strong and successful use of framing, the concealment of individual contribution information and the decreasing use of punishment.

Advertising in disguise? How disclosure and content features influence the effects of native advertising

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-324
Author(s):  
Johannes Beckert ◽  
Thomas Koch ◽  
Benno Viererbl ◽  
Nora Denner ◽  
Christina Peter
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Brand Attitudes ◽  
News Websites ◽  
Short And Long Term ◽  
Message Sidedness ◽  
Over Time

AbstractNative advertising has recently become a prominent buzzword for advertisers and publishers alike. It describes advertising formats which closely adapt their form and style to the editorial environment they appear in, intending to hide the commercial character of these ads. In two experimental studies, we test how advertising disclosures in native ads on news websites affect recipients’ attitudes towards a promoted brand in a short and long-term perspective. In addition, we explore persuasion through certain content features (i. e., message sidedness and use of exemplars) and how they affect disclosure effects. Results show that disclosures increase perceived persuasive intent but do not necessarily decrease brand attitudes. However, disclosure effects do not persist over time and remain unaffected by content features.

Coördinatie tussen individuen en tussen teams: over het belang van inzicht in sociale dilemma's

2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjolein de Best-Waldhober ◽  
Carsten K.W. De Dreu ◽  
Daan van Knippenberg
Keyword(s):  
Term Structure ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Turn Taking ◽  
Group Negotiation

Coordination between individuals and between teams: the importance of insight in social dilemmas Coordination between individuals and between teams: the importance of insight in social dilemmas Marjolein de Best-Waldhober, Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Daan van Knippenberg, Gedrag & Organisatie, Volume 17, June 2004, nr. 3, pp. 187-203. In the context of a social dilemma, in which turn taking serves collective outcomes and only in the long run self-interest and personal outcomes, we studied long-term coordination, i.e. the alternation of sacrifice to achieve maximum joint outcomes. In particular, we studied the differences between individuals and dyads (two person groups) in coordination situations. Recent studies that compared individual with group negotiation seem to lead to opposite predictions. One paradigm predicts groups will perform better, because they outweigh individuals cognitively. The other paradigm predicts individuals will perform better, because they tend to have less fear and greed than groups. Results from the current study primarily support the first explanation. Dyads were less influenced by the complexity of the situation structure than individuals, because they have a better understanding of the long term structure of the situation.

scholarly journals Self-organizing dominance hierarchies in a wild primate population

2015 ◽  
Vol 282 (1814) ◽  
pp. 20151512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Franz ◽  
Emily McLean ◽  
Jenny Tung ◽  
Jeanne Altmann ◽  
Susan C. Alberts
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Social Dynamics ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Self Organization ◽  
Social Self ◽  
Dominance Hierarchies ◽  
Change Over Time ◽  
Winner And Loser Effects ◽  
The Social ◽  
Over Time

Linear dominance hierarchies, which are common in social animals, can profoundly influence access to limited resources, reproductive opportunities and health. In spite of their importance, the mechanisms that govern the dynamics of such hierarchies remain unclear. Two hypotheses explain how linear hierarchies might emerge and change over time. The ‘prior attributes hypothesis’ posits that individual differences in fighting ability directly determine dominance ranks. By contrast, the ‘social dynamics hypothesis’ posits that dominance ranks emerge from social self-organization dynamics such as winner and loser effects. While the prior attributes hypothesis is well supported in the literature, current support for the social dynamics hypothesis is limited to experimental studies that artificially eliminate or minimize individual differences in fighting abilities. Here, we present the first evidence supporting the social dynamics hypothesis in a wild population. Specifically, we test for winner and loser effects on male hierarchy dynamics in wild baboons, using a novel statistical approach based on the Elo rating method for cardinal rank assignment, which enables the detection of winner and loser effects in uncontrolled group settings. Our results demonstrate (i) the presence of winner and loser effects, and (ii) that individual susceptibility to such effects may have a genetic basis. Taken together, our results show that both social self-organization dynamics and prior attributes can combine to influence hierarchy dynamics even when agonistic interactions are strongly influenced by differences in individual attributes. We hypothesize that, despite variation in individual attributes, winner and loser effects exist (i) because these effects could be particularly beneficial when fighting abilities in other group members change over time, and (ii) because the coevolution of prior attributes and winner and loser effects maintains a balance of both effects.

scholarly journals COMMUTER BRIDGE

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ugo Merlone ◽  
Angelo Romano
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Second Phase ◽  
Strategic Reasoning ◽  
Two Phases

Background. COMMUTER BRIDGE is a n-person social dilemma game that allows participants to experience situations in which individual rationality leads to collective disaster. Aim. Participants are asked to imagine they are commuters who must every day reach a place in the shortest possible time. Method. The game is divided in two phases: in the first phase, participants can choose between two routes whereas in the second phase they are given a third possibility by the construction of a bridge that, paradoxically, increases traffic. Results and conclusion. Participating in this activity will enhance understanding of social dilemmas, help discover the limitations of communications, and develop insights about personal fallacies in strategic reasoning.

Cooperation in Microcredit Borrowing Groups: Identity, Sanctions, and Reciprocity in the Production of Collective Goods

2005 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 496-515 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denise Anthony
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Group Identity ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Theoretical Concept ◽  
Access To Credit ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Distinct Process ◽  
Natural Laboratory ◽  
Over Time

Cooperation to produce collective goods is widespread in society, and yet so is its failure. Theorists have identified competing mechanisms for facilitating group cooperation, including group identity, sanctions and reciprocity. Here I use empirical data to explore how these mechanisms influence cooperation in the natural laboratory of microcredit borrowing groups. Microcredit makes loans to high-risk borrowers through borrowing groups in which individuals' access to credit is dependent on the behavior of other members of the group, thereby creating a social dilemma for members and an opportunity to observe cooperation in real world groups. By analyzing both collective goods production (loans) and compliance (repayment), I find that the competing mechanisms have differential effects. Group identity, sanctions and reciprocity are all associated with more borrowing in the group. Only reciprocity, however, limits loan delinquency and is associated with group longevity, suggesting both that collective goods production is a distinct process from group compliance over time, and that reciprocity may be an important mechanism in both processes. I discuss how these findings contribute to our understanding of group cooperation, as well as the implications for the related theoretical concept of embeddedness.

Using the Braess Paradox to Teach Tacit Negotiation

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 780-795 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ugo Merlone ◽  
Angelo Romano
Keyword(s):  
Educational Games ◽  
Sustainable Use ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Personal Interest ◽  
Braess Paradox ◽  
The Core ◽  
Negotiation Game ◽  
Core Concepts ◽  
Negotiation Literature

Background. Social dilemmas are situations in which following personal interest leads to collective disasters. Pollution, tropical deforestation, and the sustainable use of natural resources, can be characterized as examples of social dilemmas. In the negotiation literature, social dilemmas are known as tacit negotiations as individuals negotiate through moves rather than verbal communication. These negotiations are difficult to manage because of the absence of binding contracts and the interdependent nature of decisions of the parties involved. Therefore, it is important for participants to learn from activities addressing these issues. Although several negotiation exercises are available, it is difficult to find educational games or simulations specifically devised to allow several participants to face social dilemmas. Purpose. In this article, we present a negotiation game based on a well-known social dilemma, the Braess paradox. The Braess paradox has been observed in many real situations and is particularly suited to highlight the core concepts of social dilemmas. Approach. We will review the main negotiation activities focusing on the number ofparticipants they are implemented for. Then we will present an activity which allows to accommodate up to thirty participants and allows them to understand some interesting aspects of social dilemmas. Findings. Through the lessons gained by experiential learning, and the discussions emerging during debriefing, this activity may provide participants with a better understanding of urgent real problems.

Trust and Social Dilemmas

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen S. Cook ◽  
Bogdan State
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Environmental Issues ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Health Related

This chapter explores the linkages between trust and cooperation in social dilemmas. In the typical social dilemma individuals do not know what others will do, thus they must make assumptions about the likelihood that others will cooperate. This judgment is sometimes made on the basis of the presumed trustworthiness of the others involved, and, if so, trust makes cooperation possible. However, there are other mechanisms at work. This chapter considers when trust facilitates cooperation and when other factors are more likely to. In addition it discusses briefly the nature of the applications of work on trust and social dilemmas to a wide range of phenomena focusing on collective action in relation to corruption, systems of taxation, environmental issues, and health-related dilemmas as well as those that arise in the sharing economy. It ends with speculation about the potential for solutions of social dilemmas to improve trust in society.

Social dilemmas in knowledge sharing: an examination of the interplay between knowledge sharing culture and performance climate

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashari Halisah ◽  
Sharmila Jayasingam ◽  
Thurasamy Ramayah ◽  
Simona Popa
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Goal Congruence ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Working Adults ◽  
Moderation Model ◽  
And Performance ◽  
And Behavior

Purpose Knowledge sharing culture and performance climate are organizational interventions used by organizations to influence and shape employees’ attitudes and behavior toward knowledge sharing. While each strategy directly influences employees to respond accordingly, the interplay between the incongruent objectives of these two strategies could lead to social dilemmas in knowledge sharing. This study aims to understand social dilemmas in knowledge sharing due to the interaction between knowledge sharing culture and performance climate. Design/methodology/approach An experimental study using the vignette technique was performed on 240 working adults. ANOVA was conducted to examine the interplay effect between knowledge sharing culture and performance climate on knowledge sharing intention. Findings Results showed that performance climate moderates the effect of knowledge sharing culture on employees’ knowledge sharing intention. The findings highlight the importance of having goal congruence between knowledge sharing culture and performance climate to minimize the social dilemmas in knowledge sharing. Originality/value This study develops a moderation model based on the theory of social dilemma to investigate the interaction between knowledge sharing culture and performance climate and enhance the theoretical validity and exactness of the knowledge sharing literature. The findings from this study provide theoretical insights and practical implications for social dilemmas in knowledge sharing, as well as the foundation for continuous research into knowledge sharing and people management practices that may have a strong influence on employees’ knowledge sharing behavior, attitude and performance.

scholarly journals Retrospective Review of the Drop in Observer Detection Performance Over Time in Lesion-enriched Experimental Studies

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sian Taylor-Phillips ◽  
Markus C. Elze ◽  
Elizabeth A. Krupinski ◽  
Kathryn Dennick ◽  
Alastair G. Gale ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Retrospective Review ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Detection Performance ◽  
Over Time
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document